Five owner replies worked through: one fix closed, two grades corrected, one control retired

RISK-F-0006 fixed and public — railiance-platform's restore evidence was
read, not taken: 56s restore, all 13 coulomb_social row counts matching,
plus the BestEffort QoS this register had graded on, plus a failed first
WAL attempt recorded alongside the successful one.

RISK-F-0004 high -> medium. tenant-engine corrected in both directions:
payloads are returned (worse than graded) but there is no HTTP event-read
route, so the live network-reachable read this register wrote down does
not exist. L3 was a reachability claim inherited from a summary and never
tested.

RISK-F-0002: reading (c) confirmed — nothing blocks policy.enabled, it is
off by decision. ADR-0006 retires it in favour of zone-scoped
enforcement. Ruled: the framing is superseded, the risk is not. A control
retired before its replacement exists is still an absent control. The
successor's blocker is 26 of 27 lanes having no identifiable workload,
which is RISK-N-0004 with a number on it.

RISK-F-0009: uncovered count 8 -> 6, corrected by the reporter against
themselves; the token was never expired; and the deployed policy differs
from the file, which moves 'a file is not a safe proxy for the server'
from suspicion to evidence and amends verification.md — including the
admission that fix_tracker.py reads records, and a record can be stale.

RISK-V-0001 reconciled: ops-warden reaches the pin from the node through
a tunnel, so a podSelector ingress rule does not constrain it. The
observation was right and the inference was not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-08-21 09:32:32 +02:00
parent 59e3e0a23a
commit e482423523
8 changed files with 280 additions and 58 deletions

View file

@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ accepted_by: the-custodian
accepted_on: "2026-08-19"
accepted_until: "production transition (hard expiry, not a date)"
decision: "pragmatic default before production — carried unverified; verification of a named consumer boundary on request"
last_checked: "2026-08-20T10:02:41Z"
next_check: "2026-08-20T10:02:41Z"
cadence: instant
clean_streak: 0
last_checked: "2026-08-21T07:32:10Z"
next_check: "2026-08-21T08:32:10Z"
cadence: 1h
clean_streak: 1
waiting_on:
- who: user-engine
what: "does anything verify that a caller for tenant A cannot reach tenant B (RISK-V-0002)"
@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ waiting_on:
default_at: "2026-09-03"
graded_by: risk-nexus
ruling: RISK-RULING-2026-08-19-B
checked_by: "risk-nexus"
---
# RISK-F-0007 — nothing checks that tenants stay apart
@ -182,3 +183,4 @@ assumption that asking works.
Grade unchanged. Nothing about the boundary itself has moved.
- **2026-08-20** — not clean: On-request verification walked for the first time: RISK-V-0002 asks user-engine. Cadence instant → instant; checked again immediately.
- **2026-08-21** — clean check: no answer yet from user-engine; nothing about the boundary moved. Cadence instant → 1h (1 clean in a row); next check 2026-08-21 08:32Z.