TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth
flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real
POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json,
decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not
guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes;
every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves
to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed().
authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer
Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's
planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table).
DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is
configured.
config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern.
docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule,
and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands).
60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate
processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double
produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201.
Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a
complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration --
what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape
emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing
tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than
quietly worked around).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
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class Settings:
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flex_auth_base_url: str | None
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flex_auth_timeout_seconds: float
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host: str
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port: int
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2026-08-09 01:35:00 +02:00
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database_path: str | None = None
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TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth
flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real
POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json,
decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not
guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes;
every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves
to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed().
authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer
Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's
planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table).
DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is
configured.
config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern.
docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule,
and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands).
60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate
processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double
produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201.
Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a
complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration --
what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape
emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing
tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than
quietly worked around).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
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@classmethod
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def from_env(cls) -> "Settings":
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return cls(
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flex_auth_base_url=os.getenv("TENANT_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_URL") or None,
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flex_auth_timeout_seconds=float(os.getenv("TENANT_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "3")),
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host=os.getenv("TENANT_ENGINE_HOST", "127.0.0.1"),
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2026-08-09 01:35:00 +02:00
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port=int(os.getenv("TENANT_ENGINE_HTTP_PORT", "8090")),
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database_path=os.getenv("TENANT_ENGINE_DATABASE_PATH") or None,
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TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth
flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real
POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json,
decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not
guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes;
every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves
to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed().
authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer
Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's
planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table).
DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is
configured.
config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern.
docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule,
and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands).
60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate
processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double
produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201.
Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a
complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration --
what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape
emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing
tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than
quietly worked around).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
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)
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