test: enforce that dry runs never reach the authorization gate

flex-auth's published policy package encodes an explicit limit: apply and
apply --dry-run are indistinguishable to a PDP, since both arrive as action
`apply`. What separates them is a property of this repo - the PEP does not
call the gate for a dry run - and flex-auth recorded that as a limit rather
than implying a control they do not have, asking to be told if it stops
holding.

Verified it holds across all five dry-run handlers (apply, revoke, lifecycle
suspend/deactivate/destroy) and locked it with a regression test that fails
with the instruction to notify flex-auth. A paired test proves the hook
under test is actually load-bearing, so the guard cannot pass vacuously.

Also records the FLEX-WP-0021-T01/T02 and GH-DEC-2026-005 outcomes in
SECRETS-WP-0007-T04, including the revisit trigger flex-auth flagged: with
one calling identity the denial ladder has no action_not_granted branch, so
a second identity or a per-lane/stage split is the trigger to add it.

allow_ttl 15m needed no change - normalize_wrap_ttl already caps wrap at 15m.
The policy pin stays unset; publishing is not deploying. 257 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4

workplans/SECRETS-WP-0007-production-lifecycle-hardening.md

@@ -352,6 +352,63 @@ and the published package from `FLEX-WP-0021-T02`. The pin stays unset.
 `FLEX-WP-0021-T01`. Separately tracked: production requires a KeyCape RS256 JWT,
 not the static Bearer token this engine currently sends.
 
+Closed out 2026-09-06. gate-house amended `GH-DEC-2026-005`; flex-auth published
+the policy package (`FLEX-WP-0021-T01`/`T02` done, commit `f75db59`).
+
+- `secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle` v1 exists with both manifests, a
+  loadable registry snapshot, 26 fixtures and five standalone check requests;
+  `validate -kind policy` reports 22/22 Rego tests and 26/26 fixtures. Our
+  vocabulary is recorded in flex-auth `docs/secrets-engine-action-vocabulary.md`.
+  All four constraints from `docs/gated-actions.md` are encoded rather than
+  assumed: `test_revoke_is_not_an_action` asserts `revoke` denies
+  `unknown_action`, `destroy` is fixtured as the dual-control case before
+  `T04` opens the path, `compromise`/`reactivate` are annotated overlay-only,
+  and the ungated verbs deny `unknown_action`. flex-auth reports four of the
+  twelve would have been inferred wrongly, `revoke` most confidently.
+- **A published limit now rests on a property of this repo.** `apply` and
+  `apply --dry-run` are indistinguishable to a PDP; both arrive as action
+  `apply`. What separates them is that our PEP does not call the gate for a dry
+  run. flex-auth recorded that as a limit rather than implying a control they do
+  not have, and asked to be told if the assumption stops holding.
+  `tests/test_dry_run_never_gates.py` now enforces it across all five dry-run
+  handlers, with a paired test proving the hook is load-bearing. Changing a
+  dry-run path to gate is now a test failure carrying the instruction to notify
+  flex-auth first.
+- Dual control on `destroy` checks what the claim *says* (two distinct approver
+  subject ids). flex-auth deliberately does not re-derive temporal validity,
+  signature, or supersession — those are approval-engine's to assert and **ours
+  to verify against the live claim**. `validate_approval_claim` is that check.
+- `allow_ttl` is 15m in the package, stated rather than left to an engine
+  default. Per `FLEX-DEC-2026-004` that is authority to *issue* the operation,
+  not to keep using what it produced; bounding a delivered secret's own lifetime
+  is ours. Already satisfied: `normalize_wrap_ttl` caps wrap at 15m and lane
+  AppRoles carry 5m/15m token TTLs with a single-use Secret ID.
+- Structural note carried as a revisit trigger, not a defect: because we named
+  exactly one calling identity, the denial ladder has no `action_not_granted`
+  branch — with one subject holding all twelve actions it could never fire, and
+  a rule that cannot fail reads as per-action control that is not there.
+  Registering a second identity, or splitting the CLI identity by lane or stage,
+  is the trigger; adding the branch then is additive and needs no request-shape
+  change.
+- gate-house struck the G3 revisit trigger for a composed authorization object,
+  verified against the DecisionEnvelope schema: `lifetime` is required whenever
+  effect is allow, so carrying its own end — the one structural thing the bundle
+  did that the split does not — is already answered. Three triggers remain: a
+  third or fourth PEP-shaped consumer, a single signed forwardable artifact, and
+  §17 request-claim assent.
+- On the approver threshold we stopped checking, gate-house recorded both that
+  it is correct on layering **and** a genuine reduction in defence in depth,
+  noting a decision recording only the first would be self-serving. The
+  compensating property is reconstructability at the issuer under §9.6 —
+  detection, not prevention — not a second check here.
+
+**The pin stays unset.** Publishing is not deploying: there is still no
+`flex-auth-secrets-engine` pin and therefore no address to call. `T04` stands it
+up in `callerAuth.mode warn`; `T05` hands over the Service DNS and confirms the
+package/version to configure. Next inbound is the `T03` replay fixture — a real
+DecisionEnvelope from this package including `provenance.registry_snapshot_digest`
+— to verify the digest join unchanged.
+
 Define and enforce the decision contract needed by production commands. A
 resolved approval must bind at least: