Close WP-0004/WP-0005 with alpha/beta legal-review deferral

Maintainer decision (2026-07-29): full specialist legal review of the
TRSL/CUA is postponed until the framework moves out of beta, given
limited legal/commercial exposure during build/alpha. WP-0004-T10 and
WP-0005-T10 synthesize their jurisdiction research into adopted alpha/beta
working defaults (governing law -> arbitration at a neutral seat,
liability cap, data protection minimal-collection practice, and the
Enforcement Network's fee mechanics) rather than full resolution, and are
accepted on that basis. Propagates the decision to the License/CUA V1C1
Appendix A tables and status banners, SCOPE.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, the
WP-0008-T05 go-live gate, and README.md.

history/260729-TREN-Synthesis.md

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+# TREN Feasibility Synthesis (WP-0005 T10)
+
+**Document status:** Research artifact, Stage 0/1 (`workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md` T10)
+**Not legal advice.** Synthesizes T01–T09. Adopts alpha/beta working defaults per maintainer decision 2026-07-29 (full specialist legal review deferred until out of beta; see `history/260729-TRSL-Jurisdiction-Synthesis.md` §3 for what this does and does not mean, which applies equally here).
+
+---
+
+## 1. Consolidated feasibility matrix
+
+| Jurisdiction | Structure | Jurisdiction Percentage Cap | Note |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Germany | Split-role required | 0% (no lawful outcome-contingent fee for this engagement type) | §4a's three gates don't fit this fact pattern |
+| France | Likely single-role, structured | N/A — fixed-fee-plus-uncapped-result-fee required, not a bare percentage | Second EU data point |
+| United States | Single-role (tier 1: 50% lawful directly) | N/A — tier 1 applies | Copyright registration is the practical precondition |
+| United Kingdom | Single-role (tier 1: 50% lawful directly) | N/A — tier 1 applies | Only jurisdiction where 50% is exactly the statutory ceiling |
+| Argentina | Single-role | **35%** ordinarily (Buenos Aires City); up to 50% only if counsel assumes case-cost risk | 50% reachable via a risk-assumption variant, not the default |
+| India | Split-role required | **0%** (flat prohibition, no exception gates) | Cleanest confirmation of the split-role model |
+| China | Single-role, sliding scale | **18% (<1M CNY) → 15% (1–5M) → 12% (5–10M) → 9% (10–50M) → 6% (>50M)** | Larger claims get a *smaller* ceiling — counterintuitive, must be encoded as a schedule, not one number |
+| South Africa | Single-role | **25%** (or 2× normal fee if lower) | Hard statutory cap, confirmed via the Contingency Fees Act |
+| OHADA zone | Unresearched | Unresearched | Do not assume the French pattern applies |
+| Singapore | Single-role only for arbitration/SICC/mediation | Not stated as a percentage; **0%** for ordinary litigation | Route Singapore Enforcement Actions to arbitration/SICC where possible |
+| Japan | Broadly permitted, but split-role has its own risk | No fixed cap | **Article 12 bans fee-splitting with non-lawyers** — needs bespoke structuring even for the fallback |
+| Australia | Split-role by default (funding-market maturity, not fee-ban) | **0%** outside Victoria class actions | Different reason for split-role than Germany/India |
+
+## 2. Proposed resolutions to concept §13.2 (Jurisdiction Percentage Cap)
+
+**Adopted 2026-07-29:** the table above is now the authoritative Jurisdiction Percentage Cap reference for the eight researched jurisdictions/families, to be published by the Enforcement Registry per §13.2. China's is a schedule, not a single figure — the Enforcement Registry must publish it as such, not collapse it to one number.
+
+## 3. Proposed resolutions to concept §13.5 (open questions)
+
+1. **Funding source for the Standard Financing Amount.** Adopted for alpha/beta: the Licensor funds it directly out of pocket. A pooled fund contributed to by successful Phases is a reasonable future design but is unnecessary complexity while pilot-stage Enforcement Actions are expected to be rare or nonexistent — revisit once real Enforcement Actions actually occur.
+2. **FX reference methodology.** Adopted as the actual rule (no longer just a working assumption): the exchange rate prevailing on the announcement date (31 July), published alongside the announcement.
+3. **Reimbursement of advanced financing from Recovery.** Adopted for alpha/beta: **yes**, where a Recovery occurs, the Trust Service's advanced Standard Financing Amount is reimbursed from the Platform Share before Development Credit allocation, ahead of the Phase's own Development Credit. This does not reintroduce outcome-contingency for the lawyer's own fee (still non-contingent either way per §13.1 tier 3) — it only affects whether the Trust Service recoups its own outlay, a bookkeeping question distinct from what makes the underlying fee lawful.
+4. **18-month look-back window.** Adopted as the actual rule: cases settled within the 18 months immediately preceding the mid-year calculation date.
+5. **Split-role interaction in tier 3 jurisdictions.** Adopted as the working answer: in a tier 3 jurisdiction, the "split-role" structure collapses to a single non-contingent Local Counsel engagement, financed in part by the Standard Financing Amount — a separate Litigation Funder entity is not required by default unless a specific case's economics call for one.
+
+## 4. Japan: the split-role compliance risk is not resolved, only flagged more precisely
+
+T08 found Japan's Article 12 (no fee-splitting between a lawyer and a non-lawyer) threatens the split-role fallback itself, not just the single-role default. This synthesis does **not** resolve that — it is exactly the kind of jurisdiction-specific professional-conduct question that requires actual Japanese counsel, not a framework-level default. **Recommendation: do not pursue an Enforcement Action in Japan under either structure until specifically reviewed**, even during alpha/beta — this is a different category of risk than "we haven't finalized the liability cap wording," because it goes to whether the engagement is even lawful at all, not how favorable its terms are.
+
+## 5. Enforcement Partner Agreement — status
+
+The EPA outline in `history/260729-TREN-MechanismDesign.md` §5 remains the reference outline. No further drafting occurs in this synthesis — a full EPA draft (analogous to the License/CUA V1C1 documents) is a future deliverable, appropriately sequenced after `workplans/TREV-WP-0008-governance-and-pilot-rollout.md` T01 resolves who the Licensor actually is, since the EPA's "Licensor" party needs a real answer before its own text can be drafted meaningfully.
+
+## 6. What this synthesis does not do
+
+Consistent with `history/260729-TRSL-Jurisdiction-Synthesis.md` §3: this closes the *research and design* question of how the Contingency Share / Standard Financing Amount mechanism should work, for alpha/beta operation. It does not mean any Enforcement Action should actually be pursued yet — the Enforcement Network remains a designed-but-unused mechanism until a real Alleged Violation occurs and the Licensor (per `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` §7 step 2, §13.0) decides to press it.

history/260729-TRSL-Jurisdiction-Synthesis.md

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+# TRSL/CUA Jurisdiction Synthesis (WP-0004 T10)
+
+**Document status:** Research artifact, Stage 0/1 (`workplans/TREV-WP-0004-global-jurisdiction-research.md` T10)
+**Not legal advice.** Synthesizes T01–T09. Adopts alpha/beta working defaults per maintainer decision 2026-07-29: full specialist legal review across every jurisdiction is deferred until the framework moves out of beta, since legal and commercial exposure during build/alpha is limited and the License/CUA will be revised based on stakeholder and customer feedback before the legal framework settles. These are **provisional alpha/beta adoptions, not production-final legal conclusions** — see each item's note below.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Consolidated jurisdictional risk matrix
+
+| Jurisdiction | Governing-law/venue risk | Liability-cap enforceability | Data protection | Notable finding |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| Germany | Rome I respects B2B choice; consumer-law carve-out is the recurring risk | Transparenzgebot — clarity, not fairness, is the bar | GDPR; UK GDPR now diverging | AGB law covers B2B, not just consumer contracts |
+| EU (general) | Same as Germany | EU Late Payment Directive fills CUA §3.5's blank for EU customers | GDPR | — |
+| United States | Governing-law clauses generally respected; state choice matters | UCC §2-302/§2-719 unconscionability is a narrow backstop | CCPA/CPRA B2B exemption expired Jan 2023 | No single "US software law" — UCC Art. 2B/UCITA never uniformly adopted |
+| United Kingdom | — | UCTA 1977 reasonableness applies directly to a standard-form CUA | UK GDPR diverging from EU GDPR | — |
+| Argentina | B2B respected; Ley 24.240 consumer carve-out (same pattern) | Not researched | PDPL — EU-adequate since 2003, lowest-friction case found | — |
+| India | Foreign governing law respected by Indian courts | Contract Act §28 permits quantum caps; bars complete remedy bars | DPDPA 2023 "negative list" — more permissive than GDPR by design | — |
+| China | **Hard constraint**: foreign law needs a "foreign-related" contract + vague public-interest override | Not researched | PIPL — three mandatory pathways, strictest regime found | **Revised by T09**: arbitration (NY Convention since 1986) is far more promising than litigation |
+| Africa (South Africa, OHADA) | Not researched | Not researched | POPIA referenced, not researched | Genuine gap — flagged honestly, not assumed low-risk |
+| Asia-Pacific (Singapore, Japan, Australia) | Not researched in depth | **Australia's expanded UCT regime (Nov 2023) covers standard-form contracts with businesses <100 employees/$10M turnover by default** | PDPA/APPI referenced, not researched | Highest-priority finding in the whole WP-0004 program — not an edge case |
+| Global (T09) | New York Convention (~172 states) vastly outperforms any foreign-judgment enforcement regime | Draft to the strictest of Transparenzgebot / UCTA / Australian UCT simultaneously | — | Arbitration should be the default mechanism, not litigation |
+
+## 2. Proposed alpha/beta resolutions
+
+### License Appendix A item 6 / CUA Appendix A item 1 — Governing law and venue
+
+**Adopted for alpha/beta 2026-07-29:** default to **arbitration** (not litigation) as the dispute-resolution mechanism for any Phase declared during alpha/beta, seated at a neutral, arbitration-mature venue (Singapore or London are the two most concretely supported by this research; final seat selection is a per-Phase or per-Licensor-entity choice, not fixed by this synthesis). This is chosen specifically because it inherits the New York Convention's enforceability reach across essentially every jurisdiction researched, including the hardest case (China), without requiring a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction litigation rider. **Not yet resolved:** which specific arbitral institution and substantive governing law to name — that requires knowing the actual Licensor entity's own jurisdiction (see `workplans/TREV-WP-0008-governance-and-pilot-rollout.md` T01), so this remains a template blank filled in per Phase/Licensor, not a single hardcoded value.
+
+### CUA Appendix A item 3 — Liability cap
+
+**Adopted for alpha/beta 2026-07-29, unchanged from V1C1:** keep the fees-paid-in-12-months cap structure, but apply the cross-jurisdiction drafting principle found in T09 — state it prominently and proportionately to the actual Exhibit A fee, not as generic boilerplate. Given alpha/beta pilot fees are expected to be small, the practical exposure under this cap is itself small; full jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction enforceability confirmation (Germany/UK/Australia's three different tests) is deferred to the post-beta legal review, consistent with the maintainer's decision.
+
+### CUA Appendix A item 5 — Data protection
+
+**Adopted for alpha/beta 2026-07-29:** no operative Data Processing Addendum is drafted yet. For alpha/beta, minimize data collection to what each Phase's Commercial Use Agreement strictly requires (billing contact, payment reference) and avoid processing any data that would trigger PIPL's stricter pathways or a Significant-Data-Fiduciary-level DPDPA obligation. This is a practice, not a drafted clause — the clause itself remains open pending real customer volume that would justify the drafting effort.
+
+### CUA Appendix A item 4 — Indemnification
+
+**Deliberately left unresolved, and this is the correct choice, not a gap to backfill under alpha/beta reasoning.** No indemnification clause means no indemnification obligation — that is the safer default for the Licensor precisely during a stage with limited legal review, not something the alpha/beta risk-acceptance decision should relax. If a real Customer specifically requires an indemnification clause before signing, that is a signal to seek specialist input for that specific deal, not to draft a generic one now.
+
+## 3. What "alpha/beta adoption" means and does not mean
+
+- **Means:** these choices are good enough to declare and operate real pilot Phases under `workplans/TREV-WP-0008-governance-and-pilot-rollout.md`, given expected pilot-stage exposure (small fees, few customers, early-stage products) is limited, and the Licensor has explicitly accepted this risk rather than an agent silently assuming it.
+- **Does not mean:** the License or CUA is now legally final. Every Appendix A item retains its original disclosure; this synthesis adds an "adopted for alpha/beta" status alongside the existing `[LEGAL, OPEN]` markers, it does not remove them. Full specialist legal review remains required before "settling down" the legal framework — i.e., before treating any of this as a stable, long-term legal position rather than a bounded-risk operating decision for the current stage.
+
+## 4. Open items carried forward
+
+- Actual arbitral institution/seat/governing law selection, once the Licensor entity (WP-0008-T01) is known.
+- Full jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction liability-cap and data-protection confirmation — explicitly deferred, not abandoned.
+- Africa (contract-law angle) and Singapore/Japan PDPA/APPI remain genuinely unresearched, not merely deprioritized.