RISK-WP-0001 T01-T06,T08: the four instruments, the index, and the first grading

Severity (impact x likelihood, fidelity modifier for controls that lie,
headline-vs-constraint, build-mode double grade, the floor), disclosure
(publish/embargoed/restricted, and the build-mode deferral re-taken and
narrowed with RISK-F-0001 in hand), escalation (the five INTENT triggers
settled plus an ordering-hazard trigger the RISK-F-0002 case forced;
proposed, awaiting the custodian), review (intervals, what a review is,
what missing one produces, the production re-score).

Then applied: RISK-F-0001 critical/embargoed/escalated, RISK-F-0002
medium with a high constraint on RISK-F-0001's remediation, filed as a
peer and escalated only on the ordering, RISK-F-0003 high/embargoed/no
escalation. No unset field remains.

REGISTER.md is generated; make check reports overdue, stalled, ungraded
and unanswered escalations without changing anything.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

findings/RISK-F-0001-flex-auth-unauthenticated-check.md

@@ -11,12 +11,24 @@ system: flex-auth
 environment: production
 fix_owner: flex-auth
 fix_tracking: FLEX-WP-0015-T02
-# The three fields below are risk-nexus's, not the reporter's. Left unset
-# deliberately: the reporter says what is true, this repo says how bad it is
-# and who hears about it (INTENT, "What it does not own").
-severity: unset
-disclosure: unset
-escalation: unset
+# Graded by risk-nexus 2026-08-19 — docs/rulings/2026-08-19-first-grading.md
+severity: critical
+severity_at_production: critical
+impact: I4
+likelihood: L3
+fidelity_modifier: false
+production_rescore: false
+disclosure: embargoed
+embargo_condition: "FLEX-WP-0015-T02 ships to production"
+embargo_since: "2026-08-19"
+embargo_review: "2026-08-26"
+escalation: required
+escalation_trigger: 1
+escalation_status: pending-operator
+last_reviewed: "2026-08-19"
+review_by: "2026-08-26"
+graded_by: risk-nexus
+ruling: RISK-RULING-2026-08-19
 ---
 
 # RISK-F-0001 — flex-auth authenticates no caller on the decision surface
@@ -101,3 +113,43 @@ All four were found the same way, by repos reading their own code against a
 ladder, within a day of each other. That is a fact about the estate's
 observability worth carrying into triage: **four live defects, none found by
 monitoring.**
+
+## Register ruling — 2026-08-19
+
+`critical` (`I4` × `L3`, no fidelity modifier), embargoed until
+`FLEX-WP-0015-T02` ships, **escalated** to the operator on trigger 1.
+
+The question this finding put — whether governing access to tenant data counts
+as exposing it — is answered **yes**. An authorization oracle that can be
+forged is not one step removed from the data; it is the step.
+
+Impact is `I4` because a forged allow does not stay here: it is the answer
+other services act on, and `tenant-engine` has stated what direct authority
+over its rows would mean. Likelihood is `L3` — the normal working set, inside
+the cluster, no additional step — and the register follows the reporter in
+neither assuming a default-deny NetworkPolicy nor assuming its absence.
+
+No fidelity modifier: this endpoint answers honestly about a caller it never
+checked. The false-record hazard lives in `RISK-F-0002`'s constraint, where a
+consumer of this endpoint would begin signing records asserting an
+authorization that was never made. **That constraint binds this finding's
+remediation**: `ops-warden`'s `policy.enabled` must not be turned on until
+`/v1/check` authenticates its callers, and the ordering is
+
+```
+flex-auth warn-only -> ops-warden gate presents its SA token -> logs clean
+                    -> flex-auth fail-closed -> ops-warden policy.enabled: true
+```
+
+Nothing further is asked of `flex-auth` beyond what they have committed to,
+except one fact only they can supply: **is there a default-deny NetworkPolicy
+in front of the Service?** It is the single fact that would most change this
+grade, and it is the first question at review.
+
+Reasoning: `docs/rulings/2026-08-19-first-grading.md`.
+
+## Reviews
+
+- **2026-08-19** — graded. Next review 2026-08-26 (`critical` → 7 days).
+  Open at review: the NetworkPolicy question; whether `FLEX-WP-0015-T02` has
+  moved; whether the embargo still holds.