secrets-engine/policies/secrets-engine-prod.hcl

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# secrets-engine-prod — production stage role policy.
#
# Scope: apply approved PRODUCTION metadata (ACL policies + approle roles) and
# write approved lane values for provisioning. Deliberately NARROW:
# - no root / sudo
# - no sys/* administration beyond its own se-prod-* ACL policies
# - no identity/* administration
# - no auth/token administration
# - cannot reach into build/ or test/ prefixes
#
# Production raw-value READ stays gated: this role can write a value during an
# approved provisioning step, but broad read of arbitrary prod paths is denied.
# Consumers read their own lane through the narrow se-prod-<lane> consumer policy.
# Apply approved production lane values (provisioning) and metadata.
# Owner-scoped prod lanes (e.g. whynot-design/...) — NOT under build/ or test/.
path "secret/data/+/*" {
capabilities = ["create", "update"]
}
path "secret/metadata/+/*" {
capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "list"]
}
# Manage only the prod consumer policies this role owns.
path "sys/policies/acl/se-prod-*" {
capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete"]
}
# Manage prod approle roles only.
path "auth/approle/role/se-prod-*" {
capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete"]
}
path "auth/approle/role/se-prod-*/role-id" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "auth/approle/role/se-prod-*/secret-id" {
capabilities = ["create", "update"]
}
# Hard denials — production appliers must not become broad admins.
path "secret/data/build/*" { capabilities = ["deny"] }
path "secret/data/test/*" { capabilities = ["deny"] }
path "sys/policies/acl/secrets-engine-*" { capabilities = ["deny"] } # can't edit stage roles
path "auth/token/*" { capabilities = ["deny"] }
path "identity/*" { capabilities = ["deny"] }
path "sys/auth/*" { capabilities = ["deny"] }
path "sys/mounts/*" { capabilities = ["deny"] }