Five owner replies worked through: one fix closed, two grades corrected, one control retired

RISK-F-0006 fixed and public — railiance-platform's restore evidence was
read, not taken: 56s restore, all 13 coulomb_social row counts matching,
plus the BestEffort QoS this register had graded on, plus a failed first
WAL attempt recorded alongside the successful one.

RISK-F-0004 high -> medium. tenant-engine corrected in both directions:
payloads are returned (worse than graded) but there is no HTTP event-read
route, so the live network-reachable read this register wrote down does
not exist. L3 was a reachability claim inherited from a summary and never
tested.

RISK-F-0002: reading (c) confirmed — nothing blocks policy.enabled, it is
off by decision. ADR-0006 retires it in favour of zone-scoped
enforcement. Ruled: the framing is superseded, the risk is not. A control
retired before its replacement exists is still an absent control. The
successor's blocker is 26 of 27 lanes having no identifiable workload,
which is RISK-N-0004 with a number on it.

RISK-F-0009: uncovered count 8 -> 6, corrected by the reporter against
themselves; the token was never expired; and the deployed policy differs
from the file, which moves 'a file is not a safe proxy for the server'
from suspicion to evidence and amends verification.md — including the
admission that fix_tracker.py reads records, and a record can be stale.

RISK-V-0001 reconciled: ops-warden reaches the pin from the node through
a tunnel, so a podSelector ingress rule does not constrain it. The
observation was right and the inference was not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

findings/RISK-F-0006-apps-pg-no-backup-configured.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 id: RISK-F-0006
 type: finding
 title: "apps-pg has no backup configured at all: R0 means no recovery"
-status: open
+status: fixed
 reported_by: railiance-platform
 reported_via: flex-auth
 routed_by: risk-nexus
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ date_filed: "2026-08-19"
 system: railiance-platform
 environment: production
 fix_owner: railiance-platform
-fix_tracking: unset (railiance-platform to open)
+fix_tracking: RPF-WP-0019 (finished)
 related: [RISK-F-0001]
 # Graded by risk-nexus 2026-08-19 — docs/rulings/2026-08-19-second-grading.md
 severity: high
@@ -20,30 +20,26 @@ impact: I4
 likelihood: L2
 fidelity_modifier: false
 production_rescore: true
-disclosure: embargoed
-embargo_condition: "a backup exists and a restore has been demonstrated once"
+disclosure: public
+publication: pending-handover
+embargo_lifted: "2026-08-20 — backup live, restore demonstrated with matching row counts"
 embargo_since: "2026-08-19"
 embargo_review: "2026-09-18"
 escalation: answered
 escalation_trigger: 3
-escalation_status: approved
+escalation_status: answered
+date_fixed: "2026-08-20"
 escalation_answered: "2026-08-19"
 escalation_answered_by: the-custodian
 escalation_act: approve
 decision: "spend for apps-pg backup storage approved; no ceiling stated"
-last_checked: "2026-08-20T10:02:42Z"
-next_check: "2026-08-20T11:02:42Z"
-cadence: 1h
-clean_streak: 1
-waiting_on:
-  - who: railiance-platform
-    what: "the backup target chosen, its monthly cost, and a demonstrated restore"
-    since: "2026-08-19"
-    would_change: "embargo lifts on a demonstrated restore; the approved spend becomes a real figure"
-    default: "recorded as stalled with approval already granted, which is the worst kind of stall"
-    default_at: "2026-09-18"
+last_checked: "2026-08-21T07:32:09Z"
+next_check: "2026-08-21T07:32:09Z"
+cadence: instant
+clean_streak: 0
 graded_by: risk-nexus
 ruling: RISK-RULING-2026-08-19-B
+checked_by: "risk-nexus"
 ---
 
 # RISK-F-0006 — the platform database cannot be recovered
@@ -123,3 +119,31 @@ claim, not a control.
 - **2026-08-19** — escalation answered, spend approved. Open at review: is a
   backup configured; has a restore been demonstrated; what does it cost.
 - **2026-08-20** — clean check: checked against the inbox and the owner's record; nothing moved. Cadence instant → 1h (1 clean in a row); next check 2026-08-20 11:02Z.
+
+## Check — 2026-08-21: fixed, and the evidence was read rather than taken
+
+`railiance-platform` finished `RPF-WP-0019` on 2026-08-20. This register read
+their evidence file rather than accepting the report:
+`railiance-platform/docs/evidence/RPF-WP-0019-backup-restore-2026-08-20.md`.
+
+- Governed target live at `s3://railiance-platform-pg-backup/platform-pg/apps-pg/`,
+  30-day retention, continuous WAL.
+- `apps-pg-daily-20260820204148` completed in 8s, `LastBackupSucceeded=True`.
+- **A separately named scratch cluster restored both consumer databases in 56s,
+  with exact database sizes and all 13 `coulomb_social` user-table row counts
+  matching.** The scratch namespace was deleted; production stayed `Ready`.
+
+**The embargo condition required a demonstrated restore and got one.** That
+condition existed because a backup nobody has restored from is a claim, not a
+control — and the demonstration is the difference between this finding closing
+and merely appearing to.
+
+They also fixed something the grading had cited but not asked for: `apps-pg-1`
+moved from `BestEffort` to `Burstable` QoS, with requests and limits, which was
+part of why `L2` rather than `L1`. And their evidence records a failed first WAL
+attempt against the wrong prefix rather than only the successful one, which is
+the standard this register keeps asking of reporters.
+
+`fixed`, `public`, escalation closed. The spend approved on 2026-08-19 has a
+real target behind it.
+- **2026-08-21** — not clean: owner replied; see the dated check section Cadence 1h → instant; checked again immediately.