Adoption asked for by flex-auth (FLEX-WP-0021-T05) and glas-harness (GLAS-WP-0015), plus the first real decision this engine has obtained from the deployed pin -- which found a defect the fixtures could not. ACCESS PATH. require_supported_pdp_address refuses in-cluster Service names and any non-loopback host. This is no longer a unilateral call: the owner path is documented as loopback kubectl port-forward over the authenticated Kubernetes API, which is what authenticates the responder transitively (FLEX-DEC-2026-010). A Service name from a workstation does not fail, it resolves through the DNS search suffix to an unrelated public host, and since decision records carry no signature, a responder knowing the published package and version can return an allow that passes every check we make. Fail-closed protects against a PDP that is absent, not one that lies. The guard runs before the token is read, so a misdirected request cannot leak it; a test pins that ordering. LIVE PROOF. Minted a 10-minute TokenRequest token (audience flex-auth, SA secrets-engine/secrets-engine, mode 0600 outside the worktree, shredded after), forwarded to the named pod, and sent a real CheckRequest for glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic. Result: allow, catalog_lane_policy_matched, served by v2 (sha256:bd11c5fe...) -- so the redeploy flex-auth flagged as outstanding has landed and the pin no longer serves the tenant-blind v1. Our tenant fix is confirmed against the real service: binding.tenant is tenant:platform. THE DEFECT IT FOUND. The evaluator enriches from its registry before hashing -- subject gains attributes and tenant, resource gains tenant -- so binding.request_digest is over material we never sent and cannot reproduce. validate_decision_envelope rejects every real allow. Every replay test passes because _request_from() rebuilds the request out of the binding, i.e. the enriched form: a self-consistent fake agreeing with itself, which hid this through three rounds of digest work. Third time a real artifact has beaten a fake in this integration. NOT FIXED, DELIBERATELY. Rejecting a valid allow is wrong in the safe direction. Which fields may be enriched is flex-auth's contract to publish; inferring it means accepting a binding that differs from our proposal in a way we decided was benign -- the fail-open shape GH-DEC-2026-008 rejected for vocabularies and FLEX-DEC-2026-007 for digests. Raised with them. Tenant question closed by operator decision 5ed3fb35: tenant:platform exactly, and service_auth.TENANT stays tenant:coulomb because the two identity layers are to remain distinct. Declining to author that mapping was right -- the answer was neither reading offered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 715726@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092
123 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
123 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
"""The digest join against a REAL request, not one rebuilt from the binding.
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tests/test_decision_replay.py passes every digest assertion because
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``_request_from()`` reconstructs the request out of ``envelope["binding"]`` --
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which is the *enriched* form the evaluator hashed. That is a self-consistent
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fake agreeing with itself, and it hid the gap below through three rounds of
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digest work.
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This module builds the request the way the engine actually builds it and
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compares it to a decision the engine actually received, so the gap is pinned
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until flex-auth publishes the enrichment rule.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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from secrets_engine.authorization import (
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build_action_request,
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canonical_check_request,
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request_digest,
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validate_decision_envelope,
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)
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from secrets_engine.catalog import load_catalog
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from secrets_engine.errors import DecisionError
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LIVE = Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" / "flex-auth-live" / "decision_rotate_glas_live.json"
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CATALOG = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "catalog"
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PACKAGE = "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"
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VERSION = "v2"
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def _live():
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return json.loads(LIVE.read_text())
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def _our_request():
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entry = load_catalog(CATALOG)["glas-claude-agent-dev-anthropic"]
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return build_action_request(
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entry,
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"rotate",
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subject_id="secrets-engine",
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subject_type="service",
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purpose="live-adoption-proof",
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fields=["api_key"],
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request_id="check:secrets-engine-adoption-proof",
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)
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def test_the_live_decision_is_a_real_v2_allow():
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"""Provenance of the artifact these assertions rest on."""
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env = _live()
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assert env["effect"] == "allow"
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assert env["reason"] == "catalog_lane_policy_matched"
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provenance = env["provenance"]
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assert provenance["policy_package"] == PACKAGE
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assert provenance["policy_version"] == VERSION
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assert env["binding"]["tenant"] == "tenant:platform"
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def test_the_evaluator_enriches_subject_and_resource_before_hashing():
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"""Names exactly which fields appeared that we never sent.
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If flex-auth publishes an enrichment rule that differs from this, this test
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fails and tells us the shape moved -- which is the point. It asserts the
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observed gap, not a rule we invented.
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"""
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sent = _our_request()
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bound = _live()["binding"]
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assert "attributes" not in sent["subject"]
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assert set(bound["subject"]["attributes"]) == {
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"description", "display_name", "groups", "organization_relation", "roles",
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}
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assert "tenant" not in sent["subject"]
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assert bound["subject"]["tenant"] == sent["tenant"]
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assert "tenant" not in sent["resource"]
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assert bound["resource"]["tenant"] == sent["tenant"]
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# Everything we DID send survived unchanged. The enrichment is additive, so
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# the decision is about the action we proposed -- which is why staying
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# fail-closed here costs correctness nothing today.
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assert bound["action"] == sent["action"]
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assert bound["tenant"] == sent["tenant"]
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assert bound["context"] == sent["context"]
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assert bound["subject"]["id"] == sent["subject"]["id"]
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assert bound["subject"]["type"] == sent["subject"]["type"]
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for key in ("id", "type", "system", "attributes"):
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assert bound["resource"][key] == sent["resource"][key]
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def test_our_digest_cannot_match_a_real_binding():
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"""The join is unsatisfiable against a real request, not merely mismatched.
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We hash what we sent; the evaluator hashed what it enriched. No amount of
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care on our side closes that, because the registry material is not ours.
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"""
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sent = _our_request()
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bound = _live()["binding"]
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assert bound["request_digest"] != request_digest(sent)
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assert canonical_check_request(bound) != canonical_check_request(sent)
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def test_we_currently_reject_every_real_allow_and_that_is_fail_closed():
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"""Pins today's behaviour honestly rather than asserting it is correct.
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Rejecting a valid allow is wrong, but it is wrong in the safe direction, so
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it stays until flex-auth publishes which fields may be enriched. Guessing
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the rule would mean accepting a binding that differs from our proposal in
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some way we decided was benign -- the fail-open shape GH-DEC-2026-008
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rejected for vocabularies and FLEX-DEC-2026-007 rejected for digests.
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"""
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with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="binding does not match request"):
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validate_decision_envelope(
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_live(),
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_our_request(),
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accepted_policy_packages={PACKAGE},
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accepted_policy_versions={VERSION},
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)
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