Fix Contingency Share rule: non-contingent financing, not a disguised bounty
Per maintainer correction: the previous "Standard Bounty Amount" was still
paid only on success, meaning it remained outcome-contingent and would not
actually escape prohibitions worded around outcome-contingency generally
(India's Rule 20: "a fee contingent on the results of litigation") rather
than percentage-proportionality specifically (Germany's quota-litis-style
rules). Renamed to "Standard Financing Amount" and restructured as a fixed
sum paid or made available regardless of the Enforcement Action's outcome
- a grant toward litigation cost, not a contingent fee in any form.
specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §13 rewritten as a sequential rule
rather than "higher of two comparable numbers" (contingent percentages and
non-contingent financing are not commensurable, and treating them as
interchangeable is exactly what would make the financing look like a
disguised contingent fee):
1. 50% Contingency Share where lawful at that level.
2. Else the jurisdiction's own lower lawful outcome-contingent cap.
3. Else - no lawful outcome-contingent fee exists at all - no
Contingency Share; the Licensor's own non-contingent fee arrangement
with its lawyer governs what's owed win or lose, and the Trust
Service's Standard Financing Amount offsets that cost regardless of
outcome. Fee risk is genuinely higher here, by design: this is what
it means for the risk-shifting a contingent fee normally provides to
be unavailable, not an oversight to paper over.
New §13.0 makes explicit (per maintainer instruction) that nothing in this
rule creates a right for the Trust Service, an Enforcement Partner, or a
Litigation Funder to initiate a case - pressing charges remains
exclusively the Licensor's decision. The rule only makes a ready,
low-friction default (published caps, financing, EPA template) available
once that decision is made.
Added new core term §5.9 Standard Financing Amount; updated §5.5-5.7, §6's
lifecycle step, §9's EPA outline, and the concise definition to match.
Updated WP-0005 T10's synthesis scope and README accordingly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@ -344,26 +344,42 @@ applied) edits to `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md`.
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---
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**Added 2026-07-29 (maintainer request):** `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md`
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§13 now defines a Global Contingency Share Determination Rule (50% where
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lawful; otherwise the higher of the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap or a
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Standard Bounty Amount — a fixed, non-percentage sum defaulting to
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US $1,000 local-currency-equivalent, recalculated annually from a
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>10-case sample where available, announced by 31 July, effective the
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following 1 January). This task's synthesis must additionally:
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**Added 2026-07-29 (maintainer request), revised 2026-07-29 (same day,
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maintainer correction):** `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` §13 defines
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a sequential funding rule, not a "higher of two comparable numbers"
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calculation: (1) 50% Contingency Share where an outcome-contingent fee is
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lawful at that level; (2) else the jurisdiction's own lower lawful
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outcome-contingent cap; (3) else — where **no** outcome-contingent fee is
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lawful at all (Germany, India) — **no Contingency Share**, and instead a
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non-contingent **Standard Financing Amount** (renamed from "Standard
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Bounty Amount," precisely because a bounty paid only on success is still
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outcome-contingent and would not escape the prohibitions tier 3 exists to
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route around). The Standard Financing Amount is paid/available regardless
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of outcome, defaults to US $1,000 local-currency-equivalent, recalculates
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annually from a >10-case sample where available, is announced by 31 July,
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and takes effect the following 1 January. §13.0 additionally makes explicit
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that none of this creates any right to initiate a case — pressing charges
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remains exclusively the Licensor's decision; the rule only makes a
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ready default available once that decision is made.
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This task's synthesis must additionally:
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- Populate §13.2's Jurisdiction Percentage Cap for all 8 researched
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jurisdictions/families from the T01–T08 findings (values are already in
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each jurisdiction's `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-*.md` file and the
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consolidated table in `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` §8.1).
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- Treat §13.4 open question 1 (does a fixed, non-percentage bounty actually
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escape outcome-contingency prohibitions worded around "contingent on
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results," as opposed to prohibitions worded specifically around
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percentage-proportional fees?) as the **highest-priority legal question**
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in the entire WP-0005 program — it determines whether the Standard
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Bounty Amount actually solves anything in India (Rule 20's wording) and
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Germany, or merely relocates the same compliance problem.
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- Resolve §13.4 open questions 2–4 (FX reference methodology, exact
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18-month window definition, and how (A)/(B) interact with the
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Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split where one applies) or state
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plainly they remain open pending counsel.
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- Resolve §13.5's five open questions: funding source for the Standard
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Financing Amount (item 1); FX reference methodology (item 2); whether an
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advanced Standard Financing Amount should be reimbursed from Recovery on
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success (item 3, now a funding-recoupment question, no longer a
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legal-compliance question since the fee itself is non-contingent either
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way); the exact 18-month window definition (item 4); and how tier 3
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interacts with the Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split-role structure
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(item 5) — or state plainly which remain open pending counsel.
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- Confirm the renamed Standard Financing Amount's non-contingent framing
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actually holds up under India's Rule 20 ("a fee contingent on the results
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of litigation") and Germany's §4a: the fee/financing must not, in
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substance, depend on whether the case succeeds, only on whether it is
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brought at all — this is now a design property to verify, not an open
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question about the mechanism's basic viability the way the original
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"fixed bounty" framing left unresolved.
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