# TREN Jurisdiction Research: Asia-Pacific (Singapore, Japan, Australia)

**Document status:** Research artifact, Stage 0 (`workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md` T08)
**Not legal advice.** Findings drawn from web research (searched 2026-07-29).

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## 1. Singapore: liberalized, but only for a specific, narrow proceeding list

Since 4 May 2022, Singapore permits Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs) between lawyers and clients — but **only** for international/domestic arbitration, certain Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) proceedings, and related court/mediation proceedings. Fee structures include "win, more fee," "no win, no fee," and "no win, less fee," with a success fee that can form part of the arrangement. The regime extends to registered foreign lawyers/practices, not just Singapore-qualified ones.

**Direct implication for TREN:** unlike the UK's or Australia's broader reforms, Singapore's liberalization is **proceeding-type-limited**, not a general permission. A straightforward Enforcement Action for unauthorized Commercial Use, litigated in the ordinary Singapore courts (not arbitration or SICC), would very likely **not** qualify for a CFA under this regime as currently scoped — a real constraint the EPA template needs to account for by routing Singapore Enforcement Actions toward arbitration or SICC where the fact pattern allows, or falling back to a non-contingent fee structure otherwise.

## 2. Japan: broadly permitted by self-regulation, but with a critical fee-splitting trap for the Funder model

Contingency fees are permitted in Japan and commonly used; the Japan Federation of Bar Associations abolished its formal percentage-fee schedule in 2004, leaving attorneys free to use hourly, deferred/success-fee, partial or full contingency, or fixed-fee structures. Pure 100% contingency is not explicitly prohibited but is rare in practice, likely deterred by professional-ethics interpretation rather than hard rule.

**Critical finding:** Article 12 of the Basic Rules on the Duties of Practicing Attorneys **prohibits an attorney from splitting fees with any person who is not a lawyer or a legal professional corporation.** This directly threatens the Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split model (`history/260729-TREN-MechanismDesign.md`) as designed: if the Funder (a non-lawyer entity) is meant to receive the Contingency Share and separately compensate Local Counsel, that could itself resemble a prohibited fee-split arrangement from the lawyer's side, depending on exactly how the payment flow is structured. **This is the first jurisdiction in this research program where the split-role design itself — not just the single-role fallback — has a plausible compliance problem**, and needs specific structuring advice (e.g., ensuring the Funder contracts and pays counsel in a manner that isn't characterized as fee-splitting) before Japan is treated as either single-role or split-role viable.

## 3. Australia: federally mixed, but litigation funding itself is mature and well-established

Contingency fees for lawyers are, as a general rule, prohibited or restricted in most Australian states/territories — **Victoria is the first and (as of this research) only jurisdiction to lift the ban**, and only for class actions in the Supreme Court of Victoria specifically, following a 2018 Victorian Law Reform Commission recommendation. Federal courts do not have the power to allow solicitors a percentage cut of a class action settlement (confirmed by the High Court). Separately, and much more broadly, **third-party litigation funding is a mature, well-regulated market across Australia** generally, independent of the lawyer-contingency-fee question.

**Direct implication for TREN:** Australia is a strong candidate for the **split-role model by default** (Litigation Funder + separately-paid Local Counsel), given the funding market's maturity, rather than waiting for contingency-fee reform to spread beyond Victorian class actions. This is a different reason for the split-role recommendation than Germany's (narrow professional-conduct exception) or India's (flat prohibition) — here it's simply that the funding market is the more developed, lower-friction path already.

## 4. Summary for the WP-0005 feasibility matrix (T10)

| Question | Singapore | Japan | Australia |
|---|---|---|---|
| Direct lawyer contingency fee available? | Only for arbitration/SICC/mediation-related proceedings | Yes, broadly, via bar self-regulation (pure 100% contingency rare in practice) | Only in Victoria, only for class actions |
| Structured alternative needed? | Yes, for ordinary litigation outside the permitted proceeding list | Caution: Article 12 fee-splitting rule may complicate the split-role Funder model itself | Split-role via the mature litigation-funding market, not contingency-fee reform |
| Recommended TREN structure | Route to arbitration/SICC where possible; otherwise non-contingent fee | Needs bespoke structuring to avoid Article 12 fee-splitting characterization — flag for specialist review before using either single- or split-role | Split-role via an established Australian litigation funder |

## 5. Open items for T10 synthesis

- Japan requires dedicated specialist input on how to structure the Funder/Counsel payment flow without triggering Article 12 — this is a genuinely open compliance question, not just an undecided design preference.
- Confirm whether Singapore's proceeding-type list has expanded since the 2022 reform before finalizing the "arbitration/SICC only" constraint.
- Monitor Australian state-by-state contingency-fee reform (Victoria's may not remain the only jurisdiction) rather than treating the current mixed picture as static.