--- id: RISK-F-0010 type: finding title: "Forgejo backup source embeds a WebDAV credential default" status: fixed owner: risk-nexus reported_by: railiance-platform reported_via: railiance-platform routed_by: risk-nexus date_reported: "2026-08-23" date_filed: "2026-08-23" system: railiance-platform environment: production fix_owner: railiance-platform fix_tracking: RPF-WP-0029-T02 (done 2026-09-15) closure_condition: "provider invalidation plus governed ciphertext upload and restore receipts; source fallback removal alone does not lift the embargo" verification: RISK-V-0003 # Graded by risk-nexus 2026-09-01 — docs/rulings/2026-09-01-inbox-sweep.md severity: low severity_at_production: low impact: I2 likelihood: L2 fidelity_modifier: false production_rescore: false disclosure: public publication: pending-handover publication_id: risk-f-0010-embedded-backup-webdav-credential publication_path: "findings/embedded-backup-webdav-credential/v1/index.html" publication_subtitle: "A backup script carried a literal file-drop credential default; the default is gone, the share is invalidated, and governed upload and restore are proven." revision: "fixed-1" embargo_was_condition: "the provider credential is revoked or invalidated and the literal source default is removed" embargo_lifted: "2026-09-22 — literal default removed (observed) and predecessor share invalidated (owner attestation, no probe by design)" embargo_was_since: "2026-09-01" date_fixed: "2026-09-15" escalation: none last_checked: "2026-09-22T06:01:01Z" next_check: "2026-09-22T07:01:01Z" cadence: 1h clean_streak: 1 graded_by: risk-nexus ruling: RISK-RULING-2026-09-22-A checked_by: "worsch" --- # RISK-F-0010 — Forgejo backup source embeds a WebDAV credential default ## What is true, as reported `railiance-platform/tools/cmd/forgejo-backup` line 13 assigns a literal default to `RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_TOKEN`. The credential value is deliberately omitted from this finding, along with any fingerprint, length, or copy. The literal is in repository history and can be recovered by anyone with access to affected clones or history. It was also surfaced in captured agent command output during an attended review on 2026-08-23, which expands the set of places that must be treated as potentially exposed. The value was not used in that operation and its current validity was not tested. The configured Nextcloud endpoint was independently observed to be a write-only file drop: metadata listing and reads were denied while the approved OpenBao-sourced credential could upload ciphertext. Therefore, the established risk is an embedded credential and possible unauthorized write or storage injection if it remains live; read access to existing backups is not established. The age recovery private key is separate and was not found in the script. ## How it was found Found by source inspection while selecting the approved encrypted off-host snapshot lane for preparation-only scenario `WARDEN-WP-0027-T02-DRILL-20260822-01`. No attempt was made to authenticate with or probe the embedded value. ## Suggested direction Suggestion, owned by `railiance-platform`: 1. Revoke and regenerate the Nextcloud file-drop credential at the provider. 2. Write the replacement only to the governed OpenBao lane `platform/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane` through a mode-0600 input file, then securely remove the input. 3. Remove the source-code default so backup execution fails closed unless the value arrives through OpenBao or an explicit sanctioned environment. 4. Review reachable Git history, CI and agent logs, and clones under the applicable retention policy; do not reproduce the credential while doing so. 5. Verify a ciphertext upload and restore after rotation, then clear any exposure taint only with evidence. Risk Nexus owns severity, disclosure, escalation, and review cadence. This report intentionally does not assign them. ## Register ruling — 2026-09-01 `low` (`I2` × `L2`), embargoed, no escalation. **`I2`: limited to one backup lane on the facts established.** If the embedded value remains valid, it can authorize an ungoverned write or storage injection at the Nextcloud file-drop endpoint. Metadata listing and reads were denied, backup content is ciphertext, and the age recovery private key is separate. Nothing here establishes disclosure of an existing backup or estate-wide credential reach. **`L2`: recoverable through access the estate does grant.** The value is in Git history and appeared in captured agent output, so a repository clone or retained log is a sufficient foothold. Current validity is unknown and is not tested by this register; unknown is not treated as either live or revoked. **Embargoed.** While the source default remains and validity is unresolved, publishing that a recoverable provider credential exists materially shortens the path beyond reading the private repository. The hold lifts only when revocation or invalidation and removal of the literal are both observable. The credential value, fingerprint, and shape remain excluded from every record and message. **No escalation.** There is no evidence of a read, loss, real-person data exposure, legal notification duty, new spend, ownership dispute, or a stalled remediation yet. Railiance Platform owns both the source and provider action. Silence defaults on 2026-09-15 to the existing grade and a recorded stall; it does not soften the assessment. Reasoning: `docs/rulings/2026-09-01-inbox-sweep.md`. ## Source remediation reconciled — 2026-09-05 RPF-WP-0029-T01 records source fallback removal and fail-closed input checks. This register confirmed the named fallback is absent in the current script without displaying or testing any credential. RPF-WP-0029-T02 remains `wait` for provider invalidation and governed encrypted upload/restore receipts. [RISK-V-0003](../docs/verifications/2026-09-05-open-findings-source-review.md) records the boundary: source removal does not establish invalidation of the predecessor. Open, low, embargoed and no escalation remain appropriate on the available evidence. The 2026-09-15 review/default is unchanged. The historical source-default statements above describe the earlier assessments. ## Closure ruling — 2026-09-22 Fixed; embargo lifted; no escalation. All four closure legs are evidenced: the source default is removed, governed ciphertext upload and restore have receipts (2026-09-06), and the predecessor share was invalidated on 2026-09-15. The invalidation rests on owner attestation because probing it would mean reconstructing the credential. Age-key taint is outside this finding and has been referred to railiance-platform. Reasoning: `docs/rulings/2026-09-22-f0010-closure.md`. ## Reviews - **2026-09-01** — graded from the filed report and a redacted current-source check. The literal default remains; no fix record was found. Cadence starts at instant. - **2026-09-02** — clean check: literal source default remains; no fix tracking; embargo and 2026-09-15 wait unchanged. Cadence instant → 1h (1 clean in a row); next check 2026-09-02 09:11Z. - **2026-09-05** — not clean: Confirmed source fallback removal and RPF-WP-0029 tracking; provider invalidation and encrypted upload/restore receipts remain pending. Low grade and embargo retained; see RISK-V-0003. Cadence 1h → instant; checked again immediately. - **2026-09-22** — clean check: Closed under RISK-RULING-2026-09-22-A: source default absent, upload/restore receipts, predecessor share invalidated by owner attestation; embargo lifted. Cadence instant → 1h (1 clean in a row); next check 2026-09-22 07:01Z.