Sweep risk inbox and reconcile findings

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a058f3-8ba0-7692-a042-9a870fc3d663

docs/regulatory/audit-retention-basis.md

@@ -8,10 +8,11 @@ determined: "2026-08-20"
 finding: RISK-F-0008
 sources_read: "GDPR Arts 5, 6, 17, 21, 32; Recitals 49, 65; HGB §257; AO §147"
 external_review: none
-last_checked: "2026-08-20T10:02:42Z"
-next_check: "2026-08-20T11:02:42Z"
-cadence: 1h
-clean_streak: 1
+last_checked: "2026-09-01T00:38:53Z"
+next_check: "2026-09-01T00:38:53Z"
+cadence: instant
+clean_streak: 0
+checked_by: "codex/risk-nexus"
 ---
 
 # RISK-REG-0001 — the retention basis, written down
@@ -176,3 +177,5 @@ table as a compliance claim.
 Default if none of these arrives by 2026-11-17: this table stands as the
 estate's stated position, with the achieved-versus-target gap recorded as
 unresolved.
+
+- **2026-09-01** — not clean: the dated review found that the 2026-08-20 target-period amendment had never advanced this record's check state. The targets now stand explicitly; achievement under the shared backup horizon and keyed-commitment feasibility remain open. Cadence 1h → instant; checked again immediately.

docs/rulings/2026-09-01-inbox-sweep.md

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+id: RISK-RULING-2026-09-01-A
+type: ruling
+title: "Inbox sweep: tenant boundaries, the agent read boundary, and an embedded backup credential"
+status: adopted
+owner: risk-nexus
+adopted: "2026-09-01"
+review_interval: 6m
+disclosure: embargoed
+embargo_condition: "RISK-F-0010's provider credential is revoked or invalidated and the literal source default is removed"
+embargo_since: "2026-09-01"
+embargo_review: "2026-09-15"
+revision: "adopted-1"
+last_reviewed: "2026-09-01"
+---
+
+# Inbox sweep — 2026-09-01
+
+One unread owner reply triggered this review. Reading the dependent owner
+records then showed that six findings were being carried in states older than
+their evidence, while one filed finding had never been graded.
+
+## Decisions
+
+| Finding | Prior state | Ruling | Evidence that changes it |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `RISK-F-0002` | open, embargoed | fixed, public | zone-aware signing gate complete; authenticated live decision; focused Warden suite passes |
+| `RISK-F-0003` | mitigated, embargoed | fixed, public | absent/unknown grade fails safe; explicit grade required in CI; dependent OpenBao layer fixed |
+| `RISK-F-0004` | open, embargoed | fixed, public | broad `events()` removed from production protocol; three tenant-scope tests pass |
+| `RISK-F-0005` | mitigated, public | fixed, public | bounded production E2 isolation run plus sixty current focused tests |
+| `RISK-F-0007` | accepted, embargoed | fixed, public | the zero-verification claim is disproved by Audit, Tenant, and User Engine evidence |
+| `RISK-F-0009` | open, embargoed | fixed, public | generated source/live deny coverage is total for concrete paths; dedicated identity proved deny-wins |
+| `RISK-F-0010` | open, ungraded | low, embargoed | embedded provider credential remains in source; endpoint evidence limits impact to the write-only backup lane |
+
+The historical grades of fixed findings remain on their records. A fix changes
+the status and disclosure decision; it does not rewrite how serious the defect
+was while live.
+
+## Cross-tenant boundary ruling
+
+`RISK-F-0007` said **no** consumer boundary was verified anywhere. That exact
+claim is now false. Audit Core supplies the strongest evidence: a bounded
+production run against three calibrated cross-tenant attacks, with safe custody
+and cleanup. Tenant Engine supplies a dedicated scoped-store suite, and User
+Engine supplies negative unit and integrated scenarios. These records do not
+prove every consumer correct. They close the estate-wide absence; a future
+consumer-specific defect is filed under that owner rather than kept alive under
+a sentence no longer true.
+
+The current focused checks run by Risk Nexus are:
+
+- ops-warden: 137 passed;
+- audit-core: 60 passed;
+- tenant-engine: 3 passed;
+- user-engine: 18 passed;
+- railiance-platform high-risk boundary invariant: 19 lanes, 14 concrete
+  entries, 5 non-concrete/non-KV, 0 uncovered, 0 errors.
+
+## Embedded credential ruling
+
+`RISK-F-0010` is `I2` because the observed endpoint is a write-only file drop,
+the stored material is ciphertext, and the recovery key is separate. It is
+`L2` because the literal is recoverable from granted repository or log access.
+That yields `low`. The current value is not probed: testing an exposed
+credential would expand the action beyond safe triage and is unnecessary to
+grade the stated facts.
+
+The disclosure state is embargoed because announcing the recoverable credential
+while its validity is unknown and its literal remains in source shortens the
+route to the defect. The embargo lifts after two observable events: provider
+revocation or invalidation, and removal of the source default. Restore evidence
+is requested as closure evidence for the governed replacement, but its absence
+does not justify reproducing or testing the old value.
+
+No escalation trigger fires today. Railiance Platform owns the fix; there is no
+known use, disclosure, legal duty, new spend, ownership dispute, or fourteen-day
+stall. The dated wait makes that last statement expire rather than persist as
+prose.