43 lines
1.5 KiB
Python
43 lines
1.5 KiB
Python
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"""Defense-in-depth redaction of secret-like material.
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This is a backstop, not the primary control. The primary control is that secret
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values are never passed into evidence/log code paths in the first place. Redaction
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catches the case where a value leaks into child-process output we control.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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from typing import Iterable
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REDACTED = "***REDACTED***"
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# Token shapes we proactively mask in child-process output.
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_PATTERNS = [
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re.compile(r"npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{8,}"), # npm automation/publish tokens
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re.compile(r"(?:hv|hvs|hvb|s)\.[A-Za-z0-9._-]{16,}"), # vault/openbao tokens
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re.compile(r"gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}"), # github tokens
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re.compile(r"xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}"), # slack tokens
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re.compile(r"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"), # aws access key id
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]
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def redact_text(text: str, extra: Iterable[str] = ()) -> str:
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"""Mask known token shapes and any caller-supplied literal values."""
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if not text:
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return text
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for literal in extra:
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if literal and len(literal) >= 4:
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text = text.replace(literal, REDACTED)
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for pat in _PATTERNS:
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text = pat.sub(REDACTED, text)
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return text
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def looks_secret(name: str) -> bool:
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"""Heuristic: does a field/key name suggest it carries a secret value?"""
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lowered = name.lower()
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return any(
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marker in lowered
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for marker in ("token", "secret", "password", "passwd", "apikey", "api_key", "key", "credential")
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)
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