RISK-WP-0001-T07: rule on what was waiting outside the register

Four in as findings — tenant-engine unfiltered event read (high),
audit-core read path bounded by a flag not by code (medium), apps-pg with
no backup at all (high, escalated on spend), and the unverified tenant
boundary itself (high now, critical at production, escalated on
ownership, fix_owner deliberately unset). Two out as notes — noisy
neighbours and erasure-versus-audit, both real, neither changing a
decision this month, both carrying an event to be re-read at.

The round amended the scale twice: build mode lowers impact as well as
likelihood, and non-adversarial findings get their own likelihood
reading. The escalation rule gained a ratio test that distinguishes a
first sweep from steady-state intake, and a batching rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

findings/RISK-F-0007-unverified-tenant-boundary.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+---
+id: RISK-F-0007
+type: finding
+title: "No consumer's tenant boundary is verified anywhere"
+status: open
+reported_by: net-kingdom
+reported_via: risk-nexus
+routed_by: risk-nexus
+date_reported: "2026-08-19"
+date_filed: "2026-08-19"
+system: estate
+environment: build
+fix_owner: unset
+fix_tracking: unset
+related: [RISK-F-0004, RISK-F-0005]
+# Graded by risk-nexus 2026-08-19 — docs/rulings/2026-08-19-second-grading.md
+severity: high
+severity_at_production: critical
+impact: I3
+likelihood: L3
+fidelity_modifier: false
+production_rescore: true
+disclosure: embargoed
+embargo_condition: "a verification exists for at least one consumer boundary"
+embargo_since: "2026-08-19"
+embargo_review: "2026-09-18"
+escalation: required
+escalation_trigger: 4
+escalation_status: pending-operator
+last_reviewed: "2026-08-19"
+review_by: "2026-09-18"
+graded_by: risk-nexus
+ruling: RISK-RULING-2026-08-19-B
+---
+
+# RISK-F-0007 — nothing checks that tenants stay apart
+
+## What is true
+
+No consumer's tenant boundary is verified anywhere in the estate. This is
+Broken Object Level Authorization, first on the OWASP API Security Top 10
+since that list launched.
+
+It is currently **open question 3 in NetKingdom's *Tenancy Posture*, which is a
+draft and not a register** — which is precisely why `INTENT.md` names it as the
+thing that had nowhere to live. Filing it here does not amend that standard,
+does not ratify it, and does not settle the question it poses. A finding may
+say a standard is wrong; it cannot change one.
+
+## Why it is a finding and not a research note
+
+The floor asks whether an owner could act and whether recording it changes a
+decision. Both are yes, and the second is now demonstrable rather than
+asserted: every time a repo has looked at its own boundary this month, it has
+found a defect. `RISK-F-0004` (`tenant-engine`, unfiltered event read) and
+`RISK-F-0005` (`audit-core`, no tenant filter on read) are two instances found
+by two repos in one round.
+
+An absent verification is not the same as an absent boundary. But the sample so
+far is two for two, and the register does not get to assume the unexamined
+cases are better than the examined ones.
+
+## What is not established
+
+- Whether any consumer boundary *is* in fact correct. Nobody has checked; that
+  is the finding.
+- Who owns the fix. `fix_owner` is `unset` deliberately — see the escalation.
+
+## Register ruling — 2026-08-19
+
+`high` today (`I3` × `L3`), `critical` at production, embargoed, **escalated on
+trigger 4 (ownership)**.
+
+Today's impact is `I3` and not `I4` because there is no real tenant data behind
+the unverified boundary yet; the consequence of one occurrence is bounded by
+what the estate is currently holding. `L3`: no additional step is needed by
+anything already inside, and the two confirmed instances say the reach is real
+rather than theoretical.
+
+`production_rescore: true`, and this is the finding that matters most on that
+day: at production the same defect is `I4` × `L3` — `critical` — and the
+re-score is not optional.
+
+**Escalation, trigger 4.** This is the ownership case the trigger was written
+for, in its purest form: the defect is estate-wide, no repo owns "every
+consumer's boundary", and a routing exchange cannot settle it because there is
+nobody to route it to. Only the operator can say who verifies tenant
+boundaries — a repo, a test suite, a review obligation on each consumer — or
+that the estate deliberately carries it unverified until production.
+
+Until that is answered, `fix_owner` stays `unset` rather than being assigned to
+a repo that has not accepted it. An unowned finding with an honest `unset` is
+better than a routed one nobody agreed to.
+
+## Reviews
+
+- **2026-08-19** — filed and graded. Open at review: has an owner been named;
+  have any further instances been found; is the Tenancy Posture question still
+  open.