tenant-engine/src/tenant_engine/flex_auth.py

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TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Any
from uuid import uuid4
import httpx
# flex-auth's DecisionEnvelope schema (schemas/decision_envelope.schema.json)
# allows five effects; only "allow" authorizes anything.
ALLOW_EFFECT = "allow"
class CheckRequest:
"""Mirrors flex-auth/schemas/check_request.schema.json's shape."""
__slots__ = ("id", "tenant", "subject", "action", "resource", "context")
def __init__(
self,
*,
request_id: str,
tenant: str,
subject_id: str,
subject_type: str,
action: str,
resource_id: str,
resource_type: str,
resource_system: str = "tenant-engine",
context: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
) -> None:
self.id = request_id
self.tenant = tenant
self.subject = {"id": subject_id, "type": subject_type}
self.action = action
self.resource = {"id": resource_id, "type": resource_type, "system": resource_system}
self.context = context or {}
def to_json(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": self.id,
"tenant": self.tenant,
"subject": self.subject,
"action": self.action,
"resource": self.resource,
"context": self.context,
}
class FlexAuthCheckClient:
"""Client for flex-auth's POST /v1/check.
Fail-closed by construction: every non-"allow" effect, every non-2xx
response, every malformed body, and every transport failure (timeout,
connection error) resolves to `False` from `is_allowed()`. Nothing
raises past this boundary -- callers (the WriteAuthorizer seam) get a
plain deny, not an exception to handle inconsistently.
"""
def __init__(
self,
*,
base_url: str,
timeout_seconds: float = 3.0,
transport: httpx.BaseTransport | None = None,
bearer_token_file: str | None = None,
TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
) -> None:
self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
self.timeout_seconds = timeout_seconds
self.bearer_token_file = bearer_token_file
TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
self._client = httpx.Client(
base_url=self.base_url,
timeout=httpx.Timeout(timeout_seconds),
transport=transport,
)
def is_allowed(self, request: CheckRequest) -> bool:
try:
headers: dict[str, str] = {}
if self.bearer_token_file:
# Projected ServiceAccount tokens rotate. Read on each check
# instead of pinning the token for the lifetime of the process.
with open(self.bearer_token_file, encoding="utf-8") as token_file:
token = token_file.read().strip()
if not token:
return False
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}"
response = self._client.post("/v1/check", json=request.to_json(), headers=headers)
except (httpx.HTTPError, OSError):
TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
return False
if response.status_code != 200:
return False
try:
envelope = response.json()
except ValueError:
return False
if not isinstance(envelope, dict):
return False
return envelope.get("effect") == ALLOW_EFFECT
def close(self) -> None:
self._client.close()
def new_request_id() -> str:
return f"check:{uuid4()}"