T01 fix tracking now reads the owner's workplan file and found two
findings the register should have known about. T02 incident and external
report intake, the latter routed since the address is not ours to create.
T03 the production transition defined by what is held rather than what
was announced. T04 the README stops claiming a surface. T05 escalation
carries a delivery state and is raised once when unacknowledged. T06
checked_by and a heartbeat, so a 1q rung cannot silently mean nobody
looked. T07 coverage: 7 of 117 repos have ever appeared in a finding.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
policy-nexus owes entries; if none arrive by 2026-09-17 the findings sit
as disclosure: public with no address, which this register records as a
claim rather than a publication. Same rule we apply to everyone else.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator ruled both. Findings publish as the file a reader gets —
including RISK-F-0001's record that this register graded it critical
while its fix notice sat unread. A summary would be a second document per
finding kept in sync by hand, and drift is the failure this repo most
distrusts; and a published register containing only other repos' defects
reads as an accusation, while one containing its own reads as a record.
Method docs public except escalation, which is restricted because it
names spend thresholds and describes when the operator personally is
interrupted — a map of where attention is scarce, needed by nobody
judging a finding.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator ruling 2026-08-20. Severity no longer sets the review interval.
A check that comes back clean climbs one rung — instant, 1h, 8h, 24h,
48h, 96h, 7d, 14d, 1mo, 1q — and anything wrong drops straight back to
instant. A quarter is the ceiling. The operator may defer an instant
finding to a stated date; that is the only other way off the bottom rung.
The rung is the point: it says how stable the estate has been on that
matter, which is information severity does not carry. Volatile things get
attention automatically; quiet things stop consuming it; neither
judgement has to be made by a person who might be busy.
Escalation trigger 5 rebased onto the ladder — fourteen days at the
bottom rung, whether that is failing checks or no checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Read the repo inbox after grading, which is the wrong order and is now
recorded as such. flex-auth had answered the NetworkPolicy question on
2026-08-18 (narrow ingress, not default-deny — L3 becomes L2, critical
becomes high) and reported RISK-F-0001 fixed at 12:35 today with live 401
probes. F-0001 closes fixed and public; its escalation is withdrawn
before it was ever sent. RISK-F-0002's ordering constraint lifts with it
and its trigger-6 escalation is withdrawn.
audit-core had routed the erasure-versus-audit legal question here on
2026-08-18 asking for an owner. RISK-N-0002 was wrong to call it a note:
the remedy is not retrofittable, so the decision can only be taken early.
Promoted to RISK-F-0008, owned by this repo as regulatory intake,
escalated on trigger 2.
Accepted rapp-postgres's record format and ops-warden's typed-act
escalation vocabulary. Reading the inbox is now question zero of every
review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Severity (impact x likelihood, fidelity modifier for controls that lie,
headline-vs-constraint, build-mode double grade, the floor), disclosure
(publish/embargoed/restricted, and the build-mode deferral re-taken and
narrowed with RISK-F-0001 in hand), escalation (the five INTENT triggers
settled plus an ordering-hazard trigger the RISK-F-0002 case forced;
proposed, awaiting the custodian), review (intervals, what a review is,
what missing one produces, the production re-score).
Then applied: RISK-F-0001 critical/embargoed/escalated, RISK-F-0002
medium with a high constraint on RISK-F-0001's remediation, filed as a
peer and escalated only on the ordering, RISK-F-0003 high/embargoed/no
escalation. No unset field remains.
REGISTER.md is generated; make check reports overdue, stalled, ungraded
and unanswered escalations without changing anything.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First finding, and it establishes the record format by being one. Kept minimal
on purpose - inventing a schema before there is a second finding to test it
against would be designing in the dark.
The substance: POST /v1/check and /v1/batch_check authenticate no caller, so
any workload with network reach can assert any subject and any tenant and
receive an authoritative allow from the estate's authorization oracle.
Self-reported by flex-auth during their Tenancy Posture review, and their own
note says they did not know they were carrying it.
Severity, disclosure and escalation are left unset. Per INTENT this repo owns
those and the reporter does not, and filling them in as the routing party would
collapse the separation on the first record.
Two things stated rather than assumed. Exposure depends on whether a
default-deny NetworkPolicy fronts the service; flex-auth did not say, and I did
not check, because that would be reporting on a system I do not own. And the
disclosure question is genuinely live here - build mode is public-by-default,
this is a live authorization bypass, and the controlled-disclosure mechanism
this repo anticipates does not exist yet, so the choice today is publish or
hold with nothing in between.
Three related defects from the same review round are recorded as visible but
not filed, since filing them was not asked for. All four were found by repos
reading their own code against a ladder within a day of each other, and none
was found by monitoring - which is itself a fact worth carrying into triage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
