# Personhood Dimensions Map (Phase III) **Workplan:** SOUL-WP-0004-T01 **Date:** 2026-08-12 **Builds on:** RN-003 §§24–28; SoulFrameIntroduction §§5–6; Phase I–II stack --- ## 1. Four kinds of personhood (must not collapse) | Kind | Question | Typical sources / adjacent fields | |---|---|---| | **Descriptive** | What person-like capacities/structures does it exhibit? | psychology, cognitive science, AI character systems | | **Social** | Is it treated as a social counterpart / person among us? | Mead; recognition theory; Phase II Social Beinghood | | **Moral** | Does it warrant moral consideration / duties? | ethics of moral status; animal ethics; AI ethics | | **Legal** | Does a legal system grant personality, rights, duties? | corporate personhood; civil codes; agency law | **Soul Frame default:** “personhood” = **descriptive** unless qualified. Architectural classification must **not** silently imply moral or legal status (ResearchProgram WS5). --- ## 2. Descriptive personhood profile (P1–P12) Candidate dimensions (P1–P9 from RN-003; P10–P12 added for Phase III coverage): | ID | Dimension | Question | Linked Soul Frame concepts | |---|---|---|---| | P1 | Self-model | Model of self as distinct continuing entity? | SM2; identity | | P2 | Other-model | Differentiated models of particular others? | SM3 | | P3 | Relationship model | Histories/states of specific relationships? | SM5; Soul | | P4 | Character | Persistent dispositions across contexts? | Character | | P5 | Intentional organization | Behavior intelligible via extended intentions? | Mind; agency | | P6 | Autobiographical integration | Events as *its* history? | continuity C4/C5 | | P7 | Perspective | Entity-relative informational perspective? | first-person indexicality (without solving consciousness) | | P8 | Commitments | Present actions bind future manifestations? | normative continuity | | P9 | Social reciprocity | Recursive co-adaptation with others? | H4; Social Mind | | P10 | Communicative competence | Can participate in shared symbol systems? | language; common ground | | P11 | Responsibility-tracking | Can attributions of credit/blame stick diachronically? | identity + commitments | | P12 | Value / preference structure | Stable cares, preferences, evaluative stance? | character; intentional organization | **Not a Boolean checklist.** Profile scores; entities can be high on P10 and low on P4/P6 (stateless chatbot) or high on autonomy criteria and low on P1–P12 (daemon). --- ## 3. Independence of three axes (RN-003) | Axis | Question | |---|---| | **A — Autonomous individuality** | Integrated self-maintaining individual? | | **B — Personhood (descriptive)** | Someone-like qualities? | | **C — Social recognition** | Modeled/treated as continuing counterpart? | Illustrative profiles: ```text AUTONOMY PERSONHOOD RECOGNITION Bacterium high low low Human high high high Self-maintaining daemon high low low Stateless chatbot low high-ish high-ish Persistent social AI medium high-ish high ``` This is why **H2** holds: high personhood exposure ≠ Beinghood; high autonomy ≠ personhood. --- ## 4. APE vs Being | | APE | Being (Soul Frame v0.2 sense) | |---|---|---| | Definition | Constructed to **expose** ≥1 personhood dimensions | Autonomous individual + enough personhood + addressability + recognition | | Requirement | Intentional design for person-like interface | Systemic coherence + someone-like + social counterpart status | | Stateless persona bot | often strong APE | not Being | | Daemon | usually weak APE | autonomous individual, not Being | | Persistent social AI | strong APE | candidate / proto-Being if continuity + recognition hold | **APE is a construction category; Being is an emergent status.** --- ## 5. Literature anchors (descriptive / moral / legal separation) ### Descriptive / philosophical person concepts | Source | Role | |---|---| | Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii | person vs human organism; forensic/psychological strand | | Strawson, *Individuals* / person as basic particular | persons as entities to which both mental and physical predicates apply (pointer) | | Dennett, conditions of personhood essays | multi-condition lists; personhood as cluster | | Frankfurt, second-order volitions | hierarchical desires; not exhaustive of personhood | | Schechtman, *Constitution of Selves* | **characterization** vs **reidentification** questions | ### Social personhood | Source | Role | |---|---| | Mead 1934 | social self | | Phase II recognition map | intentional vs social/normative recognition | | Goffman, *Presentation of Self* | social presentation (also Persona) | ### Moral personhood (boundary only — do not derive from architecture) | Source | Role | |---|---| | Warren (moral status criteria tradition) | multi-criteria moral personhood lists — **adjacent, not adopted as Soul Frame descriptive P-set** | | Animal / AI ethics surveys | show contested, independent of descriptive capacity lists | ### Legal personhood (boundary only) | Source | Role | |---|---| | Corporate legal personality | legal person ≠ descriptive person | | Emerging AI legal personality debates | Phase V/XII map; not Phase III conclusions | --- ## 6. H2 assessment **H2:** Personhood and Beinghood are distinct; substantial personhood without persistent Being is possible (and reverse). | | | |---|---| | Support | RN-003 stateless chatbot vs daemon; three-axis profiles; APE category; Dennett-style cluster concepts | | Conflict | Everyday language equates “person” with full moral/legal status | | Evidence strength | **moderate → strong** (conceptual); empirical thresholds open | | Status | **supported (Phase III)** | --- ## 7. Open questions - Weighting of P1–P12 for “sufficient personhood” in Beinghood v0.2 - Minimal personhood for Social Beinghood vs full human-like profiles - Whether P7 requires phenomenal consciousness (Soul Frame: **no**, by design) - Moral/legal mapping tables (later workstreams)