Complete WP-0004 and WP-0005 jurisdiction research (8 of 8 each)

Executes all remaining shared jurisdictions across both workplans:
Germany/EU (deepened contract-law angle), US (deepened), UK (deepened),
Argentina, India, China, Africa (South Africa + OHADA), and Asia-Pacific
(Singapore, Japan, Australia) - 13 new history/ research artifacts.

Highest-priority findings:

- Australia's Unfair Contract Terms regime (expanded Nov 2023) covers
  standard-form contracts with any business under 100 employees/$10M
  turnover by default - the CUA is exactly such a contract, and most
  realistic Customers fall within this threshold. Unlike every other
  jurisdiction's consumer carve-out, this is not an edge case.
- China requires a "foreign-related" contract even to select foreign
  governing law, subject to a vague public-interest override even then -
  confirms a dedicated China rider is needed for both the License/CUA and
  the Enforcement Partner Agreement, not a shared global clause.
- India flatly prohibits advocate contingency fees (no exception gates,
  stricter than Germany) while explicitly permitting third-party
  litigation funding - the cleanest confirmation yet that the Litigation
  Funder/Local Counsel split-role model is both necessary and legal there.
- Japan's Article 12 fee-splitting rule means even the split-role
  fallback needs jurisdiction-specific structuring - the first case where
  the workaround itself, not just the original mechanism, has an open
  compliance question.
- Contingency Share ceilings vary widely where available: UK 50% (exact
  match), South Africa 25%, Argentina 35% (50% only with risk assumption),
  China 18% down to 6% on a sliding scale that shrinks as claims grow.
- Recurring cross-jurisdictional pattern (Germany, EU, US via CCPA,
  Argentina): B2B governing-law/liability clauses are respected, but an
  individual/sole-proprietor Customer's consumer-protection status is the
  operative risk everywhere, not a one-off edge case.

Updates specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §8.1 with a full 12-jurisdiction
findings table and three cross-cutting conclusions. Updates both V1C1
documents' Appendix A items (governing law, liability cap, data
protection) with the most consequential findings. Both workplans now have
only their human-gated synthesis tasks (T09-T10 / T10) remaining.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md

@@ -142,11 +142,20 @@ enforcement procedure.
 
 ```task
 id: TREV-WP-0005-T04
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "b40fef09-f2a4-4fb4-9743-57de96b9b30f"
 ```
 
+Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-Argentina.md`
+produced. Argentina permits *pacto de cuota litis* — the first jurisdiction
+where single-role is available AND the cap is close to but below 50%:
+35% ordinarily in Buenos Aires City, rising to 50% only if the lawyer
+contractually assumes the case's cost/cost-liability risk (a structure
+that naturally resembles the Litigation Funder role even though not
+strictly required here). ~33% in other provinces, 20% in labor matters.
+No dedicated litigation-funding regime confirmed in this pass.
+
 Research *pacto de cuota litis* availability for Argentine abogados
 (generally more permissive than continental Europe, often with statutory
 caps) and the broader Latin American pattern this represents or diverges
@@ -159,11 +168,21 @@ for unauthorized commercial software use.
 
 ```task
 id: TREV-WP-0005-T05
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "cb8ec312-4afa-4812-b5fd-5193c6c57140"
 ```
 
+Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-India.md` produced.
+**Cleanest confirmation of the split-role model's necessity so far**:
+Bar Council of India Rule 20 flatly prohibits advocates from any
+contingent-fee or proceeds-sharing arrangement, with no exception gates
+at all (stricter than Germany's narrow-but-existing gates). Third-party
+litigation funding is explicitly not prohibited, including outcome-based
+funder compensation — the split-role structure maps exactly onto a
+distinction Indian law already draws cleanly. A live reform debate exists
+for arbitration specifically but is not yet a rule change.
+
 Research the Bar Council of India Rules' prohibition on advocates
 charging contingency fees, whether a Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split
 (concept §8) is viable under Indian law and professional-conduct rules
@@ -177,11 +196,23 @@ themselves, subject to some uncertainty), and IP enforcement procedure.
 
 ```task
 id: TREV-WP-0005-T06
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "e83722de-de3e-4a2b-ba8f-7f5d16ac5dae"
 ```
 
+Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-China.md` produced.
+Contingency fees are permitted but nationally capped on a steep sliding
+scale (18% below 1M CNY, down to 6% above 50M CNY) — well below 50% at
+every tier, and counterintuitively *lower* for larger, more valuable
+claims. Contingency is prohibited outright in several case categories
+(criminal, administrative, mass/collective litigation among them —
+worth checking whether a multi-violation Enforcement campaign could be
+characterized as the latter). A separate "risk agency" no-win-no-fee
+structure exists under the same caps. Recommends the EPA itself likely be
+governed by Chinese law given the foreign-related-contract constraint
+found in the parallel WP-0004 T06 pass.
+
 Research Chinese lawyers' contingency-fee rules (permitted in specified
 case types, typically capped, under Ministry of Justice regulation),
 litigation funding's presence and regulatory treatment in China, and the
@@ -196,11 +227,20 @@ counsel and pursuing enforcement in Chinese courts — building on
 
 ```task
 id: TREV-WP-0005-T07
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "c84f991f-34cc-42e0-acfd-4a5822a35f56"
 ```
 
+Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-Africa.md` produced.
+South Africa's Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 confirms single-role is
+available but capped at 25% (including VAT) of the capital sum, or double
+the attorney's normal fee if lower — a hard statutory cap well below 50%,
+confirmed via the Act itself, and courts have invalidated non-compliant
+agreements. OHADA's contingency-fee rules were **not found** in this pass
+— explicitly flagged as unresearched rather than assumed to follow the
+French pattern by inference alone.
+
 Research South Africa's Contingency Fees Act 1997 (a statutory framework
 explicitly permitting capped contingency fees for attorneys — likely the
 most permissive African anchor jurisdiction) and the OHADA zone's
@@ -214,11 +254,24 @@ WP-0004 T07.
 
 ```task
 id: TREV-WP-0005-T08
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "35c7f74e-f70b-4c4b-9445-03c8dde53bb7"
 ```
 
+Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-AsiaPacific.md`
+produced. Singapore permits CFAs only since May 2022, and only for
+arbitration/SICC/mediation-related proceedings — not ordinary litigation,
+a real scope limit for a straightforward Enforcement Action. Japan permits
+contingency broadly, but Article 12 of its Basic Rules on the Duties of
+Practicing Attorneys bans fee-splitting with non-lawyers — a genuine,
+previously-unflagged compliance risk for the Litigation Funder model
+itself, the first jurisdiction where even the split-role fallback has an
+open compliance question. Australia restricts lawyer contingency fees to
+Victoria-only class actions, but has a mature, broadly-regulated
+litigation-funding market nationally, making split-role the more natural
+default there for reasons distinct from Germany's or India's.
+
 Research Singapore's recent liberalization permitting Conditional Fee
 Agreements for certain proceedings (a change from its historical
 prohibition), Japan's customary success-fee arrangements under bar-