Add the warden-sign auth-capability lane, AppRole handoff, verification guards, docs, and tests. Point the whynot-design pilot at the canonical decision and add the real publish closeout preflight/runbook.
161 lines
5.5 KiB
Python
161 lines
5.5 KiB
Python
"""Verification: prove access (or denial) without printing the value.
|
|
|
|
Positive: the approved consumer (via its approle-scoped token) CAN read the lane.
|
|
Negative: an unrelated/unscoped token CANNOT read the lane.
|
|
|
|
Each check returns a boolean + a non-secret evidence dict. The secret value is
|
|
never read into the result.
|
|
"""
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
|
from typing import Any
|
|
|
|
from secrets_engine.catalog import CatalogEntry
|
|
from secrets_engine.errors import VerificationError
|
|
from secrets_engine.openbao import OpenBaoClient
|
|
|
|
|
|
@dataclass
|
|
class VerifyResult:
|
|
check: str # "positive" | "negative"
|
|
passed: bool
|
|
detail: dict[str, Any]
|
|
|
|
def render(self) -> str:
|
|
status = "PASS" if self.passed else "FAIL"
|
|
return f" {self.check} check: {status} ({self.detail.get('reason', '')})"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def verify_positive(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry, field: str) -> VerifyResult:
|
|
"""Approved consumer token must be able to read the field."""
|
|
try:
|
|
token = client.approle_login_token(entry.role_name)
|
|
except Exception as e: # backend errors -> failed verification, not a value leak
|
|
return VerifyResult(
|
|
"positive",
|
|
False,
|
|
{"reason": f"could not obtain approle token: {e}", "path": entry.path},
|
|
)
|
|
present = client.kv_field_present(entry.mount, entry.path, field, token=token)
|
|
return VerifyResult(
|
|
"positive",
|
|
present,
|
|
{
|
|
"reason": "approved consumer can read lane field"
|
|
if present
|
|
else "approved consumer could NOT read field",
|
|
"path": entry.path,
|
|
"field": field,
|
|
"role": entry.role_name,
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def verify_negative(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry) -> VerifyResult:
|
|
"""An unrelated token must be denied. Uses an empty (invalid) token."""
|
|
# An empty/garbage token stands in for an unrelated consumer.
|
|
denied = not client.kv_can_read(entry.mount, entry.path, token="se-unrelated-denied")
|
|
return VerifyResult(
|
|
"negative",
|
|
denied,
|
|
{
|
|
"reason": "unrelated token denied read"
|
|
if denied
|
|
else "unrelated token was ABLE to read (LEAK RISK)",
|
|
"path": entry.path,
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def verify_auth_capability_positive(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry) -> VerifyResult:
|
|
"""Approved AppRole token must carry update on every exact allowed path."""
|
|
try:
|
|
token = client.approle_login_token(entry.role_name)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
return VerifyResult(
|
|
"positive",
|
|
False,
|
|
{"reason": f"could not obtain approle token: {e}", "role": entry.role_name},
|
|
)
|
|
missing: list[str] = []
|
|
for path in entry.auth_allowed_paths:
|
|
try:
|
|
caps = client.token_capabilities(path, token=token)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
return VerifyResult(
|
|
"positive",
|
|
False,
|
|
{"reason": f"could not inspect capabilities: {e}", "path": path},
|
|
)
|
|
if "update" not in caps:
|
|
missing.append(path)
|
|
passed = not missing
|
|
return VerifyResult(
|
|
"positive",
|
|
passed,
|
|
{
|
|
"reason": "approle token can update every allowlisted path"
|
|
if passed
|
|
else "approle token lacks update on allowlisted paths",
|
|
"role": entry.role_name,
|
|
"allowed_paths": sorted(entry.auth_allowed_paths),
|
|
"missing_update": missing,
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def verify_auth_capability_negative(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry) -> VerifyResult:
|
|
"""Approved AppRole token must not gain update outside denial probes."""
|
|
try:
|
|
token = client.approle_login_token(entry.role_name)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
return VerifyResult(
|
|
"negative",
|
|
False,
|
|
{"reason": f"could not obtain approle token: {e}", "role": entry.role_name},
|
|
)
|
|
leaks: list[str] = []
|
|
for path in entry.auth_denied_probe_paths:
|
|
try:
|
|
caps = client.token_capabilities(path, token=token)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
return VerifyResult(
|
|
"negative",
|
|
False,
|
|
{"reason": f"could not inspect capabilities: {e}", "path": path},
|
|
)
|
|
if "update" in caps or "sudo" in caps or "root" in caps:
|
|
leaks.append(path)
|
|
passed = not leaks
|
|
return VerifyResult(
|
|
"negative",
|
|
passed,
|
|
{
|
|
"reason": "denial probes lack update capability"
|
|
if passed
|
|
else "approle token can update outside the allowlist",
|
|
"role": entry.role_name,
|
|
"denied_probe_paths": entry.auth_denied_probe_paths,
|
|
"leaks": leaks,
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def run_verification(
|
|
client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry, field: str, *, positive: bool, negative: bool
|
|
) -> list[VerifyResult]:
|
|
results: list[VerifyResult] = []
|
|
if entry.kind == "auth-capability":
|
|
if positive:
|
|
results.append(verify_auth_capability_positive(client, entry))
|
|
if negative:
|
|
results.append(verify_auth_capability_negative(client, entry))
|
|
else:
|
|
if positive:
|
|
results.append(verify_positive(client, entry, field))
|
|
if negative:
|
|
results.append(verify_negative(client, entry))
|
|
if not results:
|
|
raise VerificationError("no verification check selected (use --positive/--negative)")
|
|
return results
|