feat: prepare data-only Anthropic native delivery lane

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a0726e-5232-73f2-aaca-2c05ceb62efb

catalog/glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+id: glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic
+kind: kv
+org: coulomb
+repo: sand-boxer
+stage: prod
+description: Proposed native exec-env delivery for CCR-2026-0016. KV custody exists;
+  no runtime grant or activation yet.
+mount: platform
+path: workloads/glas-harness/claude-agent-dev
+mount_management: existing
+fields:
+- ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
+consumers:
+- name: sand-boxer-glas-agent-dev
+  auth: approle
+  claim: catalog:glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic
+  purpose: Owner-admitted glas-harness agt run through the reviewed local profile;
+    no caller-facing key fetch
+workload_delivery: []
+delivery_modes:
+- exec-env
+- read-check
+delivery_auth:
+  method: approle
+  management: engine
+  policy_name: se-prod-glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic
+  role_name: se-prod-glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic
+  metadata_read: false
+  token_ttl: 5m
+  token_max_ttl: 15m
+  secret_id_ttl: 5m
+  secret_id_num_uses: 1
+  token_num_uses: 8
+approval:
+  model: ccr
+  decision_ref: CCR-2026-0016
+  notes: Custody only has been completed. Native apply and exec require durable exact-action
+    authorization, engine consume, scoped backend authority and verified delivery
+    state. This entry is not authorization.
+verification:
+  positive: Exact scoped AppRole reads only ANTHROPIC_API_KEY into the approved child;
+    owner binding and redaction pass.
+  negative: Wrong owner profile/project/actor, direct caller fetch, sibling KV, metadata,
+    listing and writes denied.
+risk:
+  classification: high
+  notes: API spend; provider expiry 2027-01-31T21:00:00Z is not enforced by Bao token
+    TTL. Workspace scope and budget unverified.
+rotation:
+  owner: railiance-platform + sand-boxer
+  expectation: Provider replacement, versioned CAS custody, stop old runs, verify
+    replacement then revoke predecessor at Anthropic and prove denial.
+  ttl: provider-defined
+deactivation:
+  owner: railiance-platform + sand-boxer
+  expectation: Disable lane, stop affected runs, revoke Bao sessions and provider
+    key. Preserve custody history.
+audit:
+  evidence: CCR id, actor, exact path, field name, provider key identifier if non-secret,
+    timestamps, and pass/fail only

docs/catalog-admission.md

@@ -120,3 +120,10 @@ Before accepting an existing production lane:
    that approval cannot be resolved.
 8. Preserve the interim route until native positive and negative verification
    passes without exposing a value.
+
+### Optional data-only KV read policy
+
+`delivery_auth.metadata_read` is a boolean, defaulting to `true` for existing
+lanes. Set `false` when the consumer needs only the KV data GET; generated
+policy omits the metadata endpoint. Owner metadata verification then needs
+separate operator authority, not broader consumer access.

docs/glas-claude-delivery.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Glas Claude exec delivery
+
+Proposed native lane `glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic`, provenance
+railiance-platform CCR-2026-0016; implementation/activation record SECRETS-WP-0009.
+KV custody is already confirmed at version 2. Do not provision or rotate it as
+part of native read-lane adoption.
+
+The generated plan checks existing mount `platform`, creates policy and AppRole
+`se-prod-glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic`, and grants read only on
+`platform/data/workloads/glas-harness/claude-agent-dev`. Field ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
+is selected by the exec adapter; KV policies scope entries, not fields.
+`delivery_auth.metadata_read: false` excludes the metadata endpoint; existing
+lanes retain their previous metadata access by default. Token TTL 5m, maximum
+15m, SecretID TTL 5m and single use, token use budget 8. No wildcard, listing,
+workload writes, mount mutation, provider creation or default-policy change is
+included in this plan. Verify effective token identity policies at activation.
+
+Sand-boxer's owner-configured credential route binds profile, project, actor and
+nonempty run id before invoking secrets-engine's exec-env interface. The
+provider injects the key into a private host helper that directly forwards it to
+the namespace broker. The broker injects only ANTHROPIC_API_KEY into the command
+and redacts exact values before truncating output. No OpenBao token crosses
+into the sandbox; no key is returned through Glas's API. Values are available
+to the trusted workload and descendants; encoding/exfiltration by hostile
+workload code is not prevented by an output redactor. Existing sandbox, egress,
+artifact verification and profile admission boundaries remain required.
+
+A synthetic provider proves the transport only. It does not stand in for native
+approval, OpenBao access, provider authentication or production readiness.
+
+## Activation requirements
+
+The current engine's production stance refuses before opening the backend:
+`production action 'exec' requires a durable access-engine decision record;
+live production remains disabled`. This refusal was exercised with the proposed
+catalog and service-jwt selection. No real value was requested.
+
+Activation depends on SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 (exact production actions) and
+SECRETS-WP-0008-T02/T06 (decision consumption and service authority). Require
+canonical ActionAuthorization for each protected action, successful consume,
+and exact scoped backend authority. This draft cannot authorize itself; an
+operator browser token or unsafe-demo flag is not a runtime substitute.
+
+Once those services exist: obtain the reviewed apply authorization, apply this
+exact policy/AppRole with scoped authority, verify positive read and denied
+metadata/sibling/write access without exposing values, and record delivery-ready
+state. Bind approved exec authorization and named engine service authentication
+to the sand-boxer owner route. Prove actual provider authentication and a bounded
+Glas task, then activate routing and only the validated profile.
+
+Rotation: store replacement with CAS, stop old runs, verify replacement, revoke
+predecessor at Anthropic and prove denial. Bao session expiration does not revoke
+the provider key. Compromise disables the provider key and affected runs first.

src/secrets_engine/catalog.py

@@ -284,6 +284,8 @@ def validate_entry(data: dict[str, Any], *, source: str = "<memory>") -> Catalog
         delivery_auth = data["delivery_auth"]
         if not isinstance(delivery_auth, dict):
             raise CatalogError(f"{source}: delivery_auth must be a mapping")
+        if "metadata_read" in delivery_auth and not isinstance(delivery_auth["metadata_read"], bool):
+            raise CatalogError(f"{source}: delivery_auth.metadata_read must be boolean")
         auth_method = delivery_auth.get("method", "approle")
         auth_management = delivery_auth.get("management", "engine")
         if auth_method not in VALID_DELIVERY_AUTH_METHODS:

src/secrets_engine/roles.py

@@ -175,10 +175,10 @@ def lane_policy_paths(entry: CatalogEntry) -> dict[str, list[str]]:
     """The minimal KV v2 paths + capabilities a consumer policy needs for a lane."""
     data_path = f"{entry.mount}/data/{entry.path}"
     meta_path = f"{entry.mount}/metadata/{entry.path}"
-    return {
+    paths = {data_path: ["read"]}
-        data_path: ["read"],
+    if entry.delivery_auth.get("metadata_read", True):
-        meta_path: ["read"],
+        paths[meta_path] = ["read"]
-    }
+    return paths
 
 
 def render_policy_hcl(policy_name: str, paths: dict[str, list[str]]) -> str:

tests/test_guards.py

@@ -114,3 +114,20 @@ def test_every_admitted_lane_renders_existing_mount_check_and_exact_policy():
         assert f'path "{entry.kv_data_path}"' in plan.policy_hcl
         assert "*" not in entry.kv_data_path
         assert plan.role_name.startswith("se-prod-")
+
+
+def test_metadata_read_can_be_excluded_without_changing_default():
+    from secrets_engine.roles import lane_policy_paths
+    default = _entry(stage="test", path="test/team/thing")
+    assert "secret/metadata/test/team/thing" in lane_policy_paths(default)
+    narrow = _entry(stage="test", path="test/team/thing", delivery_auth={
+        "method":"approle", "management":"engine", "metadata_read":False})
+    assert lane_policy_paths(narrow) == {"secret/data/test/team/thing":["read"]}
+    assert "metadata/" not in build_plan(narrow, "test").policy_hcl
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("invalid", ["false", None, 0, [], {}])
+def test_metadata_read_setting_requires_boolean(invalid):
+    from secrets_engine.errors import CatalogError
+    with pytest.raises(CatalogError, match="metadata_read must be boolean"):
+        _entry(delivery_auth={"metadata_read":invalid})

workplans/SECRETS-WP-0009-glas-claude-native-delivery.md

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+---
+id: SECRETS-WP-0009
+type: workplan
+title: "Activate native Claude credential delivery for Glas"
+domain: infotech
+repo: secrets-engine
+status: blocked
+owner: codex
+created: "2026-09-05"
+updated: "2026-09-05"
+---
+
+Demand: GLAS-WP-0012-T02 / SAND-WP-0015-T04, custody CCR-2026-0016.
+The user authorized continuing credential delivery after storing the key in Bao.
+This record tracks native read-lane adoption, not a new provider key or rotation.
+
+## Define the exact native read lane
+
+```task
+id: SECRETS-WP-0009-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Added catalog glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic; plan checks existing platform
+mount and proposes one data-only read policy/AppRole. Token TTL5m/max15m,
+single-use SecretID5m, token use budget8. See docs/glas-claude-delivery.md.
+No metadata, sibling, listing or write capability is proposed.
+
+## Support data-only delivery policies
+
+```task
+id: SECRETS-WP-0009-T02
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Added boolean delivery_auth.metadata_read with compatible default true and
+explicit false for this lane. Validation refuses non-booleans; generated plan
+omits metadata permissions when disabled. Full owner suite passes. Sand-boxer
+synthetic exec-env transport proof passed; no real secret was read.
+
+## Activate the approved native lane and verify real owner delivery
+
+```task
+id: SECRETS-WP-0009-T03
+status: wait
+priority: high
+```
+
+Depends on SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 and SECRETS-WP-0008-T02/T06: canonical production
+authorization, successful consume and scoped service authority must exist.
+Current production exec refuses before OpenBao because durable access-engine
+decision records are not served. Do not bypass this with unsafe-demo or a human
+operator runtime token. Then apply the exact read policy/AppRole, prove positive
+and negative access, register delivery-ready evidence, bind owner exec with
+service authentication, and return verified pins/evidence to SAND-WP-0015 and
+GLAS-WP-0012. Provider scope/budget and expiry remain explicit acceptance inputs.
+Keep the catalog route inactive until real verification passes.