New concept: Enforcement Network (contingency-incentivized violation enforcement)
Introduces specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md: independent, locally-licensed Enforcement Partners pursue unauthorized Commercial Use (License §3 violations) in their home jurisdiction for a Contingency Share of Recovery, so enforcement scales the way the framework's monetization already does - through aligned incentive rather than central litigation capacity. New terminology (Alleged Violation, Enforcement Action, Recovery, Contingency Share, Platform Share, Enforcement Registry, Enforcement Partner Agreement) plus a proposed enforcement-recovery Monetization Extension so Recovery flows into Development Credit through the existing accounting model rather than a parallel bucket. Flags the mechanism's central risk up front rather than assuming it away: lawyer contingency fees are not legal everywhere. Backed by workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md (10 tasks); four executed this session with live web research: - Germany/EU: RVG §4a permits contingency fees only in three narrow gates, none fitting this fact pattern well - single-role Enforcement Partner is very likely not viable; France permits a fixed-fee-plus-uncapped-result- fee structure instead; EU litigation-funding regulation is proposed (2022 EP resolution) but not yet adopted. - US: contingency fees broadly permitted; practical precondition is timely copyright registration of the Milestone Release to unlock statutory damages/fee-shifting; Copyright Claims Board flagged as a lower-cost venue. - UK: Damages-Based Agreements cap fees at 50% for this case category - the concept's originally-proposed 50% Contingency Share lands exactly on this real statutory ceiling, the first jurisdiction where the figure is precisely validated rather than arbitrary. - Mechanism design: synthesizes the above into a single Enforcement Partner Agreement template with jurisdiction-conditional role structure (single-role vs. Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split), with a payment- flow diagram showing the Development Credit allocation is unaffected by which structure applies. Six of ten WP-0005 tasks remain open (Argentina, India, China, Africa, Asia-Pacific, and the human-gated synthesis). Cross-referenced from README. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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---
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id: TREV-WP-0005
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type: workplan
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title: "Enforcement Network — legal feasibility and design research"
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domain: infotech
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repo: target-revenue
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status: active
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owner: claude
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topic_slug: infotech
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created: "2026-07-29"
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updated: "2026-07-29"
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---
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# Enforcement Network — legal feasibility and design research
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Researches the legal feasibility of `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md`'s
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core mechanism: independent Enforcement Partners pursuing unauthorized
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Commercial Use in their home jurisdiction for a Contingency Share of
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Recovery. This is a **distinct research axis from** `workplans/TREV-WP-0004-global-jurisdiction-research.md`:
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WP-0004 asks whether the License/Commercial Use Agreement's own terms
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(liability caps, data protection, choice of law) hold up per jurisdiction;
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this workplan asks whether the *enforcement mechanism itself* — lawyers or
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funders being paid a percentage of what they recover — is even legal in
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each jurisdiction, which is a legal-services/professional-ethics question,
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not a contract-enforceability question.
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**This workplan produces research artifacts, not final legal text or a
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final Contingency Share percentage.** Per `SCOPE.md` and `CONTRIBUTING.md`,
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no output may be treated as legal advice or as resolving an open question
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in `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` without specialist counsel review
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and the same human-accept gate already applied elsewhere in this repository.
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**Known central risk (already flagged in the concept doc, §8):**
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contingency fees for lawyers are banned or tightly restricted in several
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major jurisdictions (Germany foremost). Every jurisdiction task below must
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explicitly answer: (a) can a lawyer in this jurisdiction be paid a
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percentage of recovery directly; (b) if not, is a Litigation Funder /
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Local Counsel split (concept §8) a viable workaround under this
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jurisdiction's law; (c) what percentage or fee-structure limits apply
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either way.
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**Deliverable convention:** same as WP-0004 — dated artifacts under
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`history/`, only the synthesis task (T10) proposes edits to
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`specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` directly, gated behind human accept.
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## Germany and EU-wide
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```task
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id: TREV-WP-0005-T01
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status: done
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priority: high
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```
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Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-Germany-EU.md` produced.
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Confirmed via search: RVG §4a permits contingency fees only in three narrow
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gates (≤€2,000 claims, debt collection, or client-would-be-deterred), none
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fitting TREN's likely fact pattern well — single-role Enforcement Partner
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is very likely not viable in Germany, confirming concept §8's hypothesis.
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France (second data point) permits a fixed-fee-plus-uncapped-result-fee
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structure instead. EU-level litigation funding regulation is proposed
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(2022 EP resolution) but not yet adopted; March 2025 Commission mapping
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study found funding remains largely unregulated at EU level.
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Research German RVG §4a's narrow conditional-fee exception in detail
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(exact conditions under which *Erfolgshonorar* is permitted); the
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*pactum de quota litis* restriction's status and any liberalization trend
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across major EU civil-law jurisdictions (at least France as a second
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data point); EU-level third-party litigation funding regulation (the
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2022 European Parliament resolution/proposed directive on responsible
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private funding of litigation, if adopted or advanced); and practical
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procedural routes for pursuing unauthorized Commercial Use as copyright/
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contract infringement in Germany (injunctive relief availability, typical
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timeline, cost-shifting "loser pays" exposure).
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**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-Germany-EU.md`.
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## United States
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```task
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id: TREV-WP-0005-T02
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status: done
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priority: high
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```
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Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-US.md` produced.
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Confirmed contingency fees are broadly permitted (single-role Enforcement
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Partner viable), subject to state-bar reasonableness rules. Surfaced a
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practical (not legal) precondition: contingent-fee copyright counsel
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generally need timely copyright registration of the Milestone Release to
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unlock statutory damages ($750-$30,000/work, up to $150,000 for willful
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infringement) and fee-shifting — otherwise cases are hard to value.
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Identified the Copyright Claims Board as a lower-cost venue option for
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smaller Enforcement Actions. Litigation funding is permitted; the live
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regulatory topic is disclosure, not prohibition.
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Research US contingency-fee availability (broadly permitted, subject to
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state-bar reasonableness rules and some matter-type restrictions e.g.
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family law/criminal defense); state-level litigation funding disclosure
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and regulation trends; the historical champerty/maintenance doctrine's
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much-reduced modern relevance; and typical US copyright/software-license
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infringement procedure (statutory damages availability under the Copyright
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Act where registration applies, injunctive relief, small-claims-adjacent
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options such as the Copyright Claims Board for lower-value disputes).
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**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-US.md`.
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## United Kingdom
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```task
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id: TREV-WP-0005-T03
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status: done
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priority: high
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```
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Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-UK.md` produced.
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Confirmed the Damages-Based Agreement Regulations 2013 cap fee percentages
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at 25% (personal injury), 35% (employment), and **50% for all other
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cases** — the concept doc's proposed 50% Contingency Share lands exactly
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on this real statutory ceiling for the case category an unauthorized-
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Commercial-Use claim would fall into, the first jurisdiction where the
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original figure is precisely validated rather than arbitrary. Conditional
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Fee Agreements (fee-plus-uplift) are a second, more flexible option.
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Litigation funding is a mature, self-regulated market (ALF Code of
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Conduct); champerty/maintenance doctrines are largely set aside for
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commercial funding.
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Research Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs) and Damages-Based Agreements
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(DBAs) as the UK's structured alternative to a plain contingency fee,
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including their statutory caps; the UK's well-established, self-regulated
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third-party litigation funding market (Association of Litigation Funders
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Code of Conduct); the historical champerty/maintenance doctrine's current
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near-abolition for funded commercial litigation; and typical UK IP/breach
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enforcement procedure.
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**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-UK.md`.
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## Latin America (Argentina anchor)
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```task
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id: TREV-WP-0005-T04
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status: todo
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priority: medium
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```
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Research *pacto de cuota litis* availability for Argentine abogados
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(generally more permissive than continental Europe, often with statutory
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caps) and the broader Latin American pattern this represents or diverges
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from; local litigation-funding market maturity; and enforcement procedure
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for unauthorized commercial software use.
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**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-Argentina.md`.
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## India
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```task
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id: TREV-WP-0005-T05
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status: todo
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priority: medium
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```
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Research the Bar Council of India Rules' prohibition on advocates
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charging contingency fees, whether a Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split
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(concept §8) is viable under Indian law and professional-conduct rules
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given that prohibition, third-party litigation funding's legal status in
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India (historically permitted for funders who are not the advocate
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themselves, subject to some uncertainty), and IP enforcement procedure.
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**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-India.md`.
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## China
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```task
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id: TREV-WP-0005-T06
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status: todo
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priority: medium
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```
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Research Chinese lawyers' contingency-fee rules (permitted in specified
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case types, typically capped, under Ministry of Justice regulation),
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litigation funding's presence and regulatory treatment in China, and the
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practical constraints a foreign copyright holder faces retaining local
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counsel and pursuing enforcement in Chinese courts — building on
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`workplans/TREV-WP-0004-global-jurisdiction-research.md` T06's finding
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(if completed first) regarding foreign governing-law/venue enforceability.
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**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-China.md`.
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## Africa (representative jurisdictions)
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```task
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id: TREV-WP-0005-T07
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status: todo
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priority: medium
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```
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Research South Africa's Contingency Fees Act 1997 (a statutory framework
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explicitly permitting capped contingency fees for attorneys — likely the
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most permissive African anchor jurisdiction) and the OHADA zone's
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French-derived restriction on *pacte de quota litis* as the civil-law
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anchor, consistent with the representative-jurisdiction approach used in
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WP-0004 T07.
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**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-Africa.md`.
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## Asia-Pacific (beyond India and China)
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```task
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id: TREV-WP-0005-T08
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status: todo
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priority: medium
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```
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Research Singapore's recent liberalization permitting Conditional Fee
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Agreements for certain proceedings (a change from its historical
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prohibition), Japan's customary success-fee arrangements under bar-
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association guidelines, and Australia's mature, heavily-regulated
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litigation funding market (a global hub for funded litigation) alongside
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its state-variable rules on lawyer contingency/uplift fees.
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**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-AsiaPacific.md`.
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## Cross-cutting mechanism design
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```task
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id: TREV-WP-0005-T09
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status: done
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priority: high
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```
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Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-MechanismDesign.md` produced.
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Synthesizes T01-T03 into a single Enforcement Partner Agreement template
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with jurisdiction-conditional role structure: single-role (Local Counsel
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receives Contingency Share directly — US, likely UK/France) vs. split-role
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(Litigation Funder receives Contingency Share, pays Local Counsel under a
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locally-compliant fee — Germany, likely much of continental Europe).
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Platform Share and the Development Credit allocation rule (concept §6)
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are unaffected by which structure applies — only the Contingency Share's
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internal routing varies. Produced a payment-flow diagram and a six-clause
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EPA outline. Explicitly notes the feasibility matrix is incomplete pending
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T04-T08.
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Independent of any single jurisdiction: design the Litigation Funder /
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Local Counsel split-role structure (concept §8) in enough concrete detail
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to serve as an Enforcement Partner Agreement outline — who contracts with
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whom, how the Contingency Share flows from Recovery to the Funder and from
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the Funder (or Licensor) to Local Counsel, how standing/power-of-attorney
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works for a foreign Licensor engaging local counsel, and what the
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Enforcement Registry (Trust Service component) needs to record to keep
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this auditable without the Trust Service making any of the underlying
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legal decisions (concept §3.2, §10).
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**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-MechanismDesign.md`.
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## Synthesis: feasibility matrix and concept resolution
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```task
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id: TREV-WP-0005-T10
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status: todo
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priority: high
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human_accept_required: true
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```
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Using T01–T09, produce a consolidated feasibility matrix (one row per
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jurisdiction/family: direct lawyer contingency permitted? statutory cap?
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litigation funding regulatory status? recommended structural variant) and
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propose (but do not unilaterally apply) resolutions to
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`specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` §11's open questions, particularly
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question 2 (is 50% viable, and where) and question 5 (foreign-Licensor
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standing). Draft an Enforcement Partner Agreement outline (not full legal
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text) reflecting T09's mechanism design plus the per-jurisdiction variants
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this task identifies.
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**Human accept gate:** per the policy already applied to every other
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candidate legal document in this repository. Agents may prepare the
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synthesis and proposed concept-doc edits and leave this task `todo` —
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"ready for review," not done.
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**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Synthesis.md`, plus proposed (not yet
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applied) edits to `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md`.
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