target-revenue/src/target_revenue/ledger.py
tegwick 5064815e77 Implement hosted Target Ledger append API (WP-0006-T04)
migrations/0002_ledger.sql adds ledger_entries with an identity-column
sequence for exact append order and no UPDATE/DELETE grant for trf_app.
src/target_revenue/ledger.py: append_entry() rejects caller-supplied
previous_entry_hash/signature, enforces per-Licensor phase ownership,
serializes concurrent appends via pg_advisory_xact_lock, computes the
chain tip and signs with the Trust Service instance's own Ed25519 key
(service/keys.py), reusing validation.py's checks unchanged. Adds
POST/GET /phases/{id}/ledger and an unauthenticated GET /public-key.

Also fixes a route-ordering bug found while wiring this in: phase IDs
never needed the {phase_id:path} converter (they contain colons, not
slashes), and its greedy matching was swallowing /ledger-suffixed
paths into the plain GET /phases/{id} route.

tests/test_ledger_hosting.py (8 Docker-gated tests) exercises hash-chain
linkage, forged-field rejection, cross-Licensor isolation, currency and
duplicate-id rejection, DB-privilege enforcement, signature
verification via the public-key endpoint, and the task's own
highest-priority property: append -> export -> offline fold reproduces
the exact expected Development/Remission Credit and Outstanding Target.
2026-07-29 21:34:27 +02:00

132 lines
4.6 KiB
Python

"""Hosted Target Ledger append API (WP-0006-T04).
The highest-risk property this module owns: any party who independently
computes `fold.fold_outstanding_target` over an exported Manifest + Ledger
must get exactly the same Outstanding Target the hosted service itself
would report. This module therefore does nothing clever — it authenticates
the write, validates the entry with the same offline `validation.py`
checks Stage 0 already tested, computes `previous_entry_hash` and
`signature` itself (never trusting client-supplied values for either), and
appends. The fold is never computed or stored here; `fold.py` remains the
single source of truth, run fresh from whatever a caller exports.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Any
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
from psycopg import Connection
from psycopg.errors import UniqueViolation
from psycopg.types.json import Jsonb
from . import hashing, validation
from .registry import Licensor, RegistrationError, get_phase_manifest
def append_entry(
conn: Connection,
licensor: Licensor,
phase_id: str,
entry_input: dict[str, Any],
signing_key: Ed25519PrivateKey,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Validate, chain, sign, and persist one Target Ledger entry.
`entry_input` must not include `previous_entry_hash` or `signature` —
those are exclusively server-computed. Supplying them is rejected
outright rather than silently overwritten, so a caller never mistakes
a value it sent for one the service actually used.
"""
if "previous_entry_hash" in entry_input or "signature" in entry_input:
raise RegistrationError(
"previous_entry_hash and signature are computed by the Trust "
"Service instance and must not be supplied by the caller"
)
manifest = get_phase_manifest(conn, phase_id)
if manifest is None:
raise RegistrationError(f"phase {phase_id!r} is not registered")
manifest_licensor = conn.execute(
"SELECT licensor_id FROM phase_manifests WHERE phase_id = %s", (phase_id,)
).fetchone()[0]
if manifest_licensor != licensor.licensor_id:
raise RegistrationError(
"this token is not authorized to append to this Phase's ledger"
)
if entry_input.get("phase") != phase_id:
raise RegistrationError(
f"entry.phase {entry_input.get('phase')!r} does not match "
f"the target Phase {phase_id!r}"
)
# Serialize concurrent appends to this Phase so `previous_entry_hash`
# always reflects a real, uncontested chain tip — a transaction-scoped
# advisory lock, released automatically at commit/rollback.
conn.execute("SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(%s))", (phase_id,))
tip = conn.execute(
"""
SELECT entry FROM ledger_entries
WHERE phase_id = %s
ORDER BY sequence DESC
LIMIT 1
""",
(phase_id,),
).fetchone()
previous_entry_hash = hashing.entry_hash(tip[0]) if tip else hashing.GENESIS
candidate = {**entry_input, "previous_entry_hash": previous_entry_hash}
try:
validation.validate_ledger_entry(candidate)
except validation.ConformanceError as exc:
raise RegistrationError(
"ledger entry rejected: " + "; ".join(exc.errors)
) from exc
currency_errors = validation.check_currency_consistency(manifest, [candidate])
if currency_errors:
raise RegistrationError(
"ledger entry rejected: " + "; ".join(currency_errors)
)
signed = {**candidate, "signature": hashing.sign_record(candidate, signing_key)}
try:
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO ledger_entries
(entry_id, phase_id, entry, previous_entry_hash, signature, recognized_at)
VALUES (%s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s)
""",
(
signed["id"],
phase_id,
Jsonb(signed),
previous_entry_hash,
signed["signature"],
signed["recognized_at"],
),
)
except UniqueViolation as exc:
raise RegistrationError(
f"entry id {signed['id']!r} already exists"
) from exc
return signed
def get_ledger(conn: Connection, phase_id: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Return a Phase's entries in exact append order (fold input order)."""
rows = conn.execute(
"""
SELECT entry FROM ledger_entries
WHERE phase_id = %s
ORDER BY sequence ASC
""",
(phase_id,),
).fetchall()
return [row[0] for row in rows]