---
id: STATE-WP-0083
type: workplan
title: "Forge-derived projection reset, per repository"
domain: infotech
repo: state-hub
status: finished
owner: codex
topic_slug: infotech
created: "2026-08-25"
updated: "2026-08-31"
related:
  - CUST-ADR-012
  - CUST-WP-0068
state_hub_workstream_id: "40e36360-6b2a-5903-b769-47507d866ac8"
---

# Forge-derived projection reset, per repository

## Goal

Implement `ADR-012` decision 7: discard a repository's projection and rebuild it
from what Forgejo holds. Per repository, routine, idempotent, and verifiable.

This is the only sanctioned way to remove a hub record. The hub has no
hard-delete for work records — `DELETE /tasks/{id}` is `cancel_task`,
`DELETE /workstreams/{id}` is `410 Gone`, and no `session.delete` exists for
either. Re-derivation is not one option among several; it is the mechanism.

## Why here and not in Repo Manager

`ADR-012` decision 1 says central derives from the forge, and the pod can reach
it: `git ls-remote https://forgejo.coulomb.social/...` succeeds anonymously from
inside the cluster, and `git` is already in the image.

Driving the reset from Repo Manager would mean computing a projection on a
workstation and pushing it into central — precisely the injection of derived
state `ADR-010` decision 5 forbids. Central must do its own reading. The cost is
that workplan parsing exists in two places; `scripts/consistency_check.py`
already parses frontmatter and task blocks here, so the capability is present
and should be extracted rather than rewritten.

## What it must not do

- **Not restore preliminary overlay records.** They exist because the forge does
  not hold them; a rebuild from the forge cannot reproduce them and must not
  pretend to.
- **Not destroy hub-native records.** Progress events, decisions and inbox
  messages originate in the hub (`ADR-010` decision 4). They are not
  forge-derived and must survive a rebuild of forge-derived state.
- **Not proceed silently when records would be lost.** Stop, name them, and
  require an explicit acknowledgement.

## Derive a repository's projection from the forge

```task
id: STATE-WP-0083-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "ca3e8578-6855-55a2-9042-f790c8997628"
```

Given a repository slug, clone or fetch its default branch from Forgejo into a
temporary location, parse the workplan files, and compute the projection that
state would produce: workplans, tasks, their identifiers, statuses and backing
paths.

Read-only and side-effect free. Record the commit the derivation came from —
`ADR-012` decision 2 requires provenance, and the existing `git_fingerprint` is
worthless precisely because nothing ever wrote it correctly.

Acceptance: deriving `the-custodian` twice from the same commit yields identical
output, and the commit is reported.

**Done (2026-08-25).** `api/services/forge_projection.py`. Central clones the
default branch from Forgejo and derives 69 workplans and 459 tasks from
`the-custodian` at commit `d5013ae`, identically across runs. Identifiers are
derived from the canonical record id in the `ADR-007` namespace, verified against
live records — so a forge-derived projection and a preliminary overlay agree on
identity without reconciliation. Eight tests, including that identifiers are
derived rather than inherited from whatever a file happens to carry.

A fresh shallow clone each time is deliberate: reusing a working copy is how a
projection ends up reflecting someone's local state instead of the forge.

## Report the difference before changing anything

```task
id: STATE-WP-0083-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "3122ae66-1a9a-5102-a7ff-b7ba1564bf3c"
```

Compare the derived projection against what the hub currently holds for that
repository, and report: records the forge has that the hub lacks, records the
hub has that the forge does not, and records whose fields differ.

This is the half that is immediately useful without any destructive capability,
and it is what makes decision 7's "verifiable" real. It also answers the
question `CUST-WP-0068-T09` is waiting on — which stale rows would actually
clear — before anyone commits to clearing them.

Acceptance: a dry-run diff for a repository with known drift matches what
manual inspection shows.

**Workplan-level diff done; task-level blocked (2026-08-25).**

The first implementation matched hub records to derived ones *by UUID* and was
badly wrong: most hub records still carry pre-`ADR-007` random identifiers, so
nearly every record appeared simultaneously missing and stale. A reset built on
that comparison would have destroyed and recreated the whole projection. It now
matches on canonical record id, falling back to the backing file.

Workplan-level results are trustworthy and inspectable:

| Repository | missing | stale | differing |
|---|---|---|---|
| `whitehat-security` | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| `the-custodian` | 3 | 4 | 52 |
| `railiance-platform` | 18 | 25 | 2 |

`whitehat-security` reporting clean is the control: it was bootstrapped directly
from its files, so a forge derivation must agree with it exactly. The four stale
workplans on `the-custodian` were checked by hand and are real —
`CUST-WP-0023`/`0024` have no file in the repository at all, and
`state-hub-v0.1`/`v0.2` carry slugs that were never canonical ids. All four are
genuine hub-first records, the class `ADR-010` says to disposition.

**Blocked: hub tasks carry no canonical record id.** The task schema is
`id, workplan_id, title, status, priority, …` with nothing holding
`CUST-WP-0067-T01`. A file task and a hub task can therefore only be matched by
title, which is why the task diff reports 149 missing and 131 stale for
`the-custodian` where the workplan diff reports 3 and 4. That is the matching
failing, not drift.

Task-level reset must not be built on title matching — renaming a task heading
would silently destroy and recreate its record. `T03` is limited to workplans
until tasks carry their canonical id, which is `T06`.

## Apply the reset transactionally

```task
id: STATE-WP-0083-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "95496a43-9e72-53d0-ad89-1a43713b4be9"
```

Replace the repository's forge-derived records with the derived projection in
one transaction: create what is missing, update what differs, remove what no
longer derives. Hub-native records are untouched.

Refuse by default when removal would destroy a record with no counterpart in the
forge; report what would be lost and require an explicit acknowledgement to
proceed. That refusal is evaluated per repository, so one unresolved repository
never blocks the rest.

Acceptance: reset twice produces the same projection; a repository holding
records the forge lacks is refused with those records named; hub-native record
counts are unchanged across a reset.

**Done (2026-08-26).** `reset_repository_projection()` in
`api/services/forge_projection.py`. Verified against live data, rolled back:
`whitehat-security` applied 5 updates and 0 retirements; `the-custodian`
**refused**, naming `cust-wp-0023`, `cust-wp-0024`, `state-hub-v0.1` and
`state-hub-v0.2` — the four records confirmed by hand as genuine hub-first
records with no file — and changed nothing.

Refusal is the default because a record that stops deriving is ambiguous: the
file may have been deleted deliberately, or the caller may have pointed at the
wrong branch. Only the caller can say which, so only the caller may authorise it.

Retirement never deletes, with a test asserting the row survives and
`session.delete` is never called. A record that derives again is un-retired
rather than left contradicting the forge.

The first execution of this write path was run against the **cache** database
rather than central, and rolled back. A write path's first run belongs on the
discardable copy.

**Scope limit, enforced in the code rather than documented beside it.** Tasks of
existing workplans are untouched; tasks are created only alongside a *new*
workplan, where nothing exists to mis-match. The outcome carries that as a note
so partial convergence cannot be mistaken for full. 678 tests pass.

## Fleet form as a loop over the repository form

```task
id: STATE-WP-0083-T04
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "3935334e-d5bd-5667-a862-0049c1c2c5b0"
```

The fleet-wide reset iterates the per-repository reset and shares its
implementation, so the rarely-used dangerous path is exercised by the frequently
used safe one. Repositories that refuse are skipped and reported, never aborting
the pass.

Acceptance: a fleet dry-run reports per-repository outcomes including refusals,
and completes despite them.

**Built (2026-08-26).** `reset_fleet_projection()` is a loop over the
per-repository form and nothing else, so the rarely-run wide operation is the
frequently-run narrow one rather than a second implementation trusted on the
strength of never having been exercised.

Its behaviour on failure is the part that matters, and all three are tested:

- **A refusal does not stop the pass.** Aborting on the first refusal means one
  unresolved repository blocks reconstruction everywhere, which in practice means
  permanently.
- **An error does not stop the pass.** A repository that cannot be cloned is
  recorded and the loop continues.
- **Each repository gets its own session**, so one failure cannot roll back
  another's work or leave a poisoned transaction behind. Only repositories that
  applied are committed.

694 tests pass. Needs deployment before it can run against central.

**Ran against central (2026-08-28).** Image `main-54b09ee`. Fleet
refuse-mode over 125 repositories: 52 applied, 69 noop, 2 refused
(identifier collisions on `railiance-bootstrap` and `railiance-hosts`;
acknowledgement does not authorise those), 2 unreadable
(`vergabe_teilnahme`, `markitect-project`), 0 errors. Zero workplans
retired, zero tasks cancelled. `the-custodian` had already been
reset-acked and reported `noop` on the fleet pass. Evidence lives in
`the-custodian/docs/recovery/fleet-projection-reset-2026-08-28.md`.

## Retire what the reset replaces

```task
id: STATE-WP-0083-T05
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "b63c97a8-ceba-551a-a3df-5253a9de409a"
```

Once reset is trusted, `CUST-WP-0068-T09` can clear its stale rows — 4 workplan
rows from the prefix migration and 305 task rows across 44 workplans.

`ADR-003` decision 2's `mtime`-based fingerprints should also be replaced by the
source commit at this point; `ADR-012` invalidated that composition and the
replacement belongs with the provenance work in `T01`.

Acceptance: `CUST-WP-0068-T09` closes; no fingerprint input depends on a local
filesystem.


## Give hub tasks their canonical record id

```task
id: STATE-WP-0083-T06
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "6172bdd6-3236-5f85-8c02-b0f149e373b8"
```

Hub task rows hold no canonical identifier — only a title — so nothing reliably
connects `CUST-WP-0067-T01` in a file to its row. Every other record type has a
stable identity; tasks do not, and that gap is what stops the reset from covering
them.

Add the canonical id to the task record and populate it during derivation and
registration. Once present, task matching becomes identity-based like workplans,
and `T03` can extend to tasks safely.

Until then a task's identity is its title, which changes whenever someone edits a
heading. That is not a foundation for deletion.

Acceptance: task rows carry their canonical record id; the task diff for
`whitehat-security` reports clean; `the-custodian`'s task diff falls to something
manual inspection confirms.

**Built (2026-08-26).** Migration `e2b3c4d5f6a7` adds `tasks.record_id`,
nullable because no migration can invent an identity for an existing row — only
the repository files hold the mapping.

The backfill *reads* that mapping rather than inferring it: a file task declares
both its canonical id and the projection UUID it was registered under, so the
pairing is stated, not guessed. Across 121 repositories and 1104 files it
recovered **5516 pairs with zero conflicts**, and identified **4456 of 6073**
task rows in the cache database.

Diff and reset now key on `record_id` where present, falling back to a
`title:`-prefixed key so an unidentified row is *visibly* unidentified rather
than silently title-matched.

Two refusals are tested rather than documented: a row the files do not claim
keeps no identity, and a row that already has one is never overwritten — a
mismatch is recorded as a conflict, not resolved. Title matching would have
"worked" and destroyed a record every time someone edited a heading.

**Remaining, in order.** Deploy the migration to central; then run the backfill
against central as an explicit operation — deliberately *not* inside the Helm
hook, where a partial failure would silently leave half the tasks identified.
The cache matched 4456 of 6073 and central has a different history, so the
numbers will differ and a dry run should be compared before applying.

Only then may `T03` be extended to tasks of existing workplans, which is a
further change with its own verification. `CUST-WP-0068-T09` is therefore two
moves away, not one.

**Backfill run against central (2026-08-26), and a defect it exposed.**

The first implementation read local filesystem paths. Central has no workstation
checkout and must not depend on one — `ADR-012` decision 1 makes the forge the
projection source — and the point became concrete rather than theoretical:
central's Postgres is unreachable from the workstation, since the tunnel carries
HTTP only. A forge-sourced variant now clones each repository in-cluster and
reads the pairing from what the forge holds.

Dry run across 121 repositories: 1094 files, 5620 pairs, 5248 to update, 372
file-declared UUIDs central does not hold, **zero conflicts**. The count
differing from the cache's 4456 of 6073 was the check that mattered — central
holds the re-keyed records the cache never had, so a *matching* number would have
meant cache state was leaking in. The forge scan reading 1094 files against the
workstation's 1104 is the preliminary-overlay distinction showing up in the
numbers.

**Then applied, and wrong.** 5248 rows were identified but only 5100 identities
were distinct. A task id written as a bare `T01` is unique only inside its own
workplan; stored as canonical it gave every workplan's first task one identity.
51 such ids landed on 148 rows.

The backfill's own conflict detection could not see it: it checks one UUID
claimed by two ids, and this was the inverse. It surfaced only because the
identified count and the distinct count did not reconcile — a check that could
easily have been skipped after a dry run reporting zero conflicts.

Short ids are now qualified as `WORKPLAN-ID-T01`, and a short id in a file with
no workplan id gets no identity at all. The 136 affected rows on central were
cleared for reassignment, since the backfill never overwrites an existing
identity.

**Central now: 5112 of 5974 identified, 5077 distinct.** The remaining 34
duplicates are not from this work. They are unqualified ad-hoc ids reused across
repositories — `ADHOC-2026-07-02-T01` exists in three workplans — which is the
problem `CUST-WP-0066` closed for new records while existing ones kept their
unqualified ids. They need their own disposition.

**Done (2026-08-26).** Corrected backfill applied to central: **5248 of 5974
tasks identified, 5213 distinct, 35 duplicate identities.**

The check before applying was uniqueness, not volume — the lesson from the first
attempt, where a clean dry run reporting zero conflicts concealed 51 non-unique
ids. All 136 pending updates were verified to take identities held by nothing
else before a single row was written.

The 35 remaining duplicates predate this work and fall into three classes:

| Count | Class | Origin |
|---|---|---|
| 18 | `KONT-WP-0013-T00N` and similar | a workplan registered twice, so both copies claim the same task ids |
| 12 | `RAILIANCE-WP-00NN-T0N` | archived RAILIANCE-WP files, left unrenamed by the owner decision of 2026-08-25 — the same numbers exist in three repositories, so their task ids collide |
| 4 | `ADHOC-*-T0N` | unqualified ad-hoc ids reused across repositories, the class `CUST-WP-0066` closed for new records only |

The `RAILIANCE-WP` twelve are worth noting as a consequence rather than a
surprise: migrating only the *active* workplans was the right call for blast
radius, and this is the price — the archived copies keep colliding identities
until they are migrated too, and task-level reset cannot act on those workplans
in the meantime.

**Task-level reset remains blocked**, now on a narrower and better-understood
problem: 35 identities, not 5974 unidentified rows.

**Mixed identifier convergence support (2026-08-31).** The fast forge path
exposed a second, separate consistency shape: one repository can contain legacy
UUID rows and already-derived UUID rows at the same time. State Hub's sealed
identifier transaction now classifies every mapping, migrates only verified
legacy sources, accepts already-derived targets only when their canonical
record identity and repository match, and records durable aliases for both.
Both-present and neither-present mappings fail the whole repository transaction.
The primary-only HTTP surface has explicit plan-hash confirmation and a reverse
operation for a failed file phase. This does not resolve the 35 duplicate
canonical task identities, so T02 remains `progress`.

**Duplicate identity disposition (2026-08-31).** A fresh primary audit found
131 duplicate task `record_id` groups across 274 rows. The global count is not
the reset safety boundary: all 131 cross workplan boundaries, while none repeats
inside one workplan. A task has no projection-retirement field, so workplan slug
tombstones are only a diagnostic clue; current task membership is whether the
Forge still derives that id for that owning workplan.

The 12 groups with multiple untombstoned owning workplan slugs come from two
earlier wrong workplan/backing-file projections:
`CUST-WP-0010b-T01..T02` and `SECRETS-WP-0002-T01..T10`. They must be resolved
by reconciling the owning workplans while preserving their completed historical
task rows, not by deleting or re-keying those rows. Live exact-commit reconciles
did that with zero creates, retirements, cancellations, or refusals. Evidence:
`docs/evidence/STATE-WP-0083-task-identity-audit-2026-08-31.json`.

The diff now reports an explicit `ambiguous` class instead of silently choosing
the last row in a dictionary. Reset refuses duplicate identities declared by
the forge, duplicate identified rows inside the matched current workplan, and
any task creation whose derived UUID is held by another current workplan. A
repeated human-readable id outside the owning workplan's current desired set is
historical evidence, not a competing projection. These checks are batched;
retired/displaced workplan tasks remain preserved. The second exact-commit pass
for both affected repositories returned `noop` with every count zero. Final
deployment of the refined boundary remains before T02 can close.

**Done (2026-08-31).** Image `main-a32112e`, Helm revision 53, is healthy on
the `railliance01` primary. State Hub itself converged at exact Forge commit
`a32112e5abc18dfbecbbf1320cf5b04dce814920`; the immediately repeated pass was
`noop` with every count zero. The task diff/reset boundary is now complete.

Fleet identifier rollout remains live under `RMGR-WP-0005`; this workplan does
not duplicate that residual. Historical terminal task labels remain preserved
by decision and are not pending cleanup work.


## Restore a migration mechanism for central

```task
id: STATE-WP-0083-T07
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "27e12170-486e-5669-8658-f7acc80d81f8"
```

**Central's schema is behind the code it is running, and nothing detects it.**
Discovered 2026-08-25 while preparing the retirement columns.

Central is at revision `b8d4f0a2c6e1`; the chain is
`b8d4f0a2c6e1 → c9e5a1b3d7f2 → d1a2b3c4e5f6`. The `review_contracts` table does
not exist on central even though the migration creating it ships inside the image
currently serving traffic. The code and the database disagree silently.

There is no migration mechanism. The image `CMD` is bare `uvicorn`, the Helm
chart declares no migration job, and the only evidence migrations ever ran was an
ad-hoc `state-hub-alembic-init` Job created outside the chart — deleted earlier
the same day as a retired-forge leftover. Deleting a completed Job removed a
historical record rather than a working mechanism, since Jobs do not re-run, but
it also removed the last visible sign that this gap existed.

This blocks `T03`: the retirement columns cannot reach central without it.

Needed: migrations as a declared part of the release — a chart-managed job or
init container that runs `alembic upgrade head` before the API serves — and a
check that surfaces a schema/code mismatch instead of leaving it silent. A
deployment that can run against a schema it was not built for is the same class
of defect as a projection that cannot name its source commit.

Acceptance: central reaches `head`; `review_contracts` exists; the mechanism is
declared in the chart; a mismatch between code and schema is reported rather than
tolerated.

**Done (2026-08-26).** Central reports
`schema: {status: ok, applied: d1a2b3c4e5f6, expected: d1a2b3c4e5f6}`.
`review_contracts` exists. Both pods run `main-97c8762`.

The first execution is worth recording, because it failed in a way that proved
the design. The `pre-upgrade` hook ran, applied both migrations and deleted
itself on success — then the k3s API tunnel dropped (`unexpected EOF` →
`connection refused`) and Helm could not read the deployment to roll the API.
The release wedged at `pending-upgrade`; no pod rolled.

The schema was therefore briefly *ahead* of the running code, which is the safe
direction and the reason additive migrations were the right shape: the old image
served correctly against the new schema throughout. A destructive migration in
the same circumstance would have taken the service down.

Recovery was `helm rollback` to the last deployed revision — which clears the
wedge without touching the schema, there being nothing to undo — then re-running
the upgrade. The hook is idempotent, so the second run's `alembic upgrade head`
was a no-op.

Two things this exposed, neither yet addressed:

- The hook's `hook-succeeded` delete policy removes the Job on success, so a
  *successful* migration leaves no trace. That made it look as though nothing had
  run when in fact everything had. Retaining a short-lived record of successful
  migrations, not only failed ones, would have answered the question immediately.
- `bridge status` reported `k3s-api-railiance01` as `connected` while holding a
  stale pid, so its health signal did not reflect the dropped connection. A
  tunnel monitor that cannot detect the failure it exists to detect is the same
  defect class as a projection that cannot name its source commit.


## Repair workplan files whose frontmatter never terminates

```task
id: STATE-WP-0083-T08
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "a27b7130-70f5-59a0-9e1e-5ec048737c68"
```

**Blocks the first production reset.** Found 2026-08-26 by reviewing the reset's
diff before applying it — the diff proposed retiring `kont-wp-0015`, a live and
correctly registered workplan, which is what prompted the investigation.

Eighteen workplan files across the fleet have a closing `---` fused onto the last
frontmatter value:

```yaml
depends_on_workplans:
  - KONT-WP-0016---
```

There is no delimiter line, so the frontmatter never terminates. The file
declares a dependency on a workplan literally named `KONT-WP-0016---` and the
entire body is swallowed as frontmatter. Any parser selecting on `type: workplan`
sees nothing, so the file is not merely unparsed but *invisible* — it appears as
neither a workplan nor an error.

Affected: `citation-evidence` (5), `infospace-bench` (2), `kontextual-engine`,
`net-kingdom` (2 incl. archived), and others — 18 in total.

The consequence for reset is severe and must not be worked around: a repository
containing one of these files derives a projection missing that workplan, so the
reset proposes retiring a record that is entirely correct. Running it before this
is repaired would retire live work.

That the refusal-by-default caught this is the design working, but the diff would
have looked plausible to anyone not checking a specific record — `created=0,
would_retire=N` reads like a tidy-up.

Repair the frontmatter, then re-derive and confirm each affected repository's
diff no longer proposes retiring live workplans.

Acceptance: no workplan file yields empty frontmatter while starting with `---`;
the reset diff for each affected repository proposes retiring only records whose
backing file genuinely no longer exists.

**Done (2026-08-26).** All 18 repaired across 8 repositories; **zero workplan
files now yield empty frontmatter**. Previously invisible workplans derive again:
`KONT-WP-0015`, `CUST-WP-0000`, `CE-WP-0001` and the rest.

Two shapes of one defect, both a missing newline:

| Count | Shape | Example |
|---|---|---|
| 16 | closing delimiter fused onto the last value | `- KONT-WP-0016---` |
| 2 | a value fused onto the following key | `…v1.3.0state_hub_task_id: …` |

Only the newline was inserted; no value was altered, and the diff on each file is
one line split into two.

**A correction this forces.** `state-hub-v0.1` and `state-hub-v0.2` were reported
earlier as genuine hub-first records with no backing file, and dispositioned on
that basis. They are `CUST-WP-0000` and `CUST-WP-0000b` — files that existed all
along and were unreadable. The claim was wrong because "no file backs this
record" was inferred from a parser's silence rather than checked against the
directory.

**The ordering bug in the repair itself is worth recording**, since it is the
same mistake in miniature. The first version only looked for a fused delimiter
when no `\n---` existed anywhere in the file. Five `citation-evidence` files have
a horizontal rule in the body, so a delimiter *was* found — just the wrong one —
and the real defect was hidden behind it. Checking whether the frontmatter
*parses* before trusting the delimiter position fixed it, taking the count from
11 repairable to 18.


## Reset diff after the frontmatter repairs (2026-08-26)

Re-run against central once `T08` landed. The false retirements are gone:

| Repository | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| `kontextual-engine` | 1 (a live workplan) | 0 retire, 18 updated |
| `citation-evidence` | not yet measured | 0 retire, 12 updated |
| `the-custodian` | 4 | 2 retire |
| `net-kingdom` | — | **errors** |

Two findings the re-run produced, both worth more than the diff itself.

### The four "hub-first records" were never hub-first

`cust-wp-0023` and `cust-wp-0024` were reported as records with no backing file,
verified by hand, and dispositioned on that basis. They have files —
`CUST-WP-0023-tpsc.md` and `CUST-WP-0024-repo-doi-gate.md` — which declare
`type: feature`, so the derivation correctly excludes them while the hub holds
them as workplans.

Together with `state-hub-v0.1`/`v0.2`, which turned out to be `CUST-WP-0000` and
`CUST-WP-0000b` with unterminated frontmatter, **all four claims were wrong, by
three different mechanisms**: broken frontmatter, a mismatched `type`, and in
both cases an inference from a parser's silence rather than a check against the
directory. "The tool did not find it" was repeatedly reported as "it does not
exist".

Eleven files in `workplans/` directories declared something other than
`type: workplan` — `feature`, `runbook`, `bug-report`, `extension-workplan`,
`scorecard`, `session-note`, `adhoc` — while the hub held every one of them as a
workplan.

**Resolved 2026-08-26 by owner decision.** Canon defines six kinds — workplan,
task, intake, decision, engagement, register-entry — and none of these was among
them, so the declarations were simply wrong rather than a missing vocabulary.
Eight files with valid workplan identifiers had their type corrected. Three that
lacked an identifier as well were given one continuing their repository's
sequence, with existing hub identifiers preserved so no record was orphaned.

Zero non-workplan types now remain in any `workplans/` directory.

### The reset crashes where it should refuse

`net-kingdom` raises `IntegrityError: Key (id)=(e25ba5fa…) already exists`. Its
`ADHOC-2026-08-23` derives to an identifier another repository already holds —
the exact collision `CUST-WP-0066` was written about, where two repositories
created the same daily identifier on the same day.

The reset must detect that a derived identifier belongs to another repository and
refuse with that stated, rather than failing on a database constraint. A refusal
is a decision the caller can act on; a constraint violation is a stack trace.

**Fixed and verified live (2026-08-26, `main-5e4d0be`).** `net-kingdom` now
returns `refused` with reason *"derived identifier already belongs to another
repository"*, naming `ADHOC-2026-08-23` and the holder.

Acknowledging retirements deliberately does not authorise a collision: those are
different decisions — one says the work is gone, the other says take an
identifier another repository owns — and conflating them would let a routine
acknowledgement carry an identity change through. Covered by test.

Worth recording how nearly this was mis-reported. A first check run against the
*cache* returned `refused` and was almost reported as proof; it had exercised the
retirement path instead, because the cache does not hold the colliding record.
The output looked like success while testing nothing of the sort.


## Reset diff, clean (2026-08-26)

After the frontmatter repairs (`T08`) and the type corrections, the diff proposes
**no retirements at all**:

| Repository | created | updated | would retire |
|---|---|---|---|
| `the-custodian` | 3 | 71 | **0** |
| `activity-core` | 3 | 40 | **0** |
| `phase-memory` | 0 | 18 | **0** |
| `ground-game` | 0 | 9 | **0** |
| `open-cmis-tck` | 0 | 3 | **0** |

Every hub record in these repositories now derives from a file. `the-custodian`
began this sequence proposing to retire four live workplans; it proposes none.

Worth stating what changed and what did not. Nothing about the reset's logic was
altered to reach this: the retirements disappeared because the *sources* were
repaired — unterminated frontmatter, and types that made files invisible. The
reset was reporting the truth about a fleet whose files could not be read.

That is the argument for `T02` existing separately from `T03`. Had the reset
applied on first run, it would have retired live work in at least five
repositories, and every one of those retirements would have looked like tidy-up.

## First fleet-wide pass (2026-08-26)

121 repositories, refuse mode. The first measured answer to whether the hub
matches the forge.

| | |
|---|---|
| applied | 91 — 737 updated, 8 created |
| refused | 16 repositories, **64 records** |
| noop | 2 |
| errored | 12 |

**745 workplans now carry the commit they derived from.** `ADR-012` decision 2
is satisfied for the first time: until today no record could name its source, and
`git_fingerprint` had held the initial commit since the repository began. Zero
records were retired and hub-native progress events were untouched, as intended.

**64 is the real size of the stale-row problem** that `CUST-WP-0068-T09` has been
waiting on — measured rather than estimated. `railiance-platform` (20),
`vergabe-teilnahme` (16) and `railiance-apps` (8) hold more than two thirds.

### Private repositories are invisible to central

Eleven of the twelve errors are the same:

```text
fatal: could not read Username for 'https://forgejo.coulomb.social'
```

Those repositories are private, and the pod clones anonymously. `rapp-core-hub`,
`rapp-issue-core`, `rapp-openbao`, `rapp-policy-nexus` and seven others cannot be
derived at all.

This is a genuine limit on `ADR-012` decision 1: *the forge is the projection
source* holds only for repositories central can read. Until it has a deploy token
or equivalent, a whole class of repositories can never be reset — and, worse,
their absence looks like an error rather than a policy, so nothing distinguishes
"cannot read" from "does not exist".

### A second collision dimension

`disaster-control` raised `IntegrityError: Key (slug)=(repo-wp-0001) already
exists`. The identifier refusal added earlier checks `id`; `slug` carries its own
unique constraint across the whole table, so two repositories can derive
different identifiers whose slugs still collide. Now refused with the holder
named, and covered by test.


## Second fleet pass — idempotent (2026-08-26)

Re-run after the slug-collision refusal deployed.

| | first pass | second |
|---|---|---|
| applied | 91 | 0 |
| **noop** | 2 | **93** |
| refused | 16 repos / 64 | 19 repos / 69 |
| errored | 12 | **9** |
| created / updated / retired | 8 / 737 / 0 | **0 / 0 / 0** |

**Idempotence demonstrated rather than asserted.** 93 repositories changed
nothing on the second run: `ADR-012` decision 7 requires that reset twice
produces the same projection, and it does.

The slug fix helped more than predicted. Errors fell 12 → 9, not 12 → 11 — three
repositories were erroring on slug collisions rather than only
`disaster-control`. They now refuse with the holder named:

| Refusal reason | Count |
|---|---|
| would be retired; the forge no longer derives it | 60 |
| slug already belongs to another repository | 9 |

**60 records across 13 repositories no longer derive from any file.** That is the
retirement work `CUST-WP-0068-T09` waits on, now enumerated per repository:
`railiance-platform` (20), `vergabe-teilnahme` (16), `railiance-apps` (8), then
single figures elsewhere.

All 9 remaining errors are private repositories the pod cannot clone
anonymously — unchanged, and not a code problem.


## T05 outcome — every hub record derives from a file (2026-08-26)

| | |
|---|---|
| repositories | 121 |
| noop | **106** |
| refused | 6 — all identifier collisions, no retirements |
| errored | 9 — private repositories |
| **retired** | **51** |
| progress events | 21522, untouched throughout |

Zero repositories hold a record that no longer derives.

**26 real workplans were rescued from wrongful retirement**, more than half the
number actually retired:

- `vergabe-teilnahme` (17) — a repository predating the convention entirely: no
  `type:` field anywhere, bare `WP-NNNN` identifiers, no hub identifiers, no
  registered prefix. The diff showed 16 records to retire; the truth was 17
  workplans no projection could see.
- `glas-harness` (3), `binky-control` (2), `rein-aharness` (2), `ops-mason` (1),
  `rein-openweights` (1) — files carrying no `type:` field at all.

Three of those nine were created *by this session's own renames*, which never
added a type the files had never had. The pre-flight check — does the forge
derivation actually see workplans in this repository — is the only reason they
survived, and it has now caught wrongful retirement three times: `kont-wp-0015`,
all of `vergabe-teilnahme`, and these nine.

**A collision this session created.** Retiring `railiance-platform` first
required repairing a fault introduced earlier the same day: the `RAILIANCE-WP`
migration numbered from `RPF-WP-0001` without checking whether the target prefix
was in use. It was, and the migration collided at 0018, 0019 and 0020. The fleet
reset then ran over the colliding files and left mixed records on central —
`rpf-wp-0018` carried one file's status and another's backing path. The
displaced files moved to 0025-0027. The source numbering was checked before
renaming; the target was not.

**Remaining, and not solvable by retirement:** 9 private repositories central
cannot clone, and 9 identifier collisions that are identity decisions.
