build_action_request emitted no tenant field at all. The deployed secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v2 package reads known_tenant := "tenant:platform" request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") so an absent tenant is not an ignored field, it matches the wrong_tenant first-denial branch. Every gated action this engine sent would have been denied -- and the omission also produced a request_digest that could match no correctly issued decision, since tenant is hashed material. That is the same class of defect as hashing excluded fields, arriving from the other direction, and again only a real artifact exposed it. Found by answering the GLAS-WP-0015 tenant-alignment question instead of assuming the values lined up. - REQUEST_TENANT is pinned against the vendored allow envelopes, so a package retenanting fails a test rather than denying production. - An empty tenant is refused at build time. - Accepted policy version moves v1 -> v2. v1 had no tenant rule and failed open: a rotate under tenant:coulomb returned allow against the deployed package. flex-auth superseded rather than amended it, because a fail-open correction has to be visible as a version change. A test pins that a v1 decision is refused. - Vendored decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json as the denial evidence glas asked for, with tests that we refuse it on effect before anything else and that a deny legally carries no lifetime. docs/tenant-alignment.md states the three tenant values as this repo holds them. It does not resolve the JWT/store mapping: service_auth.TENANT is tenant:coulomb, which is exactly the value the package denies. That is either two layers sharing a namespace format or one wrong constant, and picking between them without an owner ruling is the fail-open shape GH-DEC-2026-008 rejected for action vocabularies. Both constants stay as they are, deliberately not unified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 715726@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092
195 lines
7.2 KiB
Python
195 lines
7.2 KiB
Python
"""flex-auth DecisionEnvelope consumer (step 2 of GH-DEC-2026-003).
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The ActionAuthorization envelope these tests used to cover is deferred and was
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never ratified (FLEX-DEC-2026-006); the approval fact moved to
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tests/test_approval_claim.py. The canonical request digest is unchanged and its
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contract test below is preserved verbatim -- flex-auth confirmed only the
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envelope went away, not the digest join.
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"""
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import copy
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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import pytest
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from secrets_engine.authorization import (
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build_action_request,
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request_digest,
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validate_decision_envelope,
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)
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from secrets_engine.catalog import validate_entry
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from secrets_engine.errors import DecisionError
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from tests.test_catalog import VALID
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def _request():
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entry = validate_entry(copy.deepcopy(VALID))
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return build_action_request(
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entry,
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"deactivate",
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subject_id="user:alice",
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subject_type="Human",
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purpose="contract-test",
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fields=["api_token"],
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policy_targets=[entry.policy_name],
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auth_targets=[entry.role_name],
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request_id="check:test-lane-deactivate",
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)
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def _envelope(request=None):
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"""A flex-auth DecisionEnvelope shaped by schemas/decision_envelope.schema.json."""
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request = request or _request()
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now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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return {
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"id": "decision:test-lane-deactivate",
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"contract_version": "flex-auth.decision-record.v1",
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"request_id": request["id"],
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"effect": "allow",
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"subject": copy.deepcopy(request["subject"]),
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"resource": copy.deepcopy(request["resource"]),
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"binding": {
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"tenant": request["tenant"],
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"subject": copy.deepcopy(request["subject"]),
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"action": request["action"],
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"resource": copy.deepcopy(request["resource"]),
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"context": copy.deepcopy(request["context"]),
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"request_digest": request_digest(request),
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},
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"lifetime": {
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"kind": "bounded",
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"not_before": (now - timedelta(minutes=1)).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"),
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"expires_at": (now + timedelta(minutes=10)).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"),
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},
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"provenance": {
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"evaluator": "flex-auth/secrets-engine",
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"mode": "cluster-local",
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"policy_package": "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle",
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"policy_version": "v2",
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},
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}
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def _validate(envelope, expected=None):
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return validate_decision_envelope(
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envelope,
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expected or _request(),
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accepted_policy_packages={"secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"},
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accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
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)
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def test_digest_is_stable_and_ignores_correlation_fields():
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"""The pinned digest contract now lives in tests/test_decision_replay.py.
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That file verifies against two real DecisionEnvelopes issued by the
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published package. The constant previously pinned here was computed with
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the request `id` inside the hashed material, which
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docs/canonical-request-digest.md excludes -- it matched no issued decision.
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Kept here: the structural property, checked without a hand-maintained pin.
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"""
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request = {
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"id": "check:secrets-engine-destroy-example",
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"subject": {"id": "user:alice", "type": "Human"},
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"action": "destroy",
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"resource": {
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"id": "catalog:example-build-test-token",
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"type": "secret-catalog-lane",
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"system": "secrets-engine",
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"attributes": {
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"stage": "build",
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"fields": ["token"],
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"policy_targets": [],
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"auth_targets": [],
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},
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},
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"context": {"purpose": "contract-test"},
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}
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baseline = request_digest(request)
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assert baseline.startswith("sha256:") and len(baseline) == 71
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assert request_digest({k: v for k, v in request.items() if k != "id"}) == baseline
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assert request_digest({**request, "action": "deactivate"}) != baseline
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def test_valid_allow_envelope_passes():
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result = _validate(_envelope())
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assert result.decision_id == "decision:test-lane-deactivate"
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assert result.action == "deactivate"
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assert result.subject_id == "user:alice"
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def test_state_hub_authority_is_no_longer_required():
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"""GH-DEC-2026-005: State Hub holds no runtime approval authority.
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A correctly issued record naming any other authority (or none) must pass;
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the old AUTHORITY constant failed closed against every real record.
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"""
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env = _envelope()
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env["provenance"]["authority"] = "approval-engine"
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assert _validate(env).action == "deactivate"
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env["provenance"].pop("authority")
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assert _validate(env).action == "deactivate"
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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("mutation", "match"),
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[
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(lambda d: d.update(effect="deny"), "effect is not allow"),
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(lambda d: d.update(effect="audit_only"), "effect is not allow"),
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(lambda d: d["binding"].update(action="destroy"), "binding does not match"),
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(lambda d: d["binding"].update(request_digest="sha256:" + "0" * 64),
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"request digest does not match"),
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(lambda d: d["provenance"].update(policy_package="other.package"),
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"policy package is not accepted"),
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(lambda d: d["provenance"].update(policy_version="v1"),
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"policy version is not accepted"),
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(lambda d: d.update(contract_version="flex-auth.decision-record.v2"),
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"contract version"),
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(lambda d: d["subject"].update(id="user:mallory"), "subject does not match"),
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],
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)
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def test_invalid_envelopes_fail_closed(mutation, match):
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env = _envelope()
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mutation(env)
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with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match=match):
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_validate(env)
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def test_expired_lifetime_fails_closed():
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env = _envelope()
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past = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(minutes=1)
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env["lifetime"]["expires_at"] = past.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
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with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="lifetime has expired"):
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_validate(env)
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def test_lifetime_not_yet_started_fails_closed():
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env = _envelope()
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future = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(minutes=5)
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env["lifetime"]["not_before"] = future.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
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with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="has not started"):
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_validate(env)
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def test_unaccepted_policy_pin_is_required():
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with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="package/version is required"):
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validate_decision_envelope(
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_envelope(), _request(),
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accepted_policy_packages=set(), accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
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)
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def test_unsorted_or_duplicate_target_sets_are_rejected():
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request = _request()
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request["resource"]["attributes"]["policy_targets"] = ["b", "a"]
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with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="sorted and unique"):
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_validate(_envelope(), request)
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def test_approval_fact_is_not_rechecked_here():
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"""GH-DEC-2026-005: a PIP must not republish the PDP's decision, and the
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decision layer must not restate the approval fact. Consumption, supersession
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and approver counts belong to the claim; adding them here would fail closed
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against a valid envelope that simply does not carry them."""
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env = _envelope()
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assert "approvals" not in env and "status" not in env
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assert _validate(env).action == "deactivate"
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