secrets-engine/src/secrets_engine/verify.py
tegwick 6382139890 feat: add auth-capability lanes and pilot closeout
Add the warden-sign auth-capability lane, AppRole handoff, verification guards, docs, and tests.

Point the whynot-design pilot at the canonical decision and add the real publish closeout preflight/runbook.
2026-06-29 16:58:16 +02:00

161 lines
5.5 KiB
Python

"""Verification: prove access (or denial) without printing the value.
Positive: the approved consumer (via its approle-scoped token) CAN read the lane.
Negative: an unrelated/unscoped token CANNOT read the lane.
Each check returns a boolean + a non-secret evidence dict. The secret value is
never read into the result.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any
from secrets_engine.catalog import CatalogEntry
from secrets_engine.errors import VerificationError
from secrets_engine.openbao import OpenBaoClient
@dataclass
class VerifyResult:
check: str # "positive" | "negative"
passed: bool
detail: dict[str, Any]
def render(self) -> str:
status = "PASS" if self.passed else "FAIL"
return f" {self.check} check: {status} ({self.detail.get('reason', '')})"
def verify_positive(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry, field: str) -> VerifyResult:
"""Approved consumer token must be able to read the field."""
try:
token = client.approle_login_token(entry.role_name)
except Exception as e: # backend errors -> failed verification, not a value leak
return VerifyResult(
"positive",
False,
{"reason": f"could not obtain approle token: {e}", "path": entry.path},
)
present = client.kv_field_present(entry.mount, entry.path, field, token=token)
return VerifyResult(
"positive",
present,
{
"reason": "approved consumer can read lane field"
if present
else "approved consumer could NOT read field",
"path": entry.path,
"field": field,
"role": entry.role_name,
},
)
def verify_negative(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry) -> VerifyResult:
"""An unrelated token must be denied. Uses an empty (invalid) token."""
# An empty/garbage token stands in for an unrelated consumer.
denied = not client.kv_can_read(entry.mount, entry.path, token="se-unrelated-denied")
return VerifyResult(
"negative",
denied,
{
"reason": "unrelated token denied read"
if denied
else "unrelated token was ABLE to read (LEAK RISK)",
"path": entry.path,
},
)
def verify_auth_capability_positive(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry) -> VerifyResult:
"""Approved AppRole token must carry update on every exact allowed path."""
try:
token = client.approle_login_token(entry.role_name)
except Exception as e:
return VerifyResult(
"positive",
False,
{"reason": f"could not obtain approle token: {e}", "role": entry.role_name},
)
missing: list[str] = []
for path in entry.auth_allowed_paths:
try:
caps = client.token_capabilities(path, token=token)
except Exception as e:
return VerifyResult(
"positive",
False,
{"reason": f"could not inspect capabilities: {e}", "path": path},
)
if "update" not in caps:
missing.append(path)
passed = not missing
return VerifyResult(
"positive",
passed,
{
"reason": "approle token can update every allowlisted path"
if passed
else "approle token lacks update on allowlisted paths",
"role": entry.role_name,
"allowed_paths": sorted(entry.auth_allowed_paths),
"missing_update": missing,
},
)
def verify_auth_capability_negative(client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry) -> VerifyResult:
"""Approved AppRole token must not gain update outside denial probes."""
try:
token = client.approle_login_token(entry.role_name)
except Exception as e:
return VerifyResult(
"negative",
False,
{"reason": f"could not obtain approle token: {e}", "role": entry.role_name},
)
leaks: list[str] = []
for path in entry.auth_denied_probe_paths:
try:
caps = client.token_capabilities(path, token=token)
except Exception as e:
return VerifyResult(
"negative",
False,
{"reason": f"could not inspect capabilities: {e}", "path": path},
)
if "update" in caps or "sudo" in caps or "root" in caps:
leaks.append(path)
passed = not leaks
return VerifyResult(
"negative",
passed,
{
"reason": "denial probes lack update capability"
if passed
else "approle token can update outside the allowlist",
"role": entry.role_name,
"denied_probe_paths": entry.auth_denied_probe_paths,
"leaks": leaks,
},
)
def run_verification(
client: OpenBaoClient, entry: CatalogEntry, field: str, *, positive: bool, negative: bool
) -> list[VerifyResult]:
results: list[VerifyResult] = []
if entry.kind == "auth-capability":
if positive:
results.append(verify_auth_capability_positive(client, entry))
if negative:
results.append(verify_auth_capability_negative(client, entry))
else:
if positive:
results.append(verify_positive(client, entry, field))
if negative:
results.append(verify_negative(client, entry))
if not results:
raise VerificationError("no verification check selected (use --positive/--negative)")
return results