Builds the Control Plane's browser UI (login, dashboard, Phase
registration, Development Credit entry/proposal/review, credential
admin, audit log) as a FastAPI + Jinja2 app over the already-finished
T03 backend, rather than from scratch — whynot-design's Lit web
components are vendored as static assets (source commit 4b62cffc,
v0.4.1), with lit itself resolved via an esm.sh CDN import map.
Session auth re-checks the credential token against the database on
every request rather than trusting the session cookie's cached rights,
so a mid-session revocation takes effect immediately.
9 new Docker-gated HTTP-level tests via FastAPI's TestClient (no
browser-automation tool available, so real rendering of the <wn-*>
components was never visually verified). All four WP-0009 tasks are
now done; workplan marked finished.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
migrations/0005_licensor_credentials.sql: licensors can now hold
multiple rows per licensor_id (credential_label, rights tier,
issued_by, revoked_at). Real structural finding: licensor_id couldn't
simply become non-unique, since phase_manifests, extensions, and
breach_records all FK to licensors(licensor_id), which only worked
because that column used to be unique. Introduced licensor_identities
(one row per tenant) as the new FK target for all four tables, with an
ensure_licensor_identity trigger auto-creating the identity on first
credential insert - so existing code (including every earlier test
fixture) needed no changes.
registry.py: Licensor gains credential_label/rights; RIGHTS_TIERS +
has_right() ordinal helper (enforcement is Control Plane's job, T03/
T04, not this task's); issue_sub_credential/revoke_sub_credential
(revocation via a SECURITY DEFINER function, matching
set_extension_status's existing pattern - trf_app has no UPDATE grant
on licensors); authenticate() rejects revoked credentials identically
to unrecognized ones.
Attribution scoped honestly: ledger_entry.schema.json stays unmodified
(frozen Stage 0 surface, additionalProperties:false) - per-entry human
attribution is a hosting-layer-only column
(ledger_entries.submitted_by_token, ledger.get_ledger_attribution()),
recorded alongside but never inside the signed entry payload. Narrower
than "the signature names the human," but exactly the "(or an
accompanying attributable field)" alternative this task's own
description anticipated.
All four Docker-gated test files that append Ledger entries needed
migration 0005 added (append_entry's INSERT now references the new
column). New tests/test_licensor_credentials.py (8 tests): multi-
credential resolution, duplicate-label rejection, revocation and its
idempotence, invalid-rights rejection, the has_right helper, per-entry
attribution recorded and not leaking into exported ledger JSON, and
DB-level UPDATE rejection. Full suite: 84 offline, 41 with Docker (up
from 30); no stray containers left running.
Adds migrations/0001_registries.sql (licensors, phase_manifests,
extensions tables; trf_app role with no UPDATE/DELETE grant on either
table, canonicalization only via a SECURITY DEFINER function), and
src/target_revenue/registry.py + service/app.py: a thin FastAPI layer
wrapping the existing validation.py checks with persistence and
per-Licensor token auth, adding no new validation logic per ADR-0002.
New optional service/service-dev dependency groups keep the core
offline library dependency-free. tests/test_registry_hosting.py (7
tests, Docker-gated, auto-skip otherwise) spins an ephemeral disposable
Postgres container and verifies registration, rejection, duplicate/
unknown-token handling, extension canonicalization, and two explicit
database-privilege checks that the app role cannot bypass the
append-only/governance-gated guarantees.
