tenant-engine/tests/test_flex_auth.py

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from pathlib import Path
TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
import httpx
import pytest
from tenant_engine.flex_auth import CheckRequest, FlexAuthCheckClient, new_request_id
def _request() -> CheckRequest:
return CheckRequest(
request_id=new_request_id(),
tenant="tenant:friendly:binky",
subject_id="tenant-engine",
subject_type="service",
action="tenant.create",
resource_id="t-1",
resource_type="tenant",
)
def _client(handler) -> FlexAuthCheckClient:
return FlexAuthCheckClient(
base_url="https://flex-auth.example.test",
timeout_seconds=1,
transport=httpx.MockTransport(handler),
)
def test_allow_effect_authorizes() -> None:
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
return httpx.Response(
200,
json={"id": "d-1", "effect": "allow", "resource": {}, "subject": {}, "provenance": {}},
)
TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
assert _client(handler).is_allowed(_request()) is True
@pytest.mark.parametrize("effect", ["deny", "redact", "audit_only", "not_applicable"])
def test_non_allow_effects_deny(effect: str) -> None:
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
return httpx.Response(
200,
json={"id": "d-1", "effect": effect, "resource": {}, "subject": {}, "provenance": {}},
)
TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
assert _client(handler).is_allowed(_request()) is False
def test_non_200_status_denies() -> None:
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
return httpx.Response(500, json={"error": "internal"})
assert _client(handler).is_allowed(_request()) is False
def test_malformed_json_body_denies() -> None:
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
return httpx.Response(200, content=b"not json")
assert _client(handler).is_allowed(_request()) is False
def test_non_object_json_body_denies() -> None:
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
return httpx.Response(200, json=["not", "an", "object"])
assert _client(handler).is_allowed(_request()) is False
def test_connection_failure_denies() -> None:
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
raise httpx.ConnectError("connection refused", request=request)
assert _client(handler).is_allowed(_request()) is False
def test_timeout_denies() -> None:
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
raise httpx.TimeoutException("timed out", request=request)
assert _client(handler).is_allowed(_request()) is False
def test_request_body_matches_schema_shape() -> None:
seen: dict[str, object] = {}
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
import json
seen.update(json.loads(request.content))
return httpx.Response(
200,
json={"id": "d-1", "effect": "allow", "resource": {}, "subject": {}, "provenance": {}},
)
TEN-WP-0003: FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer -- gate writes through flex-auth flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json, decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes; every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed(). authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table). DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is configured. config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern. docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule, and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands). 60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201. Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration -- what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than quietly worked around). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:54:44 +02:00
_client(handler).is_allowed(_request())
assert seen["tenant"] == "tenant:friendly:binky"
assert seen["action"] == "tenant.create"
assert seen["subject"] == {"id": "tenant-engine", "type": "service"}
assert seen["resource"] == {"id": "t-1", "type": "tenant", "system": "tenant-engine"}
def test_rotating_caller_token_is_read_for_each_check(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
token_file = tmp_path / "token"
token_file.write_text("token-one\n")
seen: list[str] = []
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
seen.append(request.headers["authorization"])
return httpx.Response(200, json={"id": "d-1", "effect": "allow"})
client = FlexAuthCheckClient(
base_url="https://flex-auth.example.test",
transport=httpx.MockTransport(handler),
bearer_token_file=str(token_file),
)
assert client.is_allowed(_request()) is True
token_file.write_text("token-two\n")
assert client.is_allowed(_request()) is True
assert seen == ["Bearer token-one", "Bearer token-two"]