Pin tenant-engine to the CI-built digest from 7e68cc8, record rollback
digests, and close T05 after live create/update/retire/replay/reactivate
evidence against a disposable production tenant. Hands the 0.1.0 contract
to USER-WP-0021.
Add an explicit tenant lifecycle (active/retired), allow-listed mutable
metadata, record versioning, and lifecycle timestamps to the tenant authority.
- domain: TenantLifecycle, with_metadata/retire/reactivate, immutability and
transition invariants. Identifier stays immutable -- it is the IAM Profile
`tenant` claim key-cape mints into tokens.
- store: mutate_tenant() commits idempotency replay, version CAS, mutation,
and audit event together; durable receipts survive restart. Retired tenants
refuse new grants and plan changes but keep their history.
- sqlite: forward-only idempotent migration; existing rows default to active
at version 1. Reads now take the write lock -- the concurrent-writer test
caught unguarded reads on the shared connection observing mid-transaction
state as a spurious tenant_not_found.
- api: GET/PATCH /tenants/{id}, POST retire|reactivate. Idempotency-Key and
If-Match required, distinct flex-auth actions per operation, stable error
schema, redacted 503s.
- docs/tenant-lifecycle-api.md: consumer contract for user-engine.
Implemented against SQLite, not PostgreSQL as the workplan assumed --
TEN-WP-0004 shipped SQLite on a PVC as the production store.
124 tests pass (was 66); no breaking change to existing endpoints.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
flex_auth.py: CheckRequest + FlexAuthCheckClient against flex-auth's real
POST /v1/check contract (schemas/check_request.schema.json,
decision_envelope.schema.json, read directly from the flex-auth repo, not
guessed). Fail-closed by construction: only effect=="allow" authorizes;
every other effect, non-200, malformed body, or transport failure resolves
to deny, nothing raises past is_allowed().
authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer implements the existing WriteAuthorizer
Protocol. Action -> resource-type mapping coordinated with FLEX-WP-0008's
planned vocabulary (both repos reference the same table).
DefaultDenyWriteAuthorizer stays the fallback when no flex-auth URL is
configured.
config.py: Settings.from_env(), mirroring qonto-assistant's pattern.
docs/flex-auth-integration.md documents the contract, fail-closed rule,
and current real state (denies everything until FLEX-WP-0008 lands).
60 tests passing. Verified live twice over real HTTP between separate
processes (not just MockTransport): a deny-returning flex-auth double
produces 403 from POST /tenants, an allow-returning one produces 201.
Also registered (not implemented) the two workplans this depends on for a
complete picture: flex-auth/FLEX-WP-0008 (protected-system registration --
what makes allow reachable) and key-cape/KEY-WP-0005 (discovered key-cape
emits none of iam-profile_v0.3.md's core claims yet, not just missing
tenant_roles -- a bigger, security-sensitive gap flagged rather than
quietly worked around).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
