# TREN Jurisdiction Research: Argentina

**Document status:** Research artifact, Stage 0 (`workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md` T04)
**Not legal advice.** Findings drawn from web research (searched 2026-07-29).

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## 1. Pacto de cuota litis: permitted, but capped and jurisdiction-variable within Argentina itself

Unlike Germany or France, Argentina generally **permits** contingency-fee arrangements (*pacto de cuota litis*) for abogados — but the caps vary by sub-jurisdiction and case type, and are more restrictive than the Licensor's proposed 50%:

- **City of Buenos Aires:** fee capped at **35%** of the result, regardless of how many agreements or professionals are involved — this can rise to **50%** ("half of the net result") only if the lawyer expressly assumes the costs/cost-liability risk of the case (i.e., a genuine risk-shifting arrangement, not a plain fee agreement).
- **Labor matters:** capped at 20% of the labor credit, nationally.
- **Other provinces:** commonly cap at one-third (≈33%) of the net result.
- Formal requirement: the agreement must be written in duplicate and may be registered with the relevant provincial bar association.

**Direct implication for TREN:** Argentina is the **first jurisdiction in this research program where a single-role Enforcement Partner is legally available, but the Licensor's proposed 50% figure is not the default** — 35% is the ordinary Buenos Aires ceiling, and 50% is available only if the Enforcement Partner contractually takes on the cost/cost-liability risk of the Enforcement Action, which maps quite naturally onto the concept doc's Litigation Funder role (§8) even in a jurisdiction that doesn't strictly require the funder/counsel split for professional-conduct reasons. This is a useful finding: **the 50%-with-risk-assumption structure Argentina already uses natively resembles the Litigation Funder model designed for Germany**, suggesting the EPA's split-role option (`history/260729-TREN-MechanismDesign.md`) may be worth offering even in jurisdictions where it isn't strictly mandatory, if it lets the Contingency Share reach 50% rather than being capped lower.

## 2. No dedicated litigation-funding regime found in this pass

This research pass did not surface a dedicated Argentine third-party litigation funding statute or regulator (distinct from the pacto de cuota litis rules governing lawyers directly) — treat this as an area requiring deeper research before relying on a Litigation Funder structure in Argentina specifically, rather than assuming one is unnecessary because direct lawyer contingency fees are already available.

## 3. Summary for the WP-0005 feasibility matrix (T10)

| Question | Argentina |
|---|---|
| Direct lawyer contingency fee available? | Yes, capped — 35% ordinarily in Buenos Aires City, 50% only with risk assumption, ~33% in other provinces, 20% in labor matters |
| Structured alternative needed? | Not strictly required, but the "50% with risk assumption" variant is structurally similar to the Litigation Funder model |
| Litigation funding regulatory status | Not found in this pass — flag as under-researched, not confirmed absent |
| Recommended TREN structure | Single-role Enforcement Partner at the applicable provincial cap; consider the risk-assumption variant to reach 50% where the case supports it |

## 4. Open items for T10 synthesis

- Confirm which cap applies to a commercial/IP claim specifically (none of the three named categories — general judgment result, labor, social-security/alimony — obviously fits an unauthorized-Commercial-Use claim; likely the general ~33-35% "net result of the judgment" category, but not confirmed against a case example in this pass).
- Research whether a dedicated Argentine litigation-funding market or regulatory framework exists, given none was found here.