The inbox round: two grades corrected, one note promoted

Read the repo inbox after grading, which is the wrong order and is now
recorded as such. flex-auth had answered the NetworkPolicy question on
2026-08-18 (narrow ingress, not default-deny — L3 becomes L2, critical
becomes high) and reported RISK-F-0001 fixed at 12:35 today with live 401
probes. F-0001 closes fixed and public; its escalation is withdrawn
before it was ever sent. RISK-F-0002's ordering constraint lifts with it
and its trigger-6 escalation is withdrawn.

audit-core had routed the erasure-versus-audit legal question here on
2026-08-18 asking for an owner. RISK-N-0002 was wrong to call it a note:
the remedy is not retrofittable, so the decision can only be taken early.
Promoted to RISK-F-0008, owned by this repo as regulatory intake,
escalated on trigger 2.

Accepted rapp-postgres's record format and ops-warden's typed-act
escalation vocabulary. Reading the inbox is now question zero of every
review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-08-19 23:38:07 +02:00
parent 37906c3a22
commit 7d6ded5743
10 changed files with 431 additions and 67 deletions

View file

@ -20,15 +20,15 @@ likelihood: L2
fidelity_modifier: false
production_rescore: false
constraint_on: RISK-F-0001
constraint_severity: high
constraint: "policy.enabled must not be turned on while flex-auth /v1/check answers unauthenticated callers — the gate would sign a false attestation"
constraint_severity: lifted
constraint: "LIFTED 2026-08-19 — flex-auth /v1/check now authenticates callers (RISK-F-0001 fixed). Enabling policy.enabled is now an availability question for ops-warden, no longer an attestation hazard."
disclosure: embargoed
embargo_condition: "FLEX-WP-0015-T02 shipped and ops-warden policy.enabled true in production"
embargo_since: "2026-08-19"
embargo_review: "2026-11-17"
escalation: required
escalation: withdrawn
escalation_trigger: 6
escalation_status: pending-operator
escalation_status: withdrawn-hazard-window-closed
last_reviewed: "2026-08-19"
review_by: "2026-11-17"
graded_by: risk-nexus
@ -193,3 +193,42 @@ Reasoning: `docs/rulings/2026-08-19-first-grading.md`.
- **2026-08-19** — graded. Next review 2026-11-17 (`medium` → 90 days).
Open at review: has `FLEX-WP-0007` or `WARDEN-WP-0007` moved; is the stated
blocker still true; does the ordering constraint still hold.
## Constraint lifted, escalation withdrawn — 2026-08-19 (same day)
`RISK-F-0001` was fixed hours after this register graded it: both `flex-auth`
production Deployments now enforce ADR-0004 TokenReview, with live
unbound-request probes returning 401.
**The attestation hazard is gone.** The constraint recorded this morning —
that enabling `policy.enabled` against a forgeable oracle would write a
`policy_decision_id` asserting an authorization nobody made — required
`/v1/check` to answer unauthenticated callers. It no longer does. Enabling the
gate is now an ordinary availability question for `ops-warden`: does the
calling side present its ServiceAccount token, and does signing survive a
`fail_closed: true`. That is `ops-warden`'s sequencing to run, not a risk
this register holds.
**The trigger-6 escalation is withdrawn.** The hazard window closed before the
operator was asked to hold the ordering. `ops-warden`'s own judgement that this
did not need the operator was, in the end, right — and the register still holds
that it was right for the wrong reason. The disagreement was never about the
severity of the hazard; it was about whether "written down in both repos"
keeps a thing held. It did not: the window closed by `flex-auth` shipping, not
by anyone re-reading the note.
**The finding stays open, unchanged at `medium`.** The gate is still off, and
`warden sign` still proceeds with no per-request judgement. Nothing about this
morning's news changes that.
**The general point earns another instance.** This finding argued that a
blocker is a claim about the world at a date, and that its own blocker had been
invalidated in a day with nothing re-checking it. That has now happened twice
to the same finding, in the same week, in the same direction. The second time,
the thing that had gone stale was this register's own grading, four hours old.
## Reviews
- **2026-08-19** — constraint lifted, escalation withdrawn, severity unchanged.
Open at review: has `ops-warden` presented SA tokens and enabled the gate;
is `FLEX-WP-0007` still the stated blocker or has it too gone stale.