feat(mvp): working secrets-engine CLI for the whynot-design npm publish lane

Implements SECRETS-WP-0002 end to end as a uv-managed Python package:

- catalog: non-secret lane registry + strict validator (build/test/prod)
- stage roles + OpenBao ACL policies; guards refuse wildcards, sys/, identity/,
  admin names, and cross-stage paths before any backend call
- plan/apply: dry-run-first, idempotent policy + approle apply, decision-gated
- decisions: State Hub lookup with local-fixture fallback; non-secret evidence
  to JSONL + hub progress, scrubbed of any value
- provision/verify: mode-0600 file import + generated test values; positive/
  negative checks that never print the value
- exec delivery: `exec --catalog ... -- npm publish` injects the token via a
  temp .npmrc for the child only, cleaned up on exit/failure/interrupt
- ops-warden routing contract + hardening backlog docs
- 34 tests incl. live OpenBao integration; scripts/demo-e2e.sh runs the full
  chain against a throwaway bao dev server

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-06-28 12:28:45 +02:00
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# OpenBao Stage Roles & Bootstrap
secrets-engine talks to OpenBao through three **stage roles**, never as root or a
platform admin. Each role is confined to one stage's KV prefix and a small,
explicit capability set.
| Role | Policy file | KV prefix | May do | May NOT do |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `secrets-engine-build` | `policies/secrets-engine-build.hcl` | `secret/.../build/` | manage build metadata + generated test values; own `se-build-*` policies/roles | touch test/prod, `sys/*`, `auth/token/*`, `identity/*`, act as root |
| `secrets-engine-test` | `policies/secrets-engine-test.hcl` | `secret/.../test/` | manage test metadata + values; run positive/negative checks; own `se-test-*` | touch build/prod, `sys/*`, `auth/token/*`, `identity/*`, act as root |
| `secrets-engine-prod` | `policies/secrets-engine-prod.hcl` | owner-scoped prod lanes | apply approved prod ACL policies + approle roles; write approved values; own `se-prod-*` | reach build/test, edit the stage roles themselves, admin `sys/auth`, `sys/mounts`, `identity/*`, `auth/token/*`, act as root |
The **product requirement** is the stage *distinction* and the *denials*, not the
exact policy names — those may evolve as info-tech-canon hardens.
## Negative guarantees (enforced two ways)
1. **In OpenBao** — each policy carries explicit `deny` stanzas for other stages
and for `sys/*`, `auth/token/*`, `identity/*`.
2. **In secrets-engine**`roles.assert_path_in_stage()` and
`roles.assert_policy_safe()` reject any *plan* that would touch another
stage's prefix, use a wildcard, name itself like an admin policy, or carry a
capability outside `create/read/update/delete/list`. A bad plan fails closed
**before** any OpenBao call.
Run the negative checks:
```bash
pytest tests/test_guards.py -q
```
## Bootstrap token files (temporary)
Until OIDC/service auth exists (see the hardening backlog), a **platform-root
operator** may mint a short-lived OpenBao token for a stage role and hand the
agent the *file path* — never the token value.
Requirements for a bootstrap token file:
- mode **0600**, owned by the invoking user;
- located **outside** any Git worktree (e.g. `~/.secrets-engine/bootstrap/`);
- named by role + environment only, never by value
(e.g. `prod.token`, not `npm_abc123.token`);
- **revocable** and **temporary** — tracked with a revocation task;
- referenced by path, e.g.:
```bash
secrets-engine apply whynot-design-npm-publish --stage prod \
--bootstrap-token-file ~/.secrets-engine/bootstrap/prod.token
```
secrets-engine refuses a bootstrap token file that is group/other-readable or
that lives inside the repo worktree (`provision`/`apply` check `st_mode & 0o077`).
### Minting (operator, one-time, root context)
```bash
# Write each stage policy into OpenBao.
bao policy write secrets-engine-build policies/secrets-engine-build.hcl
bao policy write secrets-engine-test policies/secrets-engine-test.hcl
bao policy write secrets-engine-prod policies/secrets-engine-prod.hcl
# Mint a short-lived token for one stage role, store mode-0600 outside the repo.
install -m 700 -d ~/.secrets-engine/bootstrap
bao token create -policy=secrets-engine-prod -ttl=1h -field=token \
> ~/.secrets-engine/bootstrap/prod.token
chmod 600 ~/.secrets-engine/bootstrap/prod.token
```
### Revocation (always have a path)
```bash
# Revoke by accessor (preferred) or delete the file when the TTL is short.
bao token revoke -accessor <accessor>
shred -u ~/.secrets-engine/bootstrap/prod.token
```
Every minted bootstrap token MUST have a corresponding revocation task in the
hardening backlog (`docs/hardening-backlog.md`).