Fix Contingency Share rule: non-contingent financing, not a disguised bounty

Per maintainer correction: the previous "Standard Bounty Amount" was still
paid only on success, meaning it remained outcome-contingent and would not
actually escape prohibitions worded around outcome-contingency generally
(India's Rule 20: "a fee contingent on the results of litigation") rather
than percentage-proportionality specifically (Germany's quota-litis-style
rules). Renamed to "Standard Financing Amount" and restructured as a fixed
sum paid or made available regardless of the Enforcement Action's outcome
- a grant toward litigation cost, not a contingent fee in any form.

specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §13 rewritten as a sequential rule
rather than "higher of two comparable numbers" (contingent percentages and
non-contingent financing are not commensurable, and treating them as
interchangeable is exactly what would make the financing look like a
disguised contingent fee):

  1. 50% Contingency Share where lawful at that level.
  2. Else the jurisdiction's own lower lawful outcome-contingent cap.
  3. Else - no lawful outcome-contingent fee exists at all - no
     Contingency Share; the Licensor's own non-contingent fee arrangement
     with its lawyer governs what's owed win or lose, and the Trust
     Service's Standard Financing Amount offsets that cost regardless of
     outcome. Fee risk is genuinely higher here, by design: this is what
     it means for the risk-shifting a contingent fee normally provides to
     be unavailable, not an oversight to paper over.

New §13.0 makes explicit (per maintainer instruction) that nothing in this
rule creates a right for the Trust Service, an Enforcement Partner, or a
Litigation Funder to initiate a case - pressing charges remains
exclusively the Licensor's decision. The rule only makes a ready,
low-friction default (published caps, financing, EPA template) available
once that decision is made.

Added new core term §5.9 Standard Financing Amount; updated §5.5-5.7, §6's
lifecycle step, §9's EPA outline, and the concise definition to match.
Updated WP-0005 T10's synthesis scope and README accordingly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Extracted and stabilized from the concept draft under `workplans/TREV-WP-0003-no
 
 [`specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md`](specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md) is a new, separate concept (2026-07-29): independent, locally-licensed Enforcement Partners pursue unauthorized Commercial Use in their home jurisdiction for a share of Recovery, so License §3 enforcement scales without the Licensor litigating everywhere directly. **The central open risk is that lawyer contingency fees are not legal everywhere** — Germany notably restricts them — so the concept requires a jurisdiction-conditional Litigation Funder/Local Counsel structure, not a single global fee mechanism. Backed by `workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md`; 9 of 10 tasks are done (all 8 jurisdictions plus mechanism design — see `history/260729-TREN-*.md`), only the human-gated synthesis remains. Findings: 50% is only exactly valid in the UK; most jurisdictions cap lower (18–35%) or ban direct lawyer contingency outright (Germany, India); India cleanly confirms the split-role model is both necessary and legal there; Japan's fee-splitting rule means even the split-role fallback needs jurisdiction-specific structuring, not just an availability check.
 
-The concept's §13 now defines a **Global Contingency Share Determination Rule**: 50% where lawful, otherwise the higher of the local percentage cap or a published Standard Bounty Amount (a fixed sum, not a percentage — defaulting to $1,000 local-currency-equivalent, recalculated annually from case data, announced by 31 July for the following 1 January). This is a deliberate design response to the finding above, but it introduces its own open question flagged prominently in §13.4: whether a *fixed* bounty actually escapes contingency-fee prohibitions worded around outcome-contingency generally (e.g., India's Rule 20) rather than percentage-proportionality specifically — not yet confirmed.
+The concept's §13 now defines a **Global Contingency Share Determination Rule**, sequential rather than a "pick the higher number" calculation: (1) 50% where an outcome-contingent fee is lawful at that level; (2) else the jurisdiction's own lower lawful cap; (3) else — where no outcome-contingent fee is lawful at all (Germany, India) — **no Contingency Share**, and instead a non-contingent **Standard Financing Amount** (a fixed sum, paid regardless of outcome, defaulting to $1,000 local-currency-equivalent, recalculated annually, announced by 31 July for the following 1 January) toward the cost of bringing the case. Because it doesn't depend on winning, it isn't a contingent fee at all — a deliberate fix after an earlier draft's "fixed bounty" framing was still outcome-contingent (paid only on success) and so would not have escaped prohibitions like India's Rule 20 ("a fee contingent on the results of litigation"). §13.0 also makes explicit that none of this creates a right to sue — pressing charges remains exclusively the Licensor's decision; the rule only makes a ready, low-friction default available once that decision is made.
 
 ## Repository layout
 

specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ This concept defines:
 This concept does **not** yet define:
 
 - final legal text for an Enforcement Partner Agreement;
-- a finalized, universal Contingency Share percentage (the 50% figure below is a **proposed working default**, not a settled rule — see §6);
+- a finalized, universal Contingency Share percentage — 50% is a ceiling case applied only where lawful, per the jurisdiction-conditional rule at §13, not a settled global figure;
 - jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction legal feasibility findings (that is `workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md`'s job);
 - the Trust Service's Enforcement Registry implementation.
 
@@ -85,20 +85,24 @@ The total amount actually collected as a result of an Enforcement Action (judgme
 
 ### 5.5 Contingency Share
 
-The portion of Recovery (or, for the Standard Bounty Amount component, a fixed sum rather than a portion) paid to the Enforcement Partner (or, where local law requires a different structure, to the Litigation Funder — see §8) for pursuing the Enforcement Action. **Determined per jurisdiction by the Global Contingency Share Determination Rule at §13** — not a flat global percentage. The Licensor's original 50% proposal is the rule's ceiling case, used wherever it is lawful; §13 defines what applies where it is not.
+The outcome-contingent portion of Recovery paid to the Enforcement Partner (or, where local law requires a different structure, to the Litigation Funder — see §8) for pursuing the Enforcement Action, **where an outcome-contingent fee is lawful in that jurisdiction at all**. Determined per jurisdiction by the Global Contingency Share Determination Rule at §13: 50% where lawful, otherwise the jurisdiction's own lower cap. Where no outcome-contingent fee is lawful at all, there is **no** Contingency Share — see §5.9 (Standard Financing Amount) instead.
 
 ### 5.6 Platform Share
 
-The remaining portion of Recovery after the Contingency Share, payable to the Licensor and subject to explicit allocation under §6.
+The remaining portion of Recovery after the Contingency Share (or the full Recovery, where no Contingency Share applied under §13.1 tier 3), payable to the Licensor and subject to explicit allocation under §6.
 
 ### 5.7 Enforcement Registry
 
-The Trust Service component that records Alleged Violations' status, Enforcement Partner engagement, Enforcement Action status, and Recovery/allocation facts, per §3.2's non-discretionary principle. Also publishes, per §13, each jurisdiction's current Jurisdiction Percentage Cap and Standard Bounty Amount as background information for prospective Enforcement Partners.
+The Trust Service component that records Alleged Violations' status, Enforcement Partner engagement, Enforcement Action status, and Recovery/allocation facts, per §3.2's non-discretionary principle. Also publishes, per §13, each jurisdiction's current Jurisdiction Percentage Cap and Standard Financing Amount as background information for prospective Enforcement Partners and Licensors.
 
 ### 5.8 Enforcement Partner Agreement (EPA)
 
 The instrument, distinct from the License, Commercial Use Agreement, and CLA, under which the Licensor engages an Enforcement Partner for a specific jurisdiction and/or Alleged Violation. See §9.
 
+### 5.9 Standard Financing Amount
+
+A fixed, non-contingent sum the Trust Service makes available toward the cost of pursuing an Enforcement Action, used specifically in jurisdictions where no outcome-contingent fee for this kind of engagement is lawful (§13.1 tier 3). Paid or made available regardless of the Enforcement Action's outcome — it is not a share of Recovery and not conditioned on winning. See §13.3.
+
 ## 6. Recovery allocation and Development Credit
 
 Recovery represents value the framework's Commercial Use restriction should already have captured. The Platform Share should therefore, by default, flow to Development Credit for the applicable Phase — this is arguably the single clearest case of "target-relevant allocation" the framework has, clearer even than a voluntarily-purchased Commercial Entitlement, since it corresponds to Commercial Use that already occurred without payment.
@@ -136,7 +140,7 @@ Extends the framework's five-verb lifecycle (`specs/TargetRevenueFrameworkCore.m
 3. **Engage** — the Licensor and a prospective Enforcement Partner in the relevant jurisdiction enter an Enforcement Partner Agreement scoped to the specific Alleged Violation(s).
 4. **Pursue** — the Enforcement Partner conducts the Enforcement Action under local law and procedure.
 5. **Recover** — a Recovery is collected (or the action concludes without one).
-6. **Allocate** — Recovery is split into Contingency Share and Platform Share; the Platform Share is allocated per §6; all facts are recorded in the Enforcement Registry and, where applicable, the Target Ledger.
+6. **Allocate** — Recovery is split into Contingency Share and Platform Share where a lawful Contingency Share applies (§13.1 tiers 1–2), or treated as Platform Share in full where it does not (§13.1 tier 3, §13.4); the Platform Share is allocated per §6; all facts are recorded in the Enforcement Registry and, where applicable, the Target Ledger.
 
 ## 8. The central legal risk: contingency fees are not universal
 
@@ -192,7 +196,7 @@ A fourth instrument type, alongside the License, Commercial Use Agreement, and (
 
 - scope (which Alleged Violation(s) and jurisdiction the engagement covers);
 - authorization (the Licensor's grant of authority to pursue the Enforcement Action on its behalf — likely a power of attorney or equivalent local instrument, not an assignment of the underlying copyright);
-- Contingency Share / fee structure, jurisdiction-appropriate per §8;
+- fee structure per §13's rule: an outcome-contingent Contingency Share (tiers 1–2) or a non-contingent fee arrangement supported by the Standard Financing Amount (tier 3), jurisdiction-appropriate per §8's split-role design where applicable;
 - conduct standards and reporting obligations back to the Licensor;
 - confidentiality and coordination with any Trust Service publication of the Enforcement Action's existence and status;
 - termination and withdrawal (including the Licensor's ability to settle or withdraw independently of the Enforcement Partner's preference, and how that interacts with the Contingency Share if the Licensor settles directly).
@@ -228,40 +232,56 @@ Proposed principles (not yet finalized):
 
 ## 13. Global Contingency Share Determination Rule
 
-**Added 2026-07-29, at the Licensor's request, in direct response to `workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md`'s finding that a flat 50% Contingency Share is unsafe in most researched jurisdictions.** This section defines a single rule that determines the Contingency Share for any jurisdiction, so the framework does not need bespoke percentage negotiation each time a new jurisdiction is added.
+**Added 2026-07-29, revised 2026-07-29 (same day, maintainer correction), at the Licensor's request, in direct response to `workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md`'s finding that a flat 50% Contingency Share is unsafe in most researched jurisdictions.** This section defines a single rule that determines how an Enforcement Action is funded for any jurisdiction, so the framework does not need bespoke negotiation each time a new jurisdiction is added.
+
+### 13.0 The Licensor always decides whether to press the case
+
+**Before anything else in this section: nothing here creates a right for the Trust Service, an Enforcement Partner, or a Litigation Funder to initiate an Enforcement Action.** The decision to pursue a specific Alleged Violation belongs exclusively to the Licensor (the owner of the licensed code), exactly as already stated in §7 step 2 ("Vet") and §3.2 (the Trust Service never decides). What this section adds is not a new decision-maker — it is a **ready, low-friction default** the Licensor can draw on once it has decided to proceed: a published Jurisdiction Percentage Cap, a published Standard Financing Amount, and (via §9) a template Enforcement Partner Agreement — so that a Licensor who chooses to press a case is not starting from zero in an unfamiliar jurisdiction. Making this default easy to reach must never be read as making it automatic.
 
 ### 13.1 The rule
 
-For a given jurisdiction, the Contingency Share is determined as follows:
+For a given jurisdiction, funding an Enforcement Action the Licensor has decided to pursue works as follows:
 
-1. **If a 50% Contingency Share is lawful** in that jurisdiction for this kind of engagement (i.e., a Local Counsel or Litigation Funder may lawfully be entitled to 50% of Recovery), **the Contingency Share is 50%.**
-2. **Otherwise**, the Contingency Share is the **higher of:**
-   - **(A) the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap** — the maximum percentage of Recovery lawfully payable to the Enforcement Partner (or Litigation Funder) in that jurisdiction for this kind of engagement, per §13.2; or
-   - **(B) the Standard Bounty Amount** — a fixed monetary sum, not calculated as a percentage of Recovery, per §13.3, **capped so it never exceeds the unpaid Commercial Use fees actually owed by the specific Customer in the specific case** (a case-specific fact established through the Enforcement Action's evidence, the same way a Development Credit amount is established).
+1. **If an outcome-contingent fee (Local Counsel or Litigation Funder entitled to a share of Recovery) is lawful at 50%** in that jurisdiction for this kind of engagement, **the Contingency Share is 50%**, paid from Recovery, contingent on the outcome exactly as an ordinary contingency fee.
+2. **Else, if a lower outcome-contingent percentage is lawful** (the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap, §13.2, is greater than 0%), **the Contingency Share is that jurisdiction's cap** — still paid from Recovery, still contingent on the outcome, just smaller than 50%.
+3. **Else** (the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap is 0% — no lawful outcome-contingent fee exists for this kind of engagement at all, e.g. Germany generally, India): **there is no Contingency Share.** Instead, the Trust Service makes available the **Standard Financing Amount** (§13.3) — a fixed sum, **paid or made available regardless of the Enforcement Action's outcome**, toward the cost of bringing the case. The Licensor's own fee arrangement with its lawyer (necessarily non-contingent in this branch, since outcome-contingency is what is unlawful here) governs what is actually owed, win or lose; the Standard Financing Amount offsets that cost, it does not replace or guarantee it.
 
-### 13.2 Jurisdiction Percentage Cap (A)
+**This is a sequential rule, not a "take the higher of two comparable numbers" calculation** (an earlier draft of this section compared the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap and the financing amount as if both were contingent shares of Recovery — that was a mistake, corrected here: a contingent percentage and a non-contingent financing sum are not commensurable, and treating them as interchangeable is exactly what would make the financing amount look like a disguised contingent fee, defeating its purpose). Where tier 1 or 2 applies, there is no financing amount question — a lawful contingent fee is being paid. Where tier 3 applies, there is no Contingency Share at all — only non-contingent financing support.
 
-The Jurisdiction Percentage Cap is the maximum lawful percentage found for that jurisdiction (e.g., the UK's 50% DBA cap, South Africa's 25% Contingency Fees Act cap, China's sliding 18%–6% scale by claim size, Argentina's 35% ordinary cap). Where no lawful percentage-based fee exists at all for a direct Enforcement Partner (e.g., Germany, India), the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap is **0%**, and the rule falls through entirely to (B).
+### 13.2 Jurisdiction Percentage Cap
+
+The maximum lawful outcome-contingent percentage of Recovery found for that jurisdiction (e.g., the UK's 50% DBA cap, South Africa's 25% Contingency Fees Act cap, China's sliding 18%–6% scale by claim size, Argentina's 35% ordinary cap). Where no lawful outcome-contingent fee exists at all for this kind of engagement (e.g., Germany, India), the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap is **0%**, and §13.1 falls through to tier 3.
 
 **The Enforcement Registry (§5.7) publishes the current Jurisdiction Percentage Cap for every jurisdiction with an active or prospective Enforcement Partner**, as background information for prospective Enforcement Partners and Litigation Funders — this is a publication obligation, not a discretionary determination, consistent with §3.2's non-discretionary principle.
 
-### 13.3 Standard Bounty Amount (B)
+### 13.3 Standard Financing Amount
+
+**Purpose.** A fixed sum made available by the Trust Service toward the cost of bringing an Enforcement Action, **payable without any dependency on that Enforcement Action's outcome.** Because it does not depend on winning, losing, or settling, it is not a contingent fee at all — it is closer to a grant or subsidy toward litigation cost, and is used specifically in jurisdictions (§13.1 tier 3) where an outcome-contingent arrangement for this kind of engagement is not lawful, so that the framework's support mechanism does not itself risk being characterized as a disguised contingent fee.
+
+**Not a bounty.** Nothing in this section pays more, or pays at all, *because* a case succeeds. If the case does not yield a Recovery, the Standard Financing Amount already advanced is not repaid or clawed back, and the Licensor still owes its lawyer whatever their own (non-contingent) fee agreement provides — the financing reduces the Licensor's up-front cost of trying, it does not change who bears the risk of losing.
 
 **Default:** the local-currency equivalent of **US $1,000**.
 
-**Annual recalculation:** once per year, at a mid-year calculation date, for each jurisdiction: if **more than 10** Enforcement Actions have settled in that jurisdiction with a Recovery in the trailing 18 months, the Standard Bounty Amount for the following year is recalculated as **50% of the average unpaid-fees amount across those settled cases**. If 10 or fewer qualifying cases exist, the Standard Bounty Amount remains the US $1,000 (local-currency-equivalent) default — this sample-size floor exists to avoid setting a jurisdiction's bounty from a statistically thin sample.
+**Annual recalculation:** once per year, at a mid-year calculation date, for each jurisdiction: if **more than 10** Enforcement Actions have settled in that jurisdiction (successfully or not) in the trailing 18 months, the Standard Financing Amount for the following year is recalculated as **50% of the average unpaid Commercial Use fees across those settled cases**. If 10 or fewer qualifying cases exist, the Standard Financing Amount remains the US $1,000 (local-currency-equivalent) default — this sample-size floor exists to avoid setting a jurisdiction's figure from a statistically thin sample.
 
-**Governance calendar:** the recalculated Standard Bounty Amount for a jurisdiction (or confirmation that it remains the $1,000 default) is **announced no later than 31 July**, and takes effect for Enforcement Actions in that jurisdiction from the following **1 January**. A jurisdiction's Standard Bounty Amount therefore changes at most once per year, on a known, published schedule — never retroactively, and never mid-cycle.
+**Governance calendar:** the recalculated Standard Financing Amount for a jurisdiction (or confirmation that it remains the $1,000 default) is **announced no later than 31 July**, and takes effect for Enforcement Actions in that jurisdiction from the following **1 January**. A jurisdiction's Standard Financing Amount therefore changes at most once per year, on a known, published schedule — never retroactively, and never mid-cycle.
 
-**Cap.** Regardless of which figure applies, the Standard Bounty Amount actually paid in a specific case cannot exceed that case's own unpaid Commercial Use fees — it is a floor/fallback incentive mechanism, not a windfall.
+**Cap.** The Standard Financing Amount made available in a specific case cannot exceed that case's own unpaid Commercial Use fees (a case-specific fact established through the Enforcement Action's evidence, the same way a Development Credit amount is established) — it funds pursuit of a specific, quantifiable shortfall, not an open-ended subsidy.
 
-### 13.4 Open questions this rule introduces (not resolved here)
+**Fee risk is genuinely higher where outcome-contingency is banned.** This is a direct, intended consequence of tier 3, not an oversight: where the law does not permit shifting the risk of losing onto contingent counsel, that risk sits with the Licensor, same as it would for any ordinary litigant in that jurisdiction. The Standard Financing Amount lowers the barrier to trying; it does not, and structurally cannot, eliminate that risk without becoming the same disguised contingent fee tier 3 exists to avoid.
 
-1. **Does a fixed, non-percentage bounty actually escape a jurisdiction's contingency-fee prohibition?** This is the most important open question the rule itself creates, and it must not be assumed away. Several prohibitions found in `workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md` are worded around outcome-*contingency* generally, not percentage-*proportionality* specifically — India's Bar Council Rule 20, for example, bars a fee "contingent on the results of litigation," which a fixed bounty paid only on success may still trigger regardless of it not being calculated as a percentage. The Standard Bounty Amount is a promising design response to the percentage-specific prohibitions (Germany's §4a, quota-litis-style rules), but it has **not** been verified against outcome-contingency prohibitions that would catch a fixed sum just as readily as a proportional one. This is now the highest-priority legal question for `workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md` T10's synthesis.
+### 13.4 Recovery allocation is unaffected by which tier applied
+
+Where tier 3 applied (no Contingency Share, only non-contingent financing), the Recovery collected is **not** reduced by a contingency carve-out — the full Recovery is Platform Share under §6, since no one was paid a contingent share of it. Whether the Standard Financing Amount already advanced should then be reimbursed to the Trust Service out of that Recovery is an open question (§13.5 item 3), not resolved by this rule.
+
+### 13.5 Open questions this rule introduces (not resolved here)
+
+1. **Funding source for the Standard Financing Amount.** Who actually provides the non-contingent financing — the Trust Service operator directly, a pooled fund contributed to by successful Phases, or the Licensor's own funds simply channeled through a Trust Service-published reference figure? Not resolved here; this section defines the *amount* and *governance calendar*, not who capitalizes it.
 2. **Currency conversion methodology for the US $1,000 baseline** — which reference exchange rate, and as of what date, is not yet defined. Working assumption: the rate prevailing at the announcement date (31 July), published alongside the announcement — not yet confirmed as a rule.
-3. **Precise definition of the 18-month look-back window** — whether it means cases settled within the 18 months immediately preceding the mid-year calculation date (the working assumption used in §13.3), or some other reading of "settled 18 months before." Should be stated unambiguously once this rule moves toward legal review.
-4. **Who is paid what when both (A) and (B) could apply, and (A) does not sum cleanly with the Local Counsel/Litigation Funder split-role structure** — e.g., in China, where (A) might be a low single-digit-to-teens percentage of a large Recovery while (B) is a fixed sum that could exceed it. The rule as stated picks the higher of the two amounts, but does not yet specify how that amount is then divided between a Litigation Funder and Local Counsel under §8's split-role structure where one applies — likely a matter for the Enforcement Partner Agreement's own terms (§9), not this rule.
+3. **Should an advanced Standard Financing Amount be reimbursed from Recovery if the case succeeds?** §13.4 leaves this open. Doing so would not reintroduce outcome-contingency for the *Enforcement Partner's fee* (which remains non-contingent either way) — it would only affect whether the Trust Service recoups its own financing outlay, a different question from what makes the lawyer's or funder's compensation lawful.
+4. **Precise definition of the 18-month look-back window** — whether it means cases settled within the 18 months immediately preceding the mid-year calculation date (the working assumption used in §13.3), or some other reading of "settled 18 months before." Should be stated unambiguously once this rule moves toward legal review.
+5. **Interaction with the Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split-role structure (§8) in tier 3 jurisdictions.** If Local Counsel's own fee is non-contingent (as tier 3 requires), does a Litigation Funder still have a role at all, or does the split-role structure collapse back to a single non-contingent Local Counsel engagement, financed in part by the Standard Financing Amount? Likely the latter, but not confirmed — a matter for the Enforcement Partner Agreement's own terms (§9).
 
 ## 14. Concise definition
 
-> The Enforcement Network is a proposed mechanism by which independent, locally-licensed Enforcement Partners pursue unauthorized Commercial Use of a Milestone Release in their home jurisdiction, funded by a Contingency Share of any Recovery determined per jurisdiction under §13's global rule (50% where lawful, otherwise the higher of the local percentage cap or a published Standard Bounty Amount), with the remaining Platform Share flowing to Development Credit for the applicable Phase. Because lawyer contingency fees are not available in every jurisdiction, the mechanism must be capable of separating the economic-risk-bearing role (Litigation Funder) from the locally-compliant legal-representation role (Local Counsel) where local professional-conduct rules require it, rather than assuming a single global fee structure works everywhere.
+> The Enforcement Network is a proposed mechanism by which independent, locally-licensed Enforcement Partners pursue unauthorized Commercial Use of a Milestone Release in their home jurisdiction — always at the Licensor's own decision to press the case, never automatically. Where lawful, pursuit is funded by an outcome-contingent Contingency Share of Recovery (up to 50%, or the jurisdiction's lower cap); where outcome-contingent fees are not lawful at all, the Trust Service instead makes available a fixed, non-contingent Standard Financing Amount toward the cost of pursuit, leaving the Licensor's ordinary fee risk with its own lawyer intact. Recovery not consumed by a lawful Contingency Share flows to Development Credit for the applicable Phase. Because lawyer contingency fees are not available in every jurisdiction, the mechanism must be capable of separating the economic-risk-bearing role (Litigation Funder) from the locally-compliant legal-representation role (Local Counsel) where local professional-conduct rules require it, rather than assuming a single global fee structure works everywhere.

workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md

@@ -344,26 +344,42 @@ applied) edits to `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md`.
 
 ---
 
-**Added 2026-07-29 (maintainer request):** `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md`
-§13 now defines a Global Contingency Share Determination Rule (50% where
-lawful; otherwise the higher of the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap or a
-Standard Bounty Amount — a fixed, non-percentage sum defaulting to
-US $1,000 local-currency-equivalent, recalculated annually from a
->10-case sample where available, announced by 31 July, effective the
-following 1 January). This task's synthesis must additionally:
+**Added 2026-07-29 (maintainer request), revised 2026-07-29 (same day,
+maintainer correction):** `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` §13 defines
+a sequential funding rule, not a "higher of two comparable numbers"
+calculation: (1) 50% Contingency Share where an outcome-contingent fee is
+lawful at that level; (2) else the jurisdiction's own lower lawful
+outcome-contingent cap; (3) else — where **no** outcome-contingent fee is
+lawful at all (Germany, India) — **no Contingency Share**, and instead a
+non-contingent **Standard Financing Amount** (renamed from "Standard
+Bounty Amount," precisely because a bounty paid only on success is still
+outcome-contingent and would not escape the prohibitions tier 3 exists to
+route around). The Standard Financing Amount is paid/available regardless
+of outcome, defaults to US $1,000 local-currency-equivalent, recalculates
+annually from a >10-case sample where available, is announced by 31 July,
+and takes effect the following 1 January. §13.0 additionally makes explicit
+that none of this creates any right to initiate a case — pressing charges
+remains exclusively the Licensor's decision; the rule only makes a
+ready default available once that decision is made.
+
+This task's synthesis must additionally:
 
 - Populate §13.2's Jurisdiction Percentage Cap for all 8 researched
   jurisdictions/families from the T01–T08 findings (values are already in
   each jurisdiction's `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-*.md` file and the
   consolidated table in `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` §8.1).
-- Treat §13.4 open question 1 (does a fixed, non-percentage bounty actually
-  escape outcome-contingency prohibitions worded around "contingent on
-  results," as opposed to prohibitions worded specifically around
-  percentage-proportional fees?) as the **highest-priority legal question**
-  in the entire WP-0005 program — it determines whether the Standard
-  Bounty Amount actually solves anything in India (Rule 20's wording) and
-  Germany, or merely relocates the same compliance problem.
-- Resolve §13.4 open questions 2–4 (FX reference methodology, exact
-  18-month window definition, and how (A)/(B) interact with the
-  Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split where one applies) or state
-  plainly they remain open pending counsel.
+- Resolve §13.5's five open questions: funding source for the Standard
+  Financing Amount (item 1); FX reference methodology (item 2); whether an
+  advanced Standard Financing Amount should be reimbursed from Recovery on
+  success (item 3, now a funding-recoupment question, no longer a
+  legal-compliance question since the fee itself is non-contingent either
+  way); the exact 18-month window definition (item 4); and how tier 3
+  interacts with the Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split-role structure
+  (item 5) — or state plainly which remain open pending counsel.
+- Confirm the renamed Standard Financing Amount's non-contingent framing
+  actually holds up under India's Rule 20 ("a fee contingent on the results
+  of litigation") and Germany's §4a: the fee/financing must not, in
+  substance, depend on whether the case succeeds, only on whether it is
+  brought at all — this is now a design property to verify, not an open
+  question about the mechanism's basic viability the way the original
+  "fixed bounty" framing left unresolved.