diff --git a/docs/openbao-jwt-login.md b/docs/openbao-jwt-login.md
index 7b841d4..e7369dd 100644
--- a/docs/openbao-jwt-login.md
+++ b/docs/openbao-jwt-login.md
@@ -18,6 +18,12 @@ through a temporary JSON file, never argv. The resulting OpenBao token is
 revoked at the end of the command (`token revoke -self`). Evidence records
 the provider name and an accessor fingerprint only.
 
-Until railiance-platform publishes that file, `--auth auto` keeps the named
-bootstrap-file and `BAO_TOKEN` providers. `--auth service-jwt` fail-closes.
+railiance-platform published the exact consumer file on 2026-10-10 at
+`docs/contracts/secrets-engine-openbao-jwt-login.yaml` (mount `keycape-services`,
+role `secrets-engine-openbao`, issuer `https://kc.coulomb.social`). When configured,
+`--auth auto` selects service-jwt; without a contract it keeps named bootstrap/env
+providers. Explicit service-jwt fails closed when configuration is missing.
+The current service token is login-self-only and cannot perform protected lane
+operations. T06 also requires a reviewed task-scoped execution entitlement and
+functional steady-state adoption; see [final acceptance](service-jwt-final-acceptance.md).
 A service-jwt selection never reads `--bootstrap-token-file` or `BAO_TOKEN`.
diff --git a/docs/service-auth.md b/docs/service-auth.md
index 599a1c8..b653fed 100644
--- a/docs/service-auth.md
+++ b/docs/service-auth.md
@@ -36,8 +36,10 @@ policy, TTL/use limits, and cryptographic verification.
 When `SECRETS_ENGINE_OPENBAO_JWT_LOGIN` names that contract, the CLI selects
 `service-jwt` and logs in for one command, then self-revokes the OpenBao
 token. Failure of that path never falls back to `--bootstrap-token-file`,
-`BAO_TOKEN`, or AppRole. Until the contract is published, `--auth auto` keeps
-those named providers and `--auth service-jwt` fail-closes. See
+`BAO_TOKEN`, or AppRole. The platform contract was published 2026-10-10. Configured `--auth auto`
+selects service-jwt; without that configuration it keeps bootstrap/env. The
+current login-self-only token cannot perform protected lane operations;
+functional adoption and task-scoped execution entitlement remain T06. See
 [openbao-jwt-login.md](openbao-jwt-login.md).
 
 Canonical provider contract:
diff --git a/docs/service-jwt-final-acceptance.md b/docs/service-jwt-final-acceptance.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2867c22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/service-jwt-final-acceptance.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+# Service-JWT final acceptance — SECRETS-WP-0008-T06
+
+Prepared 2026-10-11; source preparation only. T06 remains wait. This packet
+neither grants live authority nor provides owner acknowledgment.
+
+## Delivered producer and consumer work
+
+SECRETS-WP-0012 is finished: protected in-memory client-secret acquisition,
+operator cleanup, KeyCape exchange, service JWT login and service cleanup passed
+in `docs/evidence/2026-10-10-keycape-openbao-probe.json`. The platform applied
+CCR-2026-0038 on October 8 and published
+`railiance-platform/docs/contracts/secrets-engine-openbao-jwt-login.yaml` on
+October 10. Mount `keycape-services`, role `secrets-engine-openbao`, issuer
+`https://kc.coulomb.social` are published. An unpublished-mount or
+unprovisioned-registration wait is obsolete.
+
+The consumer no-fallback receipt
+`docs/evidence/2026-10-10-service-jwt-no-fallback.json` proves synthetic selection
+and real Bao CLI header behavior against a loopback listener. It is not native
+claim rejection evidence. KEY-WP-0039-T01 is source acceptance done; T02 owns the
+attended actual negative-token session. RPF-WP-0035-T02 retains native claims,
+effective policy/capability denials, and MASON-WP-0009-T05 return.
+
+WP0007 is six of seven complete with native per-lane adoption outstanding.
+WP0009 credential apply/verify/delivery/revocation passed in the September 27
+attended receipts, but its task cannot finish: held EUR 10 reservation still
+needs accounting reconciliation, replacement runtime admission and separate
+retry authority. These are existing live tasks; this packet closes neither.
+
+## Executable missing identity-boundary check
+
+`tools/verify_service_jwt_boundary.py` defaults to backend-free preparation.
+It checks exact applied CCR, published mount/role and issuer, client-secret-file
+refusal and exact guarded paths. Preparation cannot produce a passing native
+receipt. After explicit authorization for the attended metadata check, add
+`--execute` to the same command:
+
+```bash
+env -u BAO_TOKEN -u VAULT_TOKEN -u SECRETS_ENGINE_KEYCAPE_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE \
+  BAO_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:18200 \
+  SECRETS_ENGINE_KEYCAPE_TOKEN_URL=https://kc.coulomb.social/token \
+  SECRETS_ENGINE_KEYCAPE_ISSUER=https://kc.coulomb.social \
+  SECRETS_ENGINE_OPENBAO_JWT_LOGIN=/home/worsch/railiance-platform/docs/contracts/secrets-engine-openbao-jwt-login.yaml \
+  uv run python tools/verify_service_jwt_boundary.py \
+    --ccr /home/worsch/railiance-platform/credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0038-secrets-engine-service-jwt-login.yaml
+```
+
+Live mode uses existing attended custody and performs two service-token metadata
+requests: lookup-self and one batch capabilities-self. The batch checks both
+client-secret guarded paths, `sys/policies/acl/*`, `auth/*/role/*` and
+`auth/token/create`; it never reads their values or attempts writes. Cleanup
+runs even on failed verification. Two metadata calls reserve room for cleanup
+within the service token's eight-use budget. Passing requires exactly the
+self policy, no identity-policy additions, deny on every requested path and
+both operator and service revocation success. Output contains hashes, capability
+booleans and session fingerprints. No backend response/error body is printed.
+Transport fixes bind each request to the configured OpenBao origin, disable
+environment proxies and refuse all redirects including relative redirects.
+Only HTTP 200 application/json with a bounded 64 KiB body and object data is
+accepted. Errors and response bodies are suppressed. Session evidence is
+restricted to the contract whitelist with strict boolean types, the fixed
+source name, and twelve-hex session handles. Native acceptance requires every
+contract field (established, source, both fingerprints and attempted/succeeded
+cleanup flags), a normally returned cleanup call, and no verification failure.
+Stale true evidence cannot override a cleanup exception. HTTP JSON with an
+errors member is refused even when a data member also exists. Synthetic/local-loopback tests
+cover redirects, proxy environment, size/status/content/shape failures, absent
+responses, unknown exceptions and unknown evidence fields with cleanup.
+This does not prove expiry/use exhaustion, native claim negatives or adoption.
+Platform retains those native test obligations and owner review of this tool.
+
+## Protected-operation adoption is a distinct missing contract
+
+INTENT requires task-bounded authority and a functional Lifecycle API. The
+platform design explicitly says this login policy is insufficient for native
+lanes; future execution entitlement requires a separately reviewed CCR type and
+backend-enforced scope. No standing wildcard policy is accepted.
+
+Actual CLI flow (`cli._require_lane_approval`, `_open_backend`, `cmd_apply`) is
+claim → validated PDP Check → approval CAS consume → select provider → OpenBao
+operation. `_open_backend` supplies the login-only service token directly.
+There is no per-action delegated grant or scoped backend exchange in that path.
+Consequently a service-jwt default flip would consume a real approval then fail
+the protected operation. Configured `auto` chooses service-jwt; unconfigured
+`auto` still chooses bootstrap/env. Neither selection proves steady-state
+adoption. Keep existing service policy and provider defaults until the execution
+contract exists; failed JWT never switches provider.
+
+Founder/owner choice needed: retain login-self-only and implement a separately
+owned task-scoped delegation contract (recommended), or explicitly redesign
+backend execution mediation with platform enforcement. Both must preserve
+claim/PDP/CAS binding, exact action/lane/target/expiry/principal scope, failure
+closed, revocation and audit evidence; neither means granting broad standing
+ACLs. Retaining attended bootstrap/env as a transition leaves T06 open.
+
+Concrete missing owner obligation: secrets-engine and railiance-platform must
+agree the execution entitlement's owner and CCR schema, implementation endpoint,
+backend policy enforcement, exact request binding, TTL/use budget and revocation,
+then wire it after successful consume. KeyCape supplies identity, not authority.
+Existing native AppRole delivery sessions are short-lived workload read sessions,
+not an engine administrative entitlement. Existing native lane cutover requires
+scoped attended platform authority but does not implement this exchange.
+
+T06 closes only after native KEY39/CCR negative/expiry/use/cleanup evidence and
+MASON return, a reviewed implemented execution entitlement, and a selected real
+protected action through service identity plus delegated authority: exact bound
+PDP/CAS evidence, intended backend result, unauthorized target/action/expired or
+replayed request refusal, cleanup on success and failure, no standing engine
+credential, and steady-state invocation/default migration evidence. Do not use
+`apply` or any other protected live command to discover the missing entitlement.
+All of this remains in T06 and owner tasks; no residual is silently finished.
diff --git a/tests/test_service_jwt_boundary.py b/tests/test_service_jwt_boundary.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e9c35a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_service_jwt_boundary.py
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+import importlib.util
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import pytest
+
+from secrets_engine.errors import BackendError
+
+spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("boundary", Path(__file__).parents[1] / "tools/verify_service_jwt_boundary.py")
+boundary = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+spec.loader.exec_module(boundary)
+
+
+class Session:
+    client = SimpleNamespace()
+    closed = False
+
+    def close(self):
+        self.closed = True
+
+    def evidence(self):
+        return {"secret_source": "openbao-oidc-in-memory", "established": True,
+                "operator_session_handle": "0123456789ab", "session_handle": "abcdef012345",
+                "operator_revocation_attempted": True, "operator_revocation_succeeded": True,
+                "revocation_attempted": self.closed, "revocation_succeeded": self.closed}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("extra_identity", [False, True])
+def test_batch_denial_checks_identity_policy_and_always_cleans(extra_identity):
+    session = Session()
+    paths = list(boundary.EXPECTED_GUARDS + boundary.ADMIN_DENIES)
+    calls = []
+
+    def request(client, path, payload=None):
+        calls.append((path, payload))
+        if path == "auth/token/lookup-self":
+            return {"policies": ["secrets-engine-login-self"], "identity_policies": ["admin"] if extra_identity else []}
+        return {p: ["deny"] for p in paths}
+
+    result = boundary.verify_session(session, {"expected_policy": "secrets-engine-login-self", "denied_paths": paths}, request)
+    assert result["native_verified"] is (not extra_identity)
+    assert session.closed
+    assert len(calls) == 2
+    assert calls[1][1] == {"paths": paths}
+    assert not result["protected_operation_adoption_proved"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("failure", ["request", "missing-deny", "revoke"])
+def test_failed_or_partial_acceptance_never_passes(failure):
+    session = Session()
+    paths = list(boundary.EXPECTED_GUARDS + boundary.ADMIN_DENIES)
+
+    def request(client, path, payload=None):
+        if failure == "request":
+            raise BackendError("sensitive backend error")
+        if path == "auth/token/lookup-self":
+            return {"policies": ["secrets-engine-login-self"]}
+        return {p: ["deny"] for p in paths[:-1] if failure == "missing-deny"} if failure == "missing-deny" else {p: ["deny"] for p in paths}
+
+    if failure == "revoke":
+        def close():
+            raise BackendError("sensitive backend error")
+        session.close = close
+    result = boundary.verify_session(session, {"expected_policy": "secrets-engine-login-self", "denied_paths": paths}, request)
+    assert not result["native_verified"]
+    assert "sensitive backend error" not in str(result)
+    if failure != "revoke":
+        assert session.closed
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("fault", ["oversize-header", "oversize-body", "malformed", "wrong-shape", "wrong-status", "wrong-content", "no-response", "unknown-error"])
+def test_transport_failures_suppress_body_and_cleanup(monkeypatch, fault):
+    from email.message import Message
+    headers = Message()
+    headers["Content-Type"] = "text/plain" if fault == "wrong-content" else "application/json"
+    if fault == "oversize-header":
+        headers["Content-Length"] = str(boundary.MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)
+    response = SimpleNamespace(status=503 if fault == "wrong-status" else 200, headers=headers)
+    raw = b'{"data": {}}'
+    if fault == "oversize-body":
+        raw = b'x' * (boundary.MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)
+    if fault == "malformed":
+        raw = b'private-body'
+    if fault == "wrong-shape":
+        raw = b'{"data": []}'
+
+    class Response:
+        status = response.status
+        headers = response.headers
+        def __enter__(self): return self
+        def __exit__(self, *args): pass
+        def read(self, count):
+            assert count == boundary.MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1
+            return raw
+
+    def opening(req, timeout):
+        if fault in ("no-response", "unknown-error"):
+            raise RuntimeError("private-body")
+        return Response()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(boundary, "build_opener", lambda *args: SimpleNamespace(open=opening))
+    session = Session()
+    session.client = SimpleNamespace(addr="http://127.0.0.1:18200", token="sentinel")
+    plan = {"expected_policy": "secrets-engine-login-self", "denied_paths": list(boundary.EXPECTED_GUARDS + boundary.ADMIN_DENIES)}
+    result = boundary.verify_session(session, plan, lambda c,p,d=None: boundary.request_json(c,p,d,expected_addr=c.addr))
+    assert not result["native_verified"]
+    assert session.closed
+    assert "private-body" not in str(result)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("location", ["http://127.0.0.1:9/private", "/relative"])
+def test_real_redirect_refused_and_proxy_environment_ignored(monkeypatch, location):
+    import threading
+    from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
+    observed = []
+
+    class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+        def do_GET(self):
+            observed.append(self.path)
+            self.send_response(302)
+            self.send_header("Location", location)
+            self.end_headers()
+        def log_message(self, *args): pass
+
+    server = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler)
+    worker = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
+    worker.start()
+    # Invalid proxy would prevent the first request if environment proxies were used.
+    monkeypatch.setenv("http_proxy", "http://127.0.0.1:1")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HTTP_PROXY", "http://127.0.0.1:1")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("no_proxy", "")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("NO_PROXY", "")
+    addr = f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}"
+    session = Session()
+    session.client = SimpleNamespace(addr=addr, token="synthetic-token-only")
+    try:
+        result = boundary.verify_session(session, {"expected_policy":"secrets-engine-login-self", "denied_paths": list(boundary.EXPECTED_GUARDS + boundary.ADMIN_DENIES)},
+            lambda c,p,d=None: boundary.request_json(c,p,d,expected_addr=addr))
+    finally:
+        server.shutdown()
+        server.server_close()
+        worker.join()
+    assert observed == ["/v1/auth/token/lookup-self"]
+    assert session.closed
+    assert not result["native_verified"]
+
+
+def test_origin_mismatch_refused_before_request(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(boundary, "build_opener", lambda *args: pytest.fail("must not send token"))
+    client = SimpleNamespace(addr="http://evil.invalid", token="sentinel")
+    with pytest.raises(BackendError, match="response suppressed"):
+        boundary.request_json(client, "auth/token/lookup-self", expected_addr="http://127.0.0.1:18200")
+
+
+def test_unknown_evidence_and_private_failure_not_published():
+    session = Session()
+    session.evidence = lambda: {"private_token": "private-body", "session_handle": "private-body", "secret_source": "private-body", "operator_revocation_succeeded": True, "revocation_succeeded": True}
+    def fail(*args): raise RuntimeError("private-body")
+    result = boundary.verify_session(session, {"expected_policy":"secrets-engine-login-self", "denied_paths": list(boundary.EXPECTED_GUARDS)}, fail)
+    assert session.closed
+    assert not result["native_verified"]
+    assert "private-body" not in str(result)
+    assert "private_token" not in result
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("missing", list(boundary.SAFE_EVIDENCE))
+def test_every_contract_evidence_field_required(missing):
+    session = Session()
+    original = session.evidence
+    def evidence():
+        result = original()
+        del result[missing]
+        return result
+    session.evidence = evidence
+    paths = list(boundary.EXPECTED_GUARDS + boundary.ADMIN_DENIES)
+    def request(client, path, payload=None):
+        return {"policies": ["secrets-engine-login-self"]} if path == "auth/token/lookup-self" else {p:["deny"] for p in paths}
+    result = boundary.verify_session(session, {"expected_policy":"secrets-engine-login-self", "denied_paths": paths}, request)
+    assert session.closed
+    assert not result["native_verified"]
+
+
+def test_revoke_exception_cannot_be_overridden_by_stale_evidence():
+    session = Session()
+    session.closed = True
+    def close(): raise RuntimeError("private failure")
+    session.close = close
+    paths = list(boundary.EXPECTED_GUARDS + boundary.ADMIN_DENIES)
+    def request(client, path, payload=None):
+        return {"policies": ["secrets-engine-login-self"]} if path == "auth/token/lookup-self" else {p:["deny"] for p in paths}
+    result = boundary.verify_session(session, {"expected_policy":"secrets-engine-login-self", "denied_paths":paths}, request)
+    assert result["revocation_succeeded"] is True
+    assert not result["native_verified"]
+    assert "private failure" not in str(result)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("errors", [[], ["private backend failure"], None])
+def test_errors_and_data_response_never_accepted(monkeypatch, errors):
+    import json
+    from email.message import Message
+    headers = Message()
+    headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+    class Response:
+        status = 200
+        def __enter__(self): return self
+        def __exit__(self, *args): pass
+        def read(self, count): return json.dumps({"data": {}, "errors": errors}).encode()
+    response = Response()
+    response.headers = headers
+    monkeypatch.setattr(boundary, "build_opener", lambda *args: SimpleNamespace(open=lambda *a,**k: response))
+    client = SimpleNamespace(addr="http://127.0.0.1:18200", token="synthetic-only")
+    with pytest.raises(BackendError, match="response suppressed"):
+        boundary.request_json(client, "auth/token/lookup-self", expected_addr=client.addr)
diff --git a/tools/verify_service_jwt_boundary.py b/tools/verify_service_jwt_boundary.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5afbc63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/verify_service_jwt_boundary.py
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+"""Prepare or attend CCR-2026-0038 self-policy/capability acceptance.
+
+Default is backend-free. --execute invokes existing attended in-memory custody;
+never print backend response bodies, secret values, tokens or full accessors.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+from urllib.request import HTTPRedirectHandler, ProxyHandler, Request, build_opener
+
+import yaml
+
+from secrets_engine.config import Config
+from secrets_engine.engine_auth import keycape_config, load_jwt_login_contract, login_service_jwt
+from secrets_engine.errors import BackendError
+
+ADMIN_DENIES = ("sys/policies/acl/*", "auth/*/role/*", "auth/token/create")
+EXPECTED_GUARDS = (
+    "platform/data/workloads/keycape/secrets-engine-openbao",
+    "platform/metadata/workloads/keycape/secrets-engine-openbao",
+)
+
+
+def prepare(cfg, ccr_path):
+    raw = ccr_path.read_bytes()
+    ccr = yaml.safe_load(raw)
+    if not isinstance(ccr, dict) or ccr.get("id") != "CCR-2026-0038" or ccr.get("status") != "applied":
+        raise BackendError("expected applied CCR-2026-0038")
+    bao = ccr.get("openbao", {})
+    auth = bao.get("auth", {})
+    contract = load_jwt_login_contract(cfg)
+    kcfg = keycape_config(cfg)
+    if (contract.mount, contract.role, contract.bound_issuer) != (
+        auth.get("mount"), auth.get("role"), kcfg.issuer
+    ):
+        raise BackendError("login contract and issuer must match applied CCR")
+    if bao.get("guarded_paths") != list(EXPECTED_GUARDS) or bao.get("policy_name") != "secrets-engine-login-self":
+        raise BackendError("unexpected CCR guarded paths or self policy")
+    return {
+        "ccr_sha256": hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest(),
+        "contract_sha256": hashlib.sha256(contract.path.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
+        "denied_paths": list(EXPECTED_GUARDS + ADMIN_DENIES),
+        "expected_policy": "secrets-engine-login-self",
+    }
+
+
+MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 65536
+SAFE_EVIDENCE = {
+    "secret_source": str,
+    "operator_session_handle": str,
+    "session_handle": str,
+    "established": bool,
+    "operator_revocation_attempted": bool,
+    "operator_revocation_succeeded": bool,
+    "revocation_attempted": bool,
+    "revocation_succeeded": bool,
+}
+
+
+class NoRedirect(HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl):
+        raise BackendError("redirect refused")
+
+
+def origin(url):
+    parsed = urlsplit(url)
+    if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parsed.hostname or parsed.username or parsed.password or parsed.query or parsed.fragment or parsed.path not in ("", "/"):
+        raise BackendError("invalid configured OpenBao origin")
+    return (parsed.scheme, parsed.hostname, parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80))
+
+
+def request_json(client, path, payload=None, *, expected_addr=None):
+    # expected_addr is captured from Config.load(), never inferred from a response.
+    try:
+        if expected_addr is None or origin(client.addr) != origin(expected_addr):
+            raise BackendError("unexpected OpenBao origin")
+        if path not in ("auth/token/lookup-self", "sys/capabilities-self"):
+            raise BackendError("unexpected metadata endpoint")
+        data = None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload).encode()
+        req = Request(expected_addr.rstrip("/") + "/v1/" + path, data=data,
+                      headers={"X-Vault-Token": client.token, "Content-Type": "application/json"})
+        # Disable environment proxies and all redirect following before supplying token.
+        opener = build_opener(ProxyHandler({}), NoRedirect())
+        with opener.open(req, timeout=30) as response:
+            if response.status != 200 or response.headers.get_content_type() != "application/json":
+                raise BackendError("unexpected metadata response")
+            length = response.headers.get("Content-Length")
+            if length is not None and (not length.isdecimal() or int(length) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES):
+                raise BackendError("oversize metadata response")
+            raw = response.read(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)
+            if len(raw) > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
+                raise BackendError("oversize metadata response")
+            result = json.loads(raw)
+        if not isinstance(result, dict) or not isinstance(result.get("data"), dict) or "errors" in result:
+            raise BackendError("malformed metadata response")
+        return result["data"]
+    except Exception:
+        raise BackendError("boundary metadata request failed; response suppressed") from None
+
+
+def safe_evidence(session):
+    result = {}
+    try:
+        evidence = session.evidence()
+        if not isinstance(evidence, dict):
+            return result
+        for key, kind in SAFE_EVIDENCE.items():
+            value = evidence.get(key)
+            if type(value) is not kind:
+                continue
+            if kind is str:
+                if key == "secret_source" and value != "openbao-oidc-in-memory":
+                    continue
+                if key.endswith("handle") and not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{12}", value):
+                    continue
+            result[key] = value
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    return result
+
+
+def verify_session(session, plan, request=request_json):
+    """Two metadata requests, then unconditional cleanup, within 8-use budget."""
+    result = {**plan, "auth_provider": "service-jwt", "native_verified": False}
+    cleanup_returned = False
+    try:
+        lookup = request(session.client, "auth/token/lookup-self")
+        # Effective identity policies matter even when default policy is absent.
+        policies = lookup.get("policies")
+        identities = lookup.get("identity_policies", [])
+        result["exact_self_policy"] = policies == [plan["expected_policy"]] and identities == []
+        caps = request(session.client, "sys/capabilities-self", {"paths": plan["denied_paths"]})
+        result["capability_denials"] = {path: caps.get(path) == ["deny"] for path in plan["denied_paths"]}
+    except Exception:
+        result["failure"] = "metadata verification failed; response suppressed"
+    finally:
+        try:
+            session.close()
+            cleanup_returned = True
+        except Exception:
+            result["failure"] = "service revocation failed"
+        result.update(safe_evidence(session))
+    evidence_complete = (
+        result.get("secret_source") == "openbao-oidc-in-memory"
+        and result.get("established") is True
+        and result.get("operator_revocation_attempted") is True
+        and result.get("operator_revocation_succeeded") is True
+        and result.get("revocation_attempted") is True
+        and result.get("revocation_succeeded") is True
+        and all(isinstance(result.get(key), str) and re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{12}", result[key])
+                for key in ("operator_session_handle", "session_handle"))
+    )
+    result["native_verified"] = bool(
+        cleanup_returned and "failure" not in result and evidence_complete
+        and result.get("exact_self_policy") and all(result.get("capability_denials", {}).values())
+        and len(result.get("capability_denials", {})) == len(plan["denied_paths"])
+        and result.get("operator_revocation_succeeded") and result.get("revocation_succeeded")
+    )
+    # These are deliberately separate from boundary acceptance.
+    result["claim_negatives_proved"] = False
+    result["protected_operation_adoption_proved"] = False
+    return result
+
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("--ccr", type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--execute", action="store_true", help="attended live self metadata check; requires scoped authorization")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    try:
+        cfg = Config.load()
+        plan = prepare(cfg, args.ccr)
+        result = verify_session(
+            login_service_jwt(cfg), plan,
+            lambda client, path, payload=None: request_json(client, path, payload, expected_addr=cfg.bao_addr),
+        ) if args.execute else {
+            **plan, "mode": "backend-free-preparation", "native_verified": False,
+            "claim_negatives_proved": False, "protected_operation_adoption_proved": False,
+        }
+    except Exception:
+        print(json.dumps({"native_verified": False, "failure": "preflight/login failed; details suppressed"}))
+        return 1
+    print(json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0 if not args.execute or result["native_verified"] else 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
diff --git a/workplans/SECRETS-WP-0008-layer-model-lifecycle-conformance.md b/workplans/SECRETS-WP-0008-layer-model-lifecycle-conformance.md
index 54cf493..b0d05c9 100644
--- a/workplans/SECRETS-WP-0008-layer-model-lifecycle-conformance.md
+++ b/workplans/SECRETS-WP-0008-layer-model-lifecycle-conformance.md
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ Acceptance:
 id: SECRETS-WP-0008-T06
 status: wait
 depends_on: [RPF-WP-0035-T02]
-blocking_reason: "Positive service-JWT login proof passed 2026-10-10 (SECRETS-WP-0012-T03, docs/evidence/2026-10-10-keycape-openbao-probe.json). Waits on railiance-platform closing RPF-WP-0035-T02 with the CCR-2026-0038 negative checks, then on routing live engine actions through service-jwt instead of bootstrap/env."
+blocking_reason: "Published JWT contract and positive login/revocation are delivered. Native KEY-WP-0039-T02 claim negatives, CCR-2026-0038 effective-policy/capability/expiry/use checks and MASON-WP-0009-T05 remain. Login-self-only grants no protected-operation authority: agree and implement separately reviewed task-scoped backend execution entitlement, then prove functional steady-state service-identity adoption without bootstrap/env fallback."
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "d7bc8bdc-a0f8-5058-a640-374ef9859148"
 ```
@@ -352,8 +352,10 @@ argv), then self-revokes. A JWT selection refuses `--bootstrap-token-file` and
 does not read `BAO_TOKEN` on failure. `--bootstrap-token-file` is a named
 break-glass provider with `auth_break_glass` evidence.
 
-The platform-owned OpenBao JWT mount/role is still unpublished, so auto keeps
-bootstrap/env and this task remains `wait`.
+Historical 2026-09-02 state, superseded 2026-10-10: the platform-owned
+OpenBao JWT mount/role was then unpublished. The consumer contract is now
+published; native negative/capability checks and functional task-scoped backend
+execution adoption remain open, so T06 remains `wait`.
 
 Inbox triage 2026-09-21. railiance-platform `29cccf8a` (2026-09-09): status,
 not a contract. Their side is RPF-WP-0035-T02 (design
@@ -549,3 +551,20 @@ T06 still depends on RPF-WP-0035-T02, whose current file remains wait for live
 platform service registration/custody and scoped JWT provisioning plus native
 login, denial and revocation evidence. Source tenant corrections are complete.
 The workplan is now blocked; no new task or workplan was created.
+
+### 2026-10-11 final gate preparation
+
+Completed preparation record: `docs/service-jwt-final-acceptance.md` and
+`tools/verify_service_jwt_boundary.py`; synthetic acceptance tests cover added
+identity policy, omitted deny, metadata failure, failed cleanup, redirects,
+environment proxies, bounded transport, complete typed evidence, stale cleanup
+claims and mutually exclusive backend error/data responses. The tool
+default is backend-free and cannot claim native success. It prepares the exact
+applied CCR capability batch and preserves the eight-use cleanup budget.
+
+The actual CLI consumes approval before supplying its selected backend token.
+The current service token grants self endpoints only, and no delegated backend
+entitlement is implemented. Configuring auto now would not prove functional
+protected-action adoption. T06 stays wait; no provider default, policy, secret,
+live registration or owner acknowledgment changed. Existing live owner tasks
+retain all remaining acceptance and execution entitlement work.