Add Global Contingency Share Determination Rule to Enforcement Network concept

Per maintainer request, replaces the flat "working default 50%" Contingency
Share with a systematic per-jurisdiction rule, directly responding to
WP-0005's finding that 50% is unsafe almost everywhere except the UK:

1. 50% applies if lawful in the jurisdiction.
2. Otherwise, the higher of:
   (A) the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap - the actual local statutory
       maximum, published by the Enforcement Registry as background
       information for prospective Enforcement Partners; or
   (B) a Standard Bounty Amount - a fixed sum (not a percentage),
       defaulting to $1,000 local-currency-equivalent, recalculated
       annually to 50% of the trailing-18-month average unpaid-fees
       amount where more than 10 settled cases exist (a sample-size floor
       to avoid thin-sample noise), announced by 31 July, effective the
       following 1 January, always capped at the specific case's own
       unpaid fees.

Flags, as the highest-priority open question this rule itself introduces:
whether a fixed, non-percentage bounty actually escapes contingency-fee
prohibitions worded around outcome-contingency generally (India's Rule 20:
"contingent on the results of litigation") rather than percentage-
proportionality specifically (Germany's quota-litis-style rules) - the
Standard Bounty Amount may not solve what it was designed to solve in
exactly the jurisdictions that motivated it, and this is not yet verified.

Added as new specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §13 (Concise Definition
renumbered §14; no other section numbers changed, so existing cross-
references to §5.5/§6/§8/§9/§11 from workplans and history/ artifacts
remain valid). Updated §5.5, §5.7, and §8's key findings to point to the
new rule. Folded the rule's population and open questions into
WP-0005-T10's synthesis scope.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ Extracted and stabilized from the concept draft under `workplans/TREV-WP-0003-no
 
 [`specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md`](specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md) is a new, separate concept (2026-07-29): independent, locally-licensed Enforcement Partners pursue unauthorized Commercial Use in their home jurisdiction for a share of Recovery, so License §3 enforcement scales without the Licensor litigating everywhere directly. **The central open risk is that lawyer contingency fees are not legal everywhere** — Germany notably restricts them — so the concept requires a jurisdiction-conditional Litigation Funder/Local Counsel structure, not a single global fee mechanism. Backed by `workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md`; 9 of 10 tasks are done (all 8 jurisdictions plus mechanism design — see `history/260729-TREN-*.md`), only the human-gated synthesis remains. Findings: 50% is only exactly valid in the UK; most jurisdictions cap lower (18–35%) or ban direct lawyer contingency outright (Germany, India); India cleanly confirms the split-role model is both necessary and legal there; Japan's fee-splitting rule means even the split-role fallback needs jurisdiction-specific structuring, not just an availability check.
 
+The concept's §13 now defines a **Global Contingency Share Determination Rule**: 50% where lawful, otherwise the higher of the local percentage cap or a published Standard Bounty Amount (a fixed sum, not a percentage — defaulting to $1,000 local-currency-equivalent, recalculated annually from case data, announced by 31 July for the following 1 January). This is a deliberate design response to the finding above, but it introduces its own open question flagged prominently in §13.4: whether a *fixed* bounty actually escapes contingency-fee prohibitions worded around outcome-contingency generally (e.g., India's Rule 20) rather than percentage-proportionality specifically — not yet confirmed.
+
 ## Repository layout
 
 | Path | Role |