feat: complete and prove the authorization chain end to end
Implements step 2 (access-engine POST /v1/check) and wires the whole GH-DEC-2026-003 sequence together, then proves it against a live throwaway OpenBao rather than only unit-level fakes. - decision_check.check_decision performs the PDP call; an unreachable or non-200 PDP raises, since silence is never permission. - approval_consume.authorize_action coordinates steps 1 and 2 and returns an AuthorizedAction. Both steps build the same CheckRequest via a shared _expected_request, since two descriptions of the action cannot produce corresponding digests. - apply_unreachable_engine_stance takes authorized=. The published map defines fail_closed as no side effect WITHOUT a durable decision record, so holding a validated one means the residue does not apply. Not a bypass: both steps must have succeeded and CAS consume still precedes OpenBao. Unconfigured still returns None and fails closed. The end-to-end test caught one more instance of the cross-vocabulary bug: a leftover comparison of the claim's binding.action against ours. The claim says secrets.kv.destroy where we say destroy, so it would have failed against every real claim. Removed; the tie is pdp_digest. Integration coverage asserts PIP-then-PDP ordering, that consume is the last step before the backend, and that an unreachable PDP, denied decision, invalid claim, missing pdp_digest, consume conflict and action mismatch each stop before OpenBao. 284 tests pass; production still fails closed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
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@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ did before. Production additionally needs:
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| `SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_TOKEN_FILE` | mode-0600 credential, outside Git |
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| `SECRETS_ENGINE_AUTHORIZATION_SUBJECT_ID` / `_SUBJECT_TYPE` | the acting principal |
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| `SECRETS_ENGINE_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY_PACKAGE` / `_VERSION` | the live pin (step 2) |
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| `SECRETS_ENGINE_PDP_URL` / `_PDP_TOKEN_FILE` | the per-consumer access-engine pin |
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The distinct-approver threshold is no longer a consumer-side check. The claim
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does not expose approver entries; approval-engine folds that requirement into
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