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Close WP-0004/WP-0005 with alpha/beta legal-review deferral

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Maintainer decision (2026-07-29): full specialist legal review of the
TRSL/CUA is postponed until the framework moves out of beta, given
limited legal/commercial exposure during build/alpha. WP-0004-T10 and
WP-0005-T10 synthesize their jurisdiction research into adopted alpha/beta
working defaults (governing law -> arbitration at a neutral seat,
liability cap, data protection minimal-collection practice, and the
Enforcement Network's fee mechanics) rather than full resolution, and are
accepted on that basis. Propagates the decision to the License/CUA V1C1
Appendix A tables and status banners, SCOPE.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, the
WP-0008-T05 go-live gate, and README.md.
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specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md
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@ -250,9 +250,26 @@ For a given jurisdiction, funding an Enforcement Action the Licensor has decided
### 13.2 Jurisdiction Percentage Cap
The maximum lawful outcome-contingent percentage of Recovery found for that jurisdiction (e.g., the UK's 50% DBA cap, South Africa's 25% Contingency Fees Act cap, China's sliding 18%–6% scale by claim size, Argentina's 35% ordinary cap). Where no lawful outcome-contingent fee exists at all for this kind of engagement (e.g., Germany, India), the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap is **0%**, and §13.1 falls through to tier 3.
The maximum lawful outcome-contingent percentage of Recovery for a given jurisdiction. Where no lawful outcome-contingent fee exists at all for this kind of engagement, the Jurisdiction Percentage Cap is **0%**, and §13.1 falls through to tier 3.
**The Enforcement Registry (§5.7) publishes the current Jurisdiction Percentage Cap for every jurisdiction with an active or prospective Enforcement Partner**, as background information for prospective Enforcement Partners and Litigation Funders — this is a publication obligation, not a discretionary determination, consistent with §3.2's non-discretionary principle.
**Adopted 2026-07-29** (`workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md` T10, `history/260729-TREN-Synthesis.md` §2), for the eight jurisdictions/families researched so far:
| Jurisdiction | Jurisdiction Percentage Cap |
|---|---|
| Germany | 0% |
| France | N/A — fixed-fee-plus-uncapped-result-fee structure required, not a bare percentage |
| United States | N/A — 50% lawful directly (§13.1 tier 1 applies) |
| United Kingdom | N/A — 50% lawful directly (§13.1 tier 1 applies) |
| Argentina | 35% ordinarily (Buenos Aires City); up to 50% only if counsel assumes case-cost risk |
| India | 0% |
| China | Sliding schedule: 18% (<1M CNY) → 15% (1–5M) → 12% (5–10M) → 9% (10–50M) → 6% (>50M) — **a schedule, not one figure; must be published as such** |
| South Africa | 25% (or 2× normal fee if lower) |
| OHADA zone | Unresearched — do not assume the French pattern applies |
| Singapore | 0% for ordinary litigation; not stated as a percentage for arbitration/SICC/mediation, where a Conditional Fee Agreement is separately available |
| Japan | No fixed cap, but see §13.5 item 5's Article 12 flag before relying on this |
| Australia | 0% outside Victoria class actions |
**The Enforcement Registry (§5.7) publishes the current Jurisdiction Percentage Cap for every jurisdiction with an active or prospective Enforcement Partner**, as background information for prospective Enforcement Partners and Litigation Funders — this is a publication obligation, not a discretionary determination, consistent with §3.2's non-discretionary principle. The table above is the Stage 0/1 adopted content for that publication; remaining jurisdictions (Africa's other major economies, further Asia-Pacific) are not yet researched.
### 13.3 Standard Financing Amount
@ -274,13 +291,17 @@ The maximum lawful outcome-contingent percentage of Recovery found for that juri
Where tier 3 applied (no Contingency Share, only non-contingent financing), the Recovery collected is **not** reduced by a contingency carve-out — the full Recovery is Platform Share under §6, since no one was paid a contingent share of it. Whether the Standard Financing Amount already advanced should then be reimbursed to the Trust Service out of that Recovery is an open question (§13.5 item 3), not resolved by this rule.
### 13.5 Open questions this rule introduces (not resolved here)
### 13.5 Resolutions and remaining open items
1. **Funding source for the Standard Financing Amount.** Who actually provides the non-contingent financing — the Trust Service operator directly, a pooled fund contributed to by successful Phases, or the Licensor's own funds simply channeled through a Trust Service-published reference figure? Not resolved here; this section defines the *amount* and *governance calendar*, not who capitalizes it.
2. **Currency conversion methodology for the US $1,000 baseline** — which reference exchange rate, and as of what date, is not yet defined. Working assumption: the rate prevailing at the announcement date (31 July), published alongside the announcement — not yet confirmed as a rule.
3. **Should an advanced Standard Financing Amount be reimbursed from Recovery if the case succeeds?** §13.4 leaves this open. Doing so would not reintroduce outcome-contingency for the *Enforcement Partner's fee* (which remains non-contingent either way) — it would only affect whether the Trust Service recoups its own financing outlay, a different question from what makes the lawyer's or funder's compensation lawful.
4. **Precise definition of the 18-month look-back window** — whether it means cases settled within the 18 months immediately preceding the mid-year calculation date (the working assumption used in §13.3), or some other reading of "settled 18 months before." Should be stated unambiguously once this rule moves toward legal review.
5. **Interaction with the Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split-role structure (§8) in tier 3 jurisdictions.** If Local Counsel's own fee is non-contingent (as tier 3 requires), does a Litigation Funder still have a role at all, or does the split-role structure collapse back to a single non-contingent Local Counsel engagement, financed in part by the Standard Financing Amount? Likely the latter, but not confirmed — a matter for the Enforcement Partner Agreement's own terms (§9).
**Adopted 2026-07-29** (`workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md` T10, `history/260729-TREN-Synthesis.md` §3), as alpha/beta working defaults — see `history/260729-TRSL-Jurisdiction-Synthesis.md` §3 for what "adopted for alpha/beta" means and does not mean:
1. **Funding source for the Standard Financing Amount: the Licensor funds it directly**, out of pocket. A pooled fund contributed to by successful Phases is a reasonable future design, deferred as unnecessary complexity while pilot-stage Enforcement Actions are expected to be rare or nonexistent.
2. **Currency conversion methodology: the rate prevailing at the announcement date (31 July)**, published alongside the announcement — promoted from working assumption to adopted rule.
3. **An advanced Standard Financing Amount is reimbursed from Recovery, ahead of Development Credit allocation, if the case succeeds.** This does not reintroduce outcome-contingency for the Enforcement Partner's own fee (still non-contingent either way) — it only affects whether the Trust Service recoups its own outlay.
4. **The 18-month look-back window means cases settled within the 18 months immediately preceding the mid-year calculation date** — promoted from working assumption to adopted rule.
5. **In a tier 3 jurisdiction, the split-role structure collapses to a single non-contingent Local Counsel engagement**, financed in part by the Standard Financing Amount; a separate Litigation Funder is not required by default unless a specific case's economics call for one.
**Not resolved, and not to be treated as resolved by the above:** Japan's Article 12 fee-splitting prohibition threatens the split-role fallback itself, not just the single-role default (§8.1, `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-AsiaPacific.md`). This is a distinct category of risk from the items above — it goes to whether an engagement is lawful at all, not how favorable its terms are. **Recommendation: do not pursue an Enforcement Action in Japan under either structure until specifically reviewed by Japanese counsel, even during alpha/beta.**
## 14. Concise definition