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docs: seed SECRETS-WP-0004 (warden-sign lane); complete SCOPE.md sections

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- SECRETS-WP-0004: scoped warden-sign OpenBao token lane for ops-warden, to
  unblock FLEX-WP-0007 T4 joint smoke. First auth-capability (non-KV) lane and
  first lane touching production OpenBao (bao.coulomb.social).
- SCOPE.md: add the standard sections flagged by the repo scope review (Relevant
  When, Not Relevant When, How It Fits, Terminology, Related / Overlapping,
  Provided Capabilities with fenced capability blocks); refresh Current State to
  reflect the delivered MVP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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tegwick 2026-06-29 12:55:58 +02:00
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SCOPE.md
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@ -39,9 +39,114 @@ roles, safe delivery modes, and non-secret evidence.
- Storing raw secret values in this repo, State Hub, chat, prompts, or logs. - Storing raw secret values in this repo, State Hub, chat, prompts, or logs.
- Broad platform-root or platform-admin automation as a steady-state model. - Broad platform-root or platform-admin automation as a steady-state model.
## Relevant When
- An approved decision needs to become a narrow OpenBao policy/auth-role apply
without platform-root hand-typing.
- A workload or operator command needs a secret delivered **into the command**
without printing or exporting it (e.g. `npm publish`).
- A non-SSH credential need (API key, provider token, npm token, DB password,
scoped OpenBao token) is routed here by ops-warden.
- Build/test/production need different privilege, ceremony, and delivery rules
for the same kind of secret.
- A reviewer needs non-secret evidence of who applied/provisioned/verified what.
## Not Relevant When
- You need an **SSH certificate** (→ ops-warden `warden sign`).
- You need an **authorization decision** (→ flex-auth).
- You need **identity / OIDC / MFA / claim lifecycle** (→ user-engine / key-cape).
- You need a **tunnel** or remote transport (→ ops-bridge).
- You want OpenBao itself replaced as the custody/lease/audit backend (it is not).
- You want a raw secret value moved through Git, State Hub, chat, prompts, or logs
(never — delivery is exec-time or out-of-band only).
## Current State ## Current State
The repo is in bootstrap. Seed intent, PRD, boundary documentation, and an MVP MVP delivered. The Python CLI (`src/secrets_engine/`) proves the
workplan are present. The first worker should complete State Hub bootstrap, `whynot-design-npm-publish` lane end to end — catalog → decision check →
validate the generated repo identity files, then begin the whynot-design npm policy/AppRole apply → provision → positive/negative verify → exec-time npm
publish token pilot through the `SECRETS-WP-0002` workplan. delivery → ops-warden routing pointer → revoke — verified live against OpenBao
(44 tests; `scripts/demo-e2e.sh`, `scripts/npm-publish-demo.sh`). The
netkingdom maturity-gated publication-scope policy is in place but dormant
(netkingdom at `maturity-build`), so lanes clamp to repo-scope / `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN`.
Bootstrap workplans `SECRETS-WP-0001` (State Hub integration) and
`SECRETS-WP-0002` (MVP) are finished. Open: `SECRETS-WP-0003` (real pilot
close-out) and `SECRETS-WP-0004` (scoped `warden-sign` token lane for
ops-warden / FLEX-WP-0007 T4), both proposed.
## How It Fits
secrets-engine is the **interaction layer** in the NetKingdom security stack. It
sits between approval/identity systems and the OpenBao backend:
- **OpenBao / railiance-platform** — enforces custody, policy, lease, audit.
secrets-engine drives it through least-privilege stage roles and validated
paths, never as root.
- **flex-auth / State Hub decisions** — authorize. secrets-engine requires and
verifies a decision before privileged action and writes non-secret evidence
back.
- **user-engine / key-cape** — own identity and claims that bind consumers.
- **ops-warden** — routes non-SSH credential needs here (conduit-not-broker) and
issues SSH certs itself; secrets-engine mints and custodies the tokens.
- **ops-bridge** — may consume scoped delivery for remote execution but stores no
secret material.
- **info-tech-canon** — source of canonical terminology and stage/policy concepts.
Canonical cross-system boundary: `net-kingdom/docs/secrets-engine-security-infrastructure-boundary.md`.
## Terminology
| Term | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| **lane / catalog id** | a non-secret entry describing one secret's OpenBao location, consumers, delivery, approval |
| **stage** | `build` / `test` / `prod` — separate OpenBao privilege contexts |
| **stage role** | `secrets-engine-{build,test,prod}` OpenBao role, confined to its prefix |
| **delivery mode** | how a value leaves OpenBao: `exec-env`, `npm-config`, `read-check`, `wrapped` |
| **org / repo** | Gitea organisation (`coulomb`) / repository (`whynot-design`) — explicit, not the overloaded "project" |
| **npm scope** | the `@`-prefixed npm name (`@whynot`) — distinct from org and repo |
| **maturity** | `maturity-build/test/prod` package tag; feeds the publication-scope policy |
| **bootstrap token** | temporary mode-0600 OpenBao token used during setup, revocable, outside repos |
## Related / Overlapping
- **ops-warden** — front door / SSH cert issuer; routes non-SSH needs here.
- **OpenBao (railiance-platform)** — the custody/policy/lease/audit backend.
- **flex-auth** — authorization decisions secrets-engine depends on.
- **user-engine / key-cape** — identity and claim lifecycle for consumers.
- **ops-bridge** — remote transport; may consume scoped delivery.
- **net-kingdom** — owns the cross-system security-infrastructure boundary doc.
- **info-tech-canon** — canonical terminology source.
## Provided Capabilities
```capability
type: security
title: Decision-aware OpenBao policy/role apply
description: Turns an approved State Hub decision into a narrow, guarded OpenBao apply —
catalog lane to dry-run plan to idempotent ACL policy + AppRole write — through
least-privilege build/test/prod stage roles. Refuses unapproved, superseded, wildcard,
out-of-stage, or broad-admin plans before any backend call. Writes non-secret evidence.
keywords: [secrets, openbao, vault, policy, approle, catalog, decision, stage, least-privilege, netkingdom]
```
```capability
type: security
title: Exec-time secret delivery
description: Delivers a secret into a child process only — never printing, exporting, or
persisting the value. npm-config injects a temporary mode-0600 .npmrc pointing at the
configured registry; exec-env injects a scoped env var. Temp config is cleaned up on
success, failure, and interruption; child output is redacted as a backstop.
keywords: [secrets, delivery, exec, npm, publish, token, injection, redaction, npmrc, openbao]
```
```capability
type: governance
title: Maturity-gated publication-scope policy
description: Binds npm publication scope to package maturity (build to gitea-wide, test to
org-wide, prod to repo-scoped) and gates the graduated table behind the netkingdom domain
reaching production grade. While dormant, every lane clamps to the safest repo-scope —
fail-safe, never fail-open. The injected token env-var name signals the effective blast radius.
keywords: [policy, maturity, publication-scope, governance, least-privilege, npm, gitea, netkingdom]
```

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@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
---
id: SECRETS-WP-0004
type: workplan
title: "Provision a scoped warden-sign token lane (ops-warden / FLEX-WP-0007 T4)"
domain: infotech
repo: secrets-engine
status: proposed
owner: codex
topic_slug: custodian
created: "2026-06-29"
updated: "2026-06-29"
---
# SECRETS-WP-0004 - Provision a scoped warden-sign token lane
## Goal
Give ops-warden a scoped OpenBao credential that can run `warden sign` over the
HTTP API, minted and custodied by secrets-engine. Model it as a first-class
secrets-engine **auth-capability lane** (an OpenBao policy + AppRole granting a
narrow capability), not a KV value. Post the non-secret pointers to State Hub and
hand the token/secret_id to the operator out-of-band.
This unblocks FLEX-WP-0007 T4 (the joint OpenBao + policy-gate production smoke),
after which `policy.enabled: true` can go live on CoulombCore.
## Context
ops-warden raised this on State Hub (msg 077ac90d, 2026-06-28). warden's vault
backend signs over the HTTP API (`X-Vault-Token`) and holds no standing OpenBao
token (conduit-not-broker), so token custody/minting is squarely secrets-engine's
lane. The operator cannot mint one interactively: the `bao` CLI is not installed
on CoulombCore and `bao login -method=oidc` is therefore unavailable — hence the
preference for an AppRole the operator can use non-interactively.
Target backend is the **production** OpenBao at `https://bao.coulomb.social`,
mount `ssh`. Actors in scope: `agt-state-hub-bridge` (primary),
`agt-codex-interhub-bootstrap`, `adm-example`, `atm-backup-daily`. The signing
roles are `agt-role`, `adm-role`, `atm-role`.
This is the first non-KV, non-npm lane and the first lane that touches production
OpenBao, so it also exercises parts of the engine the npm pilot did not.
## Design Constraints
- No token value or AppRole `secret_id` in Git, State Hub, chat, prompts,
workplans, or normal logs — pointers only on the hub, value out-of-band.
- The `warden-sign` policy must be narrow: `update` on `ssh/sign/<role>` for the
allowlisted roles only. No broader `ssh/*`, no `sys/`, `auth/token/`,
`identity/`, no root/sudo.
- Production apply uses a mode-0600 bootstrap token outside any repo, revocable,
recorded in `docs/hardening-backlog.md` H0.
- ops-warden takes no custody; secrets-engine owns minting and revocation.
## Tasks
## T01 - Extend the catalog for auth-capability (non-KV) lanes
```task
id: SECRETS-WP-0004-T01
status: todo
priority: high
```
Add a lane kind that represents an OpenBao auth credential (AppRole + policy)
granting a capability on a mount, rather than a KV value. The current schema
assumes a KV `mount/path/fields` value and `provision --from-file`; an
auth-capability lane has no stored value — the deliverable is the minted token /
`secret_id`.
Acceptance:
- The schema validates a `warden-sign` auth-capability lane (kind explicit).
- KV-only assumptions (`kv_data_path`, from-file provisioning, value verification)
are bypassed for this kind without weakening the npm KV path.
- `plan`/`apply` produce a policy + AppRole for the lane.
## T02 - Define the warden-sign policy and AppRole
```task
id: SECRETS-WP-0004-T02
status: todo
priority: high
```
Author the `warden-sign` ACL policy and AppRole. Policy: `update` on
`ssh/sign/agt-role` (plus `adm-role`, `atm-role`) on the `ssh` mount; nothing
else. AppRole `warden-sign` bound to that policy with a short token TTL, usable
non-interactively via `role_id` + `secret_id` (no `bao` CLI needed).
Acceptance:
- The policy lists exact allowed/denied paths; the guards in `roles.py` refuse any
broader variant (`ssh/*`, `sys/`, `auth/token/`, `identity/`, wildcards, root).
- Negative check: a token from this AppRole can `sign` only the allowlisted roles
and is denied elsewhere on the `ssh` mount.
- The AppRole issues a scoped token carrying only the sign capability.
## T03 - Apply against production OpenBao via bootstrap token
```task
id: SECRETS-WP-0004-T03
status: todo
priority: high
```
Apply the policy + AppRole on `https://bao.coulomb.social` using a mode-0600
bootstrap token stored outside any repo. Idempotent re-apply.
Acceptance:
- The `warden-sign` policy and AppRole exist on the production OpenBao.
- The bootstrap token file is recorded in `docs/hardening-backlog.md` H0 with an
explicit revocation task and TTL.
- Apply evidence is non-secret (policy/role names, mount, addr, status — no value).
## T04 - Out-of-band handoff and non-secret pointers
```task
id: SECRETS-WP-0004-T04
status: todo
priority: high
```
Define and execute the handoff: mint a fresh `secret_id`, deliver it (with the
`role_id`) to the operator out-of-band; warden does `approle login` to obtain a
`VAULT_TOKEN`. Post the non-secret pointers on the ops-warden thread (policy name,
AppRole name, mount `ssh`, addr `https://bao.coulomb.social`, token TTL, status).
Acceptance:
- Pointers are posted to State Hub; no token value or `secret_id` appears there or
in Git/logs.
- The operator can run, on CoulombCore:
`FLEX_AUTH_EXTERNAL=1 SMOKE_VAULT=1 VAULT_TOKEN=<scoped> ~/ops-warden/scripts/policy_gate_production_smoke.sh`.
## T05 - Confirm the joint smoke and signal ops-warden
```task
id: SECRETS-WP-0004-T05
status: todo
priority: medium
```
Confirm the unblock end to end, then reply to ops-warden (msg 077ac90d) with the
pointers and runbook alignment. The reply is the explicit "we will signal
ops-warden when done" step.
Acceptance:
- Allow path resolves to `backend: vault` + a `policy_decision_id`; deny path
(ttl 999) is rejected by flex-auth before OpenBao.
- ops-warden is replied to on State Hub with the non-secret pointers.
- A revocation/rotation task exists for the minted credential.
## Exit Criteria
- A narrow `warden-sign` policy + AppRole exist on production OpenBao, minted and
custodied by secrets-engine, granting only `ssh/sign/<allowlisted-role>` update.
- The operator can obtain a scoped `VAULT_TOKEN` non-interactively without `bao`.
- FLEX-WP-0007 T4 joint smoke is unblocked (or blocked only on an explicit
external condition).
- ops-warden has the non-secret pointers; no secret value crossed State Hub.
- The bootstrap token and the minted credential have revocation tasks.