tenant-engine/src/tenant_engine/config.py

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TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from dataclasses import dataclass
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
class Settings:
flex_auth_base_url: str | None
flex_auth_timeout_seconds: float
host: str
port: int
database_path: str | None = None
TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
@classmethod
def from_env(cls) -> "Settings":
return cls(
flex_auth_base_url=os.getenv("TENANT_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_URL") or None,
flex_auth_timeout_seconds=float(os.getenv("TENANT_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "3")),
host=os.getenv("TENANT_ENGINE_HOST", "127.0.0.1"),
port=int(os.getenv("TENANT_ENGINE_HTTP_PORT", "8090")),
database_path=os.getenv("TENANT_ENGINE_DATABASE_PATH") or None,
TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
)