diff --git a/workplans/SECRETS-WP-0007-production-lifecycle-hardening.md b/workplans/SECRETS-WP-0007-production-lifecycle-hardening.md
index 5ea11af..195738c 100644
--- a/workplans/SECRETS-WP-0007-production-lifecycle-hardening.md
+++ b/workplans/SECRETS-WP-0007-production-lifecycle-hardening.md
@@ -453,6 +453,42 @@ class we had just been warning about.
   one package covering all twelve actions. Do not build per-action pin
   configuration for a distinction that does not exist.
 
+Brought into practice 2026-09-06. The chain is complete in code and proven end
+to end; what remains is deployment only.
+
+- Step 2 is implemented (`decision_check.check_decision`, POST `/v1/check`) and
+  `approval_consume.authorize_action` coordinates steps 1 and 2. Both build the
+  same CheckRequest through one `_expected_request`, since two descriptions of
+  the proposed action cannot produce corresponding digests.
+- `apply_unreachable_engine_stance` now takes `authorized=`. The published map
+  defines `fail_closed` as no protected side effect *without* a durable
+  access-engine decision record, so holding a validated one means the engine was
+  reachable and the residue does not apply. This is not a stance bypass: both
+  steps must have succeeded, CAS consume still precedes OpenBao, and with
+  nothing configured `authorize_action` returns `None` and production fails
+  closed exactly as before. Verified by CLI, not only by unit test.
+- `tests/test_integration_authorization.py` drives the real gate through
+  claim -> check -> consume -> OpenBao against a live throwaway OpenBao, and
+  asserts PIP-before-PDP ordering, consume as the last step before the backend,
+  and that an unreachable PDP, a denied decision, an invalid claim, a missing
+  `pdp_digest`, a consume conflict, and an action mismatch each stop before the
+  backend. The stub serves transport and sequencing only; wire contracts stay
+  pinned to flex-auth's real fixtures.
+- The end-to-end run found a third instance of the cross-vocabulary defect: a
+  leftover comparison of the claim's `binding.action` against ours. Real claims
+  say `secrets.kv.destroy` where we say `destroy`, so it would have failed
+  against every one of them. Removed; the tie is `pdp_digest`. Worth noting the
+  pattern: unit tests with self-consistent fakes hid all three, and each was
+  found only by a real artifact or a real chain.
+
+Remaining to go live is configuration and deployment, not engine work:
+`SECRETS_ENGINE_PDP_URL`/`_PDP_TOKEN_FILE` (awaiting the `flex-auth-secrets-engine`
+pin, `FLEX-WP-0021-T04`/`T05`), `SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_URL`/`_TOKEN_FILE`
+(awaiting `APPROVAL-WP-0002-T03`), the policy pin (published but not to be set
+until T05), a KeyCape RS256 credential in place of the static Bearer token, and
+`approval.authorization_id` on each lane. Destroy additionally needs the
+vocabulary mapping or a `pdp_digest` guarantee.
+
 Define and enforce the decision contract needed by production commands. A
 resolved approval must bind at least: