Harden secret provisioning and lifecycle controls
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Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a0217e-8c4c-7383-be6b-f50a6e485306
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-08-23 12:05:58 +02:00
parent 0617923ff1
commit 3a1bd4f1c8
23 changed files with 1369 additions and 162 deletions

View file

@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ class VerifyResult:
return f" {self.check} check: {status} ({self.detail.get('reason', '')})"
def _session_evidence(session: object | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Extract only the session's explicit non-secret lifecycle record."""
if session is None:
return {"established": False}
evidence = getattr(session, "evidence", None)
if callable(evidence):
return evidence()
return {"established": True}
def verify_positive(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry, field: str) -> VerifyResult:
"""Approved consumer token must be able to read the field."""
if entry.delivery_auth_method != "approle" or not entry.has_delivery_auth:
@ -35,15 +45,20 @@ def verify_positive(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry, field: str) -> V
False,
{"reason": "lane has no AppRole delivery auth", "path": entry.path},
)
session = None
try:
token = client.approle_login_token(entry.role_name)
with client.approle_session(entry.role_name) as session:
present = session.client.kv_field_present(entry.mount, entry.path, field)
except Exception as e: # backend errors -> failed verification, not a value leak
return VerifyResult(
"positive",
False,
{"reason": f"could not obtain approle token: {e}", "path": entry.path},
{
"reason": f"scoped verification session failed: {e}",
"path": entry.path,
"session": _session_evidence(session),
},
)
present = client.kv_field_present(entry.mount, entry.path, field, token=token)
return VerifyResult(
"positive",
present,
@ -54,6 +69,7 @@ def verify_positive(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry, field: str) -> V
"path": entry.path,
"field": field,
"role": entry.role_name,
"session": _session_evidence(session),
},
)
@ -76,26 +92,26 @@ def verify_negative(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry) -> VerifyResult:
def verify_auth_capability_positive(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry) -> VerifyResult:
"""Approved AppRole token must carry update on every exact allowed path."""
missing: list[str] = []
session = None
try:
token = client.approle_login_token(entry.role_name)
with client.approle_session(entry.role_name) as session:
for path in entry.auth_allowed_paths:
caps = session.client.token_capabilities(
path, token=session.client.token
)
if "update" not in caps:
missing.append(path)
except Exception as e:
return VerifyResult(
"positive",
False,
{"reason": f"could not obtain approle token: {e}", "role": entry.role_name},
{
"reason": f"scoped verification session failed: {e}",
"role": entry.role_name,
"session": _session_evidence(session),
},
)
missing: list[str] = []
for path in entry.auth_allowed_paths:
try:
caps = client.token_capabilities(path, token=token)
except Exception as e:
return VerifyResult(
"positive",
False,
{"reason": f"could not inspect capabilities: {e}", "path": path},
)
if "update" not in caps:
missing.append(path)
passed = not missing
return VerifyResult(
"positive",
@ -107,32 +123,33 @@ def verify_auth_capability_positive(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry)
"role": entry.role_name,
"allowed_paths": sorted(entry.auth_allowed_paths),
"missing_update": missing,
"session": _session_evidence(session),
},
)
def verify_auth_capability_negative(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry) -> VerifyResult:
"""Approved AppRole token must not gain update outside denial probes."""
leaks: list[str] = []
session = None
try:
token = client.approle_login_token(entry.role_name)
with client.approle_session(entry.role_name) as session:
for path in entry.auth_denied_probe_paths:
caps = session.client.token_capabilities(
path, token=session.client.token
)
if "update" in caps or "sudo" in caps or "root" in caps:
leaks.append(path)
except Exception as e:
return VerifyResult(
"negative",
False,
{"reason": f"could not obtain approle token: {e}", "role": entry.role_name},
{
"reason": f"scoped verification session failed: {e}",
"role": entry.role_name,
"session": _session_evidence(session),
},
)
leaks: list[str] = []
for path in entry.auth_denied_probe_paths:
try:
caps = client.token_capabilities(path, token=token)
except Exception as e:
return VerifyResult(
"negative",
False,
{"reason": f"could not inspect capabilities: {e}", "path": path},
)
if "update" in caps or "sudo" in caps or "root" in caps:
leaks.append(path)
passed = not leaks
return VerifyResult(
"negative",
@ -144,6 +161,7 @@ def verify_auth_capability_negative(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry)
"role": entry.role_name,
"denied_probe_paths": entry.auth_denied_probe_paths,
"leaks": leaks,
"session": _session_evidence(session),
},
)