T02 inbox check, wired into make check and verified against the actual
2026-08-19 failure — replayed at that moment it surfaces all three
messages that were already waiting. T03 sweeps the rest of the
quietly-tolerated class: bad dates, cadence off the ladder, undefined
disclosure states, dangling constraint_on and related refs, embargoes
without conditions, escalations without triggers. T04 requests
verification of user-engine's tenant boundary — the first walk down the
on-request path, chosen as a consumer not already known to fail it. T05
established by trying what this register can verify: cluster yes, OpenBao
403. T06 puts regulatory records on the findings ladder.
T01 stays in progress: the procedure, make due and make checked exist,
but arming something that runs them on schedule is a standing compute
commitment and the operator's to make.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cluster reads work from this host; OpenBao returns 403, the same wall
ops-warden hit. So the register can check what the cluster admits and
cannot check what the secret store permits, and every grade touching an
OpenBao policy is a grade on a document. That asymmetry is recorded
rather than closed: a risk register holding production secret-store
access would have traded a verification problem for a worse one.
RISK-V-0001 is the first verification. It confirms RISK-F-0001's ingress
claim against the live cluster — the first grade here standing on
evidence this repo gathered — contradicts the 'egress: []' claim, which
live shows as 443/6443 to anywhere, and surfaces a third policy created
the day of the fix whose Ingress policyType carries no rules, which bears
on whether enabling ops-warden's gate would fail closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
