RISK-WP-0001 T01-T06,T08: the four instruments, the index, and the first grading

Severity (impact x likelihood, fidelity modifier for controls that lie,
headline-vs-constraint, build-mode double grade, the floor), disclosure
(publish/embargoed/restricted, and the build-mode deferral re-taken and
narrowed with RISK-F-0001 in hand), escalation (the five INTENT triggers
settled plus an ordering-hazard trigger the RISK-F-0002 case forced;
proposed, awaiting the custodian), review (intervals, what a review is,
what missing one produces, the production re-score).

Then applied: RISK-F-0001 critical/embargoed/escalated, RISK-F-0002
medium with a high constraint on RISK-F-0001's remediation, filed as a
peer and escalated only on the ordering, RISK-F-0003 high/embargoed/no
escalation. No unset field remains.

REGISTER.md is generated; make check reports overdue, stalled, ungraded
and unanswered escalations without changing anything.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

findings/RISK-F-0002-ops-warden-sign-ungated.md

@@ -12,10 +12,27 @@ environment: production
 fix_owner: ops-warden
 fix_tracking: WARDEN-WP-0007 (gate shipped, disabled) / FLEX-WP-0007 (runtime deploy)
 related: [RISK-F-0001]
-# risk-nexus's to set, not the reporter's (INTENT, "What it does not own").
-severity: unset
-disclosure: unset
-escalation: unset
+# Graded by risk-nexus 2026-08-19 — docs/rulings/2026-08-19-first-grading.md
+severity: medium
+severity_at_production: medium
+impact: I3
+likelihood: L2
+fidelity_modifier: false
+production_rescore: false
+constraint_on: RISK-F-0001
+constraint_severity: high
+constraint: "policy.enabled must not be turned on while flex-auth /v1/check answers unauthenticated callers — the gate would sign a false attestation"
+disclosure: embargoed
+embargo_condition: "FLEX-WP-0015-T02 shipped and ops-warden policy.enabled true in production"
+embargo_since: "2026-08-19"
+embargo_review: "2026-11-17"
+escalation: required
+escalation_trigger: 6
+escalation_status: pending-operator
+last_reviewed: "2026-08-19"
+review_by: "2026-11-17"
+graded_by: risk-nexus
+ruling: RISK-RULING-2026-08-19
 ---
 
 # RISK-F-0002 — the SSH signing gate is off, and turning it on is now the more dangerous move
@@ -120,3 +137,59 @@ the risk of a decision we had already made and filed away as merely blocked.
 The estate's habit of recording a blocker once and not revisiting it is the
 thing to watch. A blocker is a claim about the world at a date. `RISK-F-0001`
 invalidated this one in a day, and nothing would have re-checked it.
+
+## Register ruling — 2026-08-19
+
+All three questions this finding put are answered.
+
+**1. Severity — `medium` today, with a `high` constraint.** The headline
+scores the state of the world now: the gate is off, a missing control honestly
+represented. `I3` (SSH certificates into production hosts cross a trust
+boundary) × `L2` (scoped `VAULT_TOKEN`, actor in `inventory.yaml`, TTLs, every
+issuance logged — thin, but not nothing).
+
+The argument that the two states are not equally bad is **accepted in full**,
+and it is now written into the scale as the fidelity modifier: a control that
+lies is one impact band worse than the same control absent
+(`docs/method/severity.md`). It is recorded as a constraint rather than the
+headline because the register describes the estate as it is, and the dangerous
+state does not exist yet:
+
+> **Constraint, severity `high`.** Enabling `policy.enabled` while `/v1/check`
+> answers unauthenticated callers converts an absent control into a false
+> attestation — a genuine `allow` obtained by anyone with ClusterIP reach, and
+> a `policy_decision_id` in the signature log asserting the issuance was
+> authorized. `I3 + fidelity → I4`, `L2` → `high`.
+
+The constraint is attached to `RISK-F-0001`'s remediation and recorded on both
+findings. A reader must not take away `medium` and miss it.
+
+**2. Peer, not consequence.** Filed as `ops-warden` filed it. The fix owner
+differs and the "off" state has standing regardless of how `RISK-F-0001`
+resolves — if that finding were withdrawn tomorrow, production signing would
+still carry no per-request judgement. What is not independent is the ordering,
+and that travels as a constraint rather than by collapsing the two records.
+
+**3. Escalation — the register disagrees, narrowly.** On triggers 1-5 it
+agrees with `ops-warden`: no real tenant data, no obligation, no spend, no
+ownership dispute, no stall. But "it is written down in both repos" is the one
+argument the register cannot accept here, because this finding is itself the
+evidence against it: its own blocker was written down, filed, and invalidated
+in a day with nothing re-checking it.
+
+So trigger 6 — ordering hazard producing a false attestation — fires **once**.
+One acknowledgement that the operator holds the ordering, then the register
+carries it. Not a standing supervision request. That trigger exists in
+`docs/method/escalation.md` because of this finding.
+
+**The general point is adopted.** "A blocker is a claim about the world at a
+date" is now question 2 of every review in `docs/method/review.md`, and this
+finding is cited there as the case that bought it.
+
+Reasoning: `docs/rulings/2026-08-19-first-grading.md`.
+
+## Reviews
+
+- **2026-08-19** — graded. Next review 2026-11-17 (`medium` → 90 days).
+  Open at review: has `FLEX-WP-0007` or `WARDEN-WP-0007` moved; is the stated
+  blocker still true; does the ordering constraint still hold.