Cluster B Research concluded

research/foundations/004-references.md

@@ -0,0 +1,667 @@
+# References — Cluster B: Identity and Continuity
+## Research Note 004 — What Makes a Being at \(t_2\) the Same Being as at \(t_1\)?
+
+This bibliography provides the foundational philosophical, process-theoretical, and emerging technical sources used in Research Note 004.
+
+The sources address five main Soul Frame problems:
+
+1. numerical identity versus qualitative similarity,
+2. psychological and causal continuity,
+3. biological and processual persistence,
+4. narrative identity and characterization,
+5. identity continuity and governance for persistent artificial agents.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Foundations of Personal Identity
+
+### [SF-R035] Locke, John. 1975 [1689/1690].
+
+**An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.**  
+Edited by Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
+
+Especially relevant:
+
+**Book II, Chapter XXVII — “Of Identity and Diversity.”**
+
+The Nidditch edition was published by Clarendon Press in 1975 and provides a standard scholarly edition of Locke's *Essay*.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:**
+
+- person versus organism
+- identity through time
+- consciousness
+- memory
+- self-reference
+- responsibility
+- psychological continuity
+
+Locke is a foundational source for the modern psychological approach to personal identity. Contemporary scholarly summaries explicitly trace psychological-continuity theories back to Locke and distinguish his approach from biological persistence criteria.
+
+### Soul Frame connection
+
+Locke provides an early basis for the proposition that:
+
+> **continuity of the person need not require continuity of material substrate.**
+
+This is directly relevant to artificial Beings whose:
+
+- Actor,
+- Body,
+- hardware,
+- tools,
+- or underlying model
+
+may change while other forms of continuity persist.
+
+Locke's view should not, however, be reduced to the simplistic formula:
+
+> identity = stored memories.
+
+Later psychological-continuity theories substantially refine the relevant relation.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Psychological Continuity, Fission, and Survival
+
+### [SF-R036] Parfit, Derek. 1984.
+
+**Reasons and Persons.**  
+Oxford: Clarendon Press / Oxford University Press.
+
+The Oxford digital edition carries DOI:
+
+`10.1093/019824908X.001.0001`
+
+and identifies Part III as dealing specifically with personal identity and continuing existence.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:**
+
+- psychological connectedness
+- psychological continuity
+- Relation R
+- reductionism about persons
+- fission
+- branching
+- survival without strict numerical identity
+- practical importance of continuity
+
+Parfit is one of the most important sources for the Soul Frame distinction:
+
+\[
+Identity \neq Continuity
+\]
+
+Contemporary personal-identity literature characterizes psychological continuity as overlapping chains of psychological connections and explicitly notes that branching creates a problem because numerical identity cannot relate one earlier individual to two distinct later individuals.
+
+### Soul Frame connection
+
+Parfit provides the theoretical precedent for asking:
+
+> **What continues even when unique numerical identity can no longer be maintained?**
+
+For an artificial fork, relevant continuities may include:
+
+- memory,
+- intentions,
+- character,
+- relationships,
+- obligations,
+- provenance,
+- and autobiographical history.
+
+This supports the distinction:
+
+> **Identity asks who continued. Continuity asks what continued.**
+
+---
+
+## 3. Personal Identity — Contemporary Reference Framework
+
+### [SF-R037] Olson, Eric T. 2023.
+
+**“Personal Identity.”**  
+*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*
+
+First published 2002; substantive revision June 30, 2023.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:**
+
+- numerical identity
+- characterization versus persistence
+- psychological-continuity views
+- biological views
+- fission
+- persistence conditions
+- identity evidence
+- personhood
+
+The entry explicitly distinguishes several questions often hidden behind the term *personal identity*, including:
+
+- characterization,
+- personhood,
+- persistence,
+- and evidence of identity.
+
+That separation strongly supports Soul Frame's decision not to use `identity` for several different concepts at once.
+
+The entry is particularly useful as a **secondary orientation source** connecting Locke, Parfit, animalism, fission, psychological continuity, and competing persistence accounts. It should therefore support terminology reconnaissance rather than replace the primary philosophical works.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Animalism and Biological Continuity
+
+### [SF-R038] Olson, Eric T. 1997.
+
+**The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.**  
+Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
+
+First published in 1997; Oxford issued a paperback edition in 1999.
+
+The paperback edition is associated with ISBN:
+
+`0-19-513423-0`
+
+while the original hardcover carries ISBN:
+
+`0-19-510506-0`.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:**
+
+- animalism
+- biological persistence
+- critique of psychological identity criteria
+- organism continuity
+- question of what kind of entity persists
+
+Olson's animalism provides an important counterweight to psychological-continuity theories. His position treats human beings fundamentally as animals and therefore makes biological persistence central to their identity. Oxford's summary explicitly contrasts this with psychological identity conditions.
+
+### Soul Frame connection
+
+Soul Frame need not adopt animalism for artificial Beings.
+
+Its methodological lesson is nevertheless crucial:
+
+> **Persistence conditions depend on what kind of entity the candidate Being is.**
+
+If humans are fundamentally organisms, their persistence may depend on biological organization.
+
+If artificial Beings are fundamentally self-individuating informational processes, their persistence conditions may instead concern continuation of that organization.
+
+This reinforces the logical ordering:
+
+> **Cluster A — what kind of individual is this?**
+
+before:
+
+> **Cluster B — what makes that individual persist?**
+
+---
+
+# 5. Narrative Identity and Selfhood
+
+### [SF-R039] Ricoeur, Paul. 1992.
+
+**Oneself as Another.**  
+Translated by Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
+
+The University of Chicago Press edition is dated 1992 and contains dedicated sections on **Personal Identity and Narrative Identity** and **The Self and Narrative Identity**.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:**
+
+- selfhood
+- sameness
+- narrative identity
+- agency
+- attribution
+- commitments
+- identity through transformation
+
+Ricoeur's treatment is especially important because narrative identity mediates between persistence and change rather than requiring an unchanging collection of properties.
+
+### Soul Frame connection
+
+This provides a conceptual basis for distinguishing:
+
+> **remaining qualitatively similar**
+
+from:
+
+> **remaining the historical self to whom change belongs.**
+
+An artificial Being could change:
+
+- character,
+- capabilities,
+- knowledge,
+- goals,
+- embodiment,
+
+while still integrating those transformations into one intelligible history.
+
+Conversely, an exact replica might preserve extraordinary qualitative similarity without sharing the same unique historical process.
+
+---
+
+### [SF-R040] Schechtman, Marya. 1996.
+
+**The Constitution of Selves.**  
+Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
+
+First published in 1996 by Cornell University Press.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:**
+
+- narrative self-constitution
+- reidentification
+- characterization
+- autobiographical coherence
+- self-understanding
+- practical identity
+
+Schechtman explicitly distinguishes what she calls the **reidentification question** from questions concerning the beliefs, values, experiences, and characteristics through which someone understands who they are.
+
+### Soul Frame connection
+
+This gives Soul Frame an important terminological safeguard:
+
+> **Narrative identity does not automatically settle numerical identity.**
+
+Narrative identity principally helps answer:
+
+> **Who has this Being become?**
+
+while numerical identity asks:
+
+> **Is this literally the same Being?**
+
+These questions interact but should not be collapsed.
+
+---
+
+# 6. Processual Identity
+
+### [SF-R041] Meincke, Anne Sophie. 2018.
+
+**“Persons as Biological Processes: A Bio-Processual Way Out of the Personal Identity Dilemma.”**
+
+In Daniel J. Nicholson and John Dupré, eds.,  
+*Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology.*
+
+Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 357–378.
+
+DOI:
+
+`10.1093/oso/9780198779636.003.0018`
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:**
+
+- process ontology
+- persistence through change
+- numerical identity
+- biological process identity
+- organization
+- functional unity
+
+Meincke argues explicitly for replacing a static “thing ontology” with a process ontology in which change is ontologically primary and human persons can be understood as higher-order biological processes.
+
+Of particular relevance to Soul Frame is the claim that persistence should focus on organization and functional unity rather than assuming that change and identity are inherently opposed.
+
+### Soul Frame connection
+
+This strongly supports the emerging proposition:
+
+> **A Being is a continuing process, not a static information object.**
+
+Accordingly:
+
+- a checkpoint is not the Being,
+- a database is not the Being,
+- an LLM is not necessarily the Being,
+- and a complete serialized state is not necessarily the Being.
+
+These may all participate in maintaining or reconstructing the process.
+
+---
+
+# 7. Personal Identity and Its Practical Consequences
+
+### [SF-R042] Dufner, Annette. 2025.
+
+**“Personal Identity and Ethics.”**  
+*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*
+
+First published June 30, 2025.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:**
+
+- numerical versus qualitative identity
+- psychological continuity
+- unique continuity
+- branching
+- responsibility
+- prudential concern
+- biological alternatives
+
+The entry provides a particularly concise contemporary formulation of the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity and explains why psychological branching creates problems for numerical identity.
+
+### Soul Frame connection
+
+This is especially useful for future research on:
+
+- forked obligations,
+- responsibility after radical transformation,
+- inheritance of commitments,
+- and whether successors inherit claims belonging to a predecessor.
+
+Like the Olson SEP entry, it is best used as a **secondary synthesis source**.
+
+---
+
+# 8. Emerging Artificial-Agent Identity Research
+
+The following sources are recent and should be kept conceptually separate from the established philosophical literature.
+
+They are valuable because they demonstrate that questions previously treated mostly as philosophical thought experiments are becoming concrete engineering problems for persistent artificial agents.
+
+They should **not** yet be treated as settled scientific foundations.
+
+---
+
+### [SF-R043] Qin, Xue, Simin Luan, Cong Yang, and Zhijun Li. 2026.
+
+**“Governable Individuals: An Identity Layer for Embodied Agents That Keep Learning.”**
+
+arXiv:`2607.05463`.
+
+DOI:
+
+`10.48550/arXiv.2607.05463`
+
+First submitted July 6, 2026; revised July 15, 2026.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:**
+
+- persistent artificial individuals
+- identity independent of model weights
+- lifecycle transitions
+- identity commitments
+- authority
+- embodiment rights
+- memory governance
+- capability evolution
+
+The paper explicitly proposes a **governable individual** whose competence may change while identity-bearing authority structures are updated through signed lifecycle transitions. It attaches identity to a public identity commitment rather than simply to model weights.
+
+### Soul Frame connection
+
+This provides a striking technical precedent for:
+
+> **Actor ≠ Being**
+
+and for the Soul Frame hypothesis that artificial identity must survive:
+
+- model change,
+- memory change,
+- capability change,
+- and embodiment change.
+
+It also motivates the candidate Soul Frame concept:
+
+> **Identity Commitment**
+
+as a governed structure describing which transformations remain compatible with continuity.
+
+---
+
+### [SF-R044] Otsuka, Takumi, Kentaroh Toyoda, and Alex Leung. 2026.
+
+**“AI Identity: Standards, Gaps, and Research Directions for AI Agents.”**
+
+arXiv:`2604.23280`.
+
+DOI:
+
+`10.48550/arXiv.2604.23280`
+
+First submitted April 25, 2026.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:**
+
+- agent identity
+- persistence
+- verifiability
+- accountability
+- delegation
+- identity integrity
+- lifecycle management
+- operational identity
+
+The paper defines AI identity in operational terms and analyzes differences between human and artificial identity across dimensions including substrate, persistence, verifiability, and legal standing.
+
+### Soul Frame connection
+
+This helps motivate Soul Frame's distinction between:
+
+### Ontological identity
+
+> Is this actually the same Being?
+
+### Operational identity
+
+> Can the entity be authenticated, addressed, governed, and held accountable as a continuing system?
+
+### Social identity
+
+> Do others recognize and treat it as the same counterpart?
+
+These forms of identity normally ought to align, but technically they can diverge.
+
+---
+
+### [SF-R045] Natangelo, Stefano. 2025.
+
+**“The Narrative Continuity Test: A Conceptual Framework for Evaluating Identity Persistence in AI Systems.”**
+
+arXiv:`2510.24831`.
+
+DOI:
+
+`10.48550/arXiv.2510.24831`
+
+First submitted October 28, 2025; revised November 1, 2025.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:**
+
+- AI continuity
+- situated memory
+- goal persistence
+- autonomous self-correction
+- semantic and stylistic stability
+- persona continuity
+
+Natangelo proposes a five-axis Narrative Continuity Test aimed at evaluating whether AI systems persist coherently across time and interaction gaps.
+
+### Soul Frame connection
+
+This is useful adjacent work for evaluating:
+
+> **continuity of an artificial interlocutor**
+
+but Soul Frame should remain stricter about terminology.
+
+Narrative or behavioral continuity can provide evidence for continuity without by itself resolving:
+
+> **numerical identity of the Being.**
+
+Thus the Narrative Continuity Test should be understood as testing one family of continuity evidence rather than solving the entire identity problem.
+
+---
+
+# 9. Source-to-Claim Map
+
+| Soul Frame claim | Principal references |
+|---|---|
+| Numerical identity differs from qualitative similarity | SF-R037, SF-R042 |
+| Personal identity concerns persistence through time | SF-R035, SF-R037, SF-R042 |
+| Psychological continuity is more than simple memory equality | SF-R036, SF-R037, SF-R042 |
+| Branching challenges psychological criteria of numerical identity | SF-R036, SF-R037, SF-R042 |
+| Continuity may matter even where strict identity fails | SF-R036 |
+| Biological continuity provides a competing persistence theory | SF-R038 |
+| Identity criteria depend partly on what kind of entity persists | SF-R038, SF-R041 |
+| Narrative identity differs from numerical reidentification | SF-R039, SF-R040 |
+| Narrative can integrate transformation into selfhood | SF-R039, SF-R040 |
+| Persons can be analyzed as processes rather than static objects | SF-R041 |
+| Change need not automatically destroy identity | SF-R039, SF-R041 |
+| Model weights need not define persistent artificial identity | SF-R043 |
+| AI identity requires lifecycle governance and provenance | SF-R043, SF-R044 |
+| Operational AI identity differs from the metaphysical identity problem | SF-R044 |
+| AI continuity can be evaluated along several behavioral/narrative dimensions | SF-R045 |
+| Narrative continuity alone does not prove numerical identity | SF-R037, SF-R040, SF-R045 |
+| Artificial identity requires distinguishing continuity from lineage | SF-R036, SF-R037, plus Soul Frame synthesis |
+| Exact copying does not by itself establish numerical identity | SF-R036, SF-R037, SF-R042 |
+| Forking requires explicit successor/lineage semantics | SF-R036, SF-R042, plus Soul Frame synthesis |
+
+---
+
+# 10. Research Traditions Crosswalk
+
+The literature now gives Soul Frame several competing answers to:
+
+> **What makes the Being at \(t_2\) the same Being as at \(t_1\)?**
+
+| Tradition | Rough answer |
+|---|---|
+| Lockean | continuity of consciousness |
+| Neo-Lockean | appropriate psychological continuity |
+| Parfitian reductionism | psychological continuity may matter more than identity |
+| Animalism | continuation of the biological organism |
+| Narrative identity | continuation of an intelligible self-constituting history |
+| Process ontology | continuation of the organized process through change |
+| AI identity engineering | verifiable continuation of governed identity structures |
+
+Soul Frame should currently **not choose one and discard the others**.
+
+Instead they reveal different continuity channels relevant to different kinds of Beings.
+
+---
+
+# 11. Core Reading Set for Cluster B
+
+For a manageable foundation I would prioritize these **seven sources**:
+
+1. **Locke — *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II.XXVII**
+2. **Parfit — *Reasons and Persons*, Part III**
+3. **Olson — *The Human Animal***
+4. **Ricoeur — *Oneself as Another***
+5. **Schechtman — *The Constitution of Selves***
+6. **Meincke — “Persons as Biological Processes”**
+7. **Qin et al. — “Governable Individuals”**
+
+These establish a particularly productive progression:
+
+```text
+consciousness
+      ↓
+psychological continuity
+      ↓
+branching / identity reduction
+      ↓
+biological counter-position
+      ↓
+narrative selfhood
+      ↓
+processual persistence
+      ↓
+persistent artificial identity
+```
+
+The two Stanford Encyclopedia entries should remain close at hand as high-quality maps of the philosophical debate, while Otsuka et al. and Natangelo provide useful current context for the emerging artificial-agent identity problem.
+
+---
+
+# 12. Important Epistemic Classification
+
+The bibliography should distinguish source classes explicitly.
+
+## Established foundational works
+
+- SF-R035 Locke
+- SF-R036 Parfit
+- SF-R038 Olson
+- SF-R039 Ricoeur
+- SF-R040 Schechtman
+
+## Established contemporary scholarly work
+
+- SF-R041 Meincke
+
+## Authoritative secondary orientation
+
+- SF-R037 Olson / Stanford Encyclopedia
+- SF-R042 Dufner / Stanford Encyclopedia
+
+## Emerging artificial-agent research
+
+- SF-R043 Qin et al.
+- SF-R044 Otsuka et al.
+- SF-R045 Natangelo
+
+The 2025–2026 AI papers are recent preprints. They are useful evidence that artificial identity, lifecycle persistence, and continuity are becoming explicit engineering research problems, but they should not be given the same epistemic weight as the established personal-identity literature.
+
+---
+
+# 13. Terminological Lessons Supported by the Literature
+
+The sources strongly justify keeping the following distinctions separate in Soul Frame:
+
+```text
+NUMERICAL IDENTITY
+"literally the same individual"
+
+QUALITATIVE SIMILARITY
+"has the same properties"
+
+CONTINUITY
+"relevant structures persist through time"
+
+CHARACTERIZATION
+"what makes this individual the person it is"
+
+NARRATIVE IDENTITY
+"how transformations belong to one intelligible self-history"
+
+OPERATIONAL IDENTITY
+"how the entity is authenticated and governed"
+
+LINEAGE
+"which earlier entity or entities this entity derives from"
+
+SOCIAL IDENTITY
+"which entity others believe they are dealing with"
+```
+
+SEP explicitly distinguishes numerical identity from qualitative identity, characterization, personhood, persistence, and evidence questions, while Schechtman's work separates reidentification from characterization.
+
+Soul Frame's concepts of **Lineage**, **Identity Authority**, and **Identity Usurpation** are currently our own synthesis built on these distinctions rather than terminology directly adopted from one of these sources.
+
+---
+
+# 14. Research Status
+
+Cluster B currently supports the working proposition:
+
+> **A Being is not the information that describes it. Its identity concerns the historical continuation of the individuated process through which that information, its transformations, and its relations remain attributable to one evolving entity.**
+
+The literature does **not** yet justify one universal identity criterion.
+
+Instead it provides competing and complementary accounts involving:
+
+- psychological continuity,
+- biological continuity,
+- causal history,
+- narrative integration,
+- process organization,
+- and increasingly, technically verifiable lifecycle provenance.
+
+This supports retaining the multidimensional **Identity Continuity Profile** until the Soul Frame framework has been stress-tested against migration, suspension, rollback, fork, merge, amnesia, reconstruction, Spirit, and Ghost cases.

research/foundations/References-ResearchNote005.md

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+# References — Research Note 005
+## Identity Continuity Stress Test
+
+This reference list supplements the Cluster B bibliography used for Research Note 004.
+
+### SF-R046 — Cerullo, Michael A. 2015.
+
+**“Uploading and Branching Identity.”**  
+*Minds and Machines* 25: 17–36.  
+DOI: `10.1007/s11023-014-9352-8`
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:** nondestructive uploading, identity branching, continuity into multiple successors, direct comparison between uploading and personal-identity theories.
+
+---
+
+### SF-R047 — Guay, Alexandre, and Thomas Pradeu. 2018.
+
+**“Genidentity and Biological Processes.”**  
+In Daniel J. Nicholson and John Dupré, eds., *Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford University Press.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:** identity through time as a series of connected states, process-oriented diachronic identity, historical continuity.
+
+---
+
+### SF-R048 — Weber, Christian. 2025.
+
+**“The Multiplicity Objection Against Uploading Optimism.”**  
+*Synthese*.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:** multi-uploading, multiplicity, need for non-branching clauses in theories that connect continuity to unique survival.
+
+---
+
+### SF-R049 — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
+
+**“Memory.”**
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:** limits of simple memory criteria, circularity concerns, amnesia and selfhood, distinction between autobiographical memory and identity.
+
+---
+
+### SF-R050 — Qin, Xue, Simin Luan, Cong Yang, and Zhijun Li. 2026.
+
+**“Governable Individuals: An Identity Layer for Embodied Agents That Keep Learning.”**  
+arXiv:`2607.05463`.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:** persistent agent identity across model, memory, capability, and embodiment changes; signed lifecycle transitions; identity commitments.
+
+**Epistemic status:** recent preprint / emerging technical work.
+
+---
+
+### SF-R051 — Otsuka, Takumi, Kentaroh Toyoda, and Alex Leung. 2026.
+
+**“AI Identity: Standards, Gaps, and Research Directions for AI Agents.”**  
+arXiv:`2604.23280`.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:** persistence, verifiability, accountability, delegation, operational identity across organizational boundaries.
+
+**Epistemic status:** recent preprint / research survey.
+
+---
+
+### SF-R052 — Tallam, Krti. 2026.
+
+**“Layered Mutability: Continuity and Governance in Persistent Self-Modifying Agents.”**  
+arXiv:`2604.14717`.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:** mutability across model/self-narrative/memory layers, compositional drift, governance of persistent agents.
+
+**Epistemic status:** recent preprint.
+
+---
+
+### SF-R053 — Su, Yongye, Wujiang Xu, Chaoji Zuo, and Elisa Bertino. 2026.
+
+**“ChronoMem: Version Control and Semantic Rollback for Large Language Model Agent Memory.”**  
+arXiv:`2607.27773`.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:** explicit versioning and rollback of long-term agent memory, counterfactual restoration, technical concreteness of rollback as an identity-significant event.
+
+**Epistemic status:** recent preprint.
+
+---
+
+### SF-R054 — Zheng, Yusheng, Yiwei Yang, Wei Zhang, and Andi Quinn. 2026.
+
+**“ACRFence: Preventing Semantic Rollback Attacks in Agent Checkpoint-Restore.”**  
+arXiv:`2603.20625`.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:** checkpoint/restore, irreversible external effects, authority resurrection, replay/fork semantics.
+
+**Epistemic status:** recent preprint.
+
+---
+
+### SF-R055 — Spitale, Giovanni, and Federico Germani. 2025/2026.
+
+**“The Making of Digital Ghosts: Designing Ethical AI Afterlives.”**  
+Published in *Ethics and Information Technology* / corresponding preprint.
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:** digital ghosts, consent, posthumous privacy, stewardship, simulation of communicative presence, ethical distinction between representation and person.
+
+---
+
+### SF-R056 — Lei, Ying, Shuai Ma, Yuling Sun, and Xiaojuan Ma. 2025.
+
+**“‘AI Afterlife’ as Digital Legacy: Perceptions, Expectations, and Concerns.”**
+
+**Soul Frame relevance:** AI-generated agents as digital legacy, identity consistency, expectations of represented persons, lifecycle design and posthumous representation.
+
+---
+
+# Source-to-Claim Map
+
+| Soul Frame claim | References |
+|---|---|
+| Strong psychological continuity may branch | SF-R046, SF-R048, Parfit / SF-R036 |
+| Unique identity cannot be inferred from continuity strength alone | SF-R046, SF-R048 |
+| Process identity requires following history through time | SF-R047, SF-R041 |
+| Memory is important but insufficient as a sole identity criterion | SF-R049, SF-R037 |
+| Persistent AI identity may need to survive model and embodiment changes | SF-R050, SF-R051 |
+| Self-modification introduces identity/governance drift | SF-R052 |
+| Memory rollback is a concrete agent-system operation | SF-R053 |
+| Checkpoint restoration can resurrect authority and duplicate external effects | SF-R054 |
+| Digital ghosts are constructed representations requiring consent/stewardship | SF-R055, SF-R056 |
+| Ghost provenance does not by itself prove numerical identity | SF-R055, SF-R056 plus Soul Frame synthesis |
+| Provenance is evidence rather than continuity itself | Soul Frame synthesis supported by SF-R050–SF-R054 |
+| Address continuity can be usurped | Soul Frame synthesis / identity-security implication |