diff --git a/WORK-RECORDS.md b/WORK-RECORDS.md
index 6fb36f7..ff39c7c 100644
--- a/WORK-RECORDS.md
+++ b/WORK-RECORDS.md
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 | workplan | TEN-WP-0003 | finished | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0003-flex-auth-write-authorizer.md |
 | workplan | TEN-WP-0004 | finished | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0004-production-runtime.md |
 | workplan | TEN-WP-0005 | finished | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0005-tenant-update-and-retirement-api.md |
-| workplan | TEN-WP-0006 | finished | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
+| workplan | TEN-WP-0006 | ready | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
 | task | ADHOC-2026-07-24-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-07-24.md |
 | task | TEN-WP-0001-T01 | done | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0001-statehub-bootstrap.md |
 | task | TEN-WP-0001-T02 | done | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0001-statehub-bootstrap.md |
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@
 | task | TEN-WP-0005-T03 | done | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0005-tenant-update-and-retirement-api.md |
 | task | TEN-WP-0005-T04 | done | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0005-tenant-update-and-retirement-api.md |
 | task | TEN-WP-0005-T05 | done | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0005-tenant-update-and-retirement-api.md |
-| task | TEN-WP-0006-T01 | done | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
-| task | TEN-WP-0006-T02 | done | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
-| task | TEN-WP-0006-T03 | done | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
-| task | TEN-WP-0006-T04 | done | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
-| task | TEN-WP-0006-T05 | done | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
+| task | TEN-WP-0006-T01 | todo | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
+| task | TEN-WP-0006-T02 | todo | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
+| task | TEN-WP-0006-T03 | todo | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
+| task | TEN-WP-0006-T04 | todo | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
+| task | TEN-WP-0006-T05 | todo | — | workplans/TEN-WP-0006-guardrail-quota-policy.md |
diff --git a/workplans/TEN-WP-0007-guardrail-production-rollout.md b/workplans/TEN-WP-0007-guardrail-production-rollout.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4a42cfd..0000000
--- a/workplans/TEN-WP-0007-guardrail-production-rollout.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
----
-id: TEN-WP-0007
-type: workplan
-title: "Production rollout of the guardrail surface"
-domain: infotech
-repo: tenant-engine
-status: ready
-owner: claude
-topic_slug: tenant-guardrails
-created: "2026-08-16"
-updated: "2026-08-16"
-depends_on:
-  - TEN-WP-0006
-unblocks: []
----
-
-# TEN-WP-0007 - Guardrail production rollout
-
-TEN-WP-0006 deliberately left production rollout out of scope. The operator has
-now authorized proceeding, so this workplan carries the deploy that TEN-WP-0006
-would not.
-
-## Sequencing (agreed with flex-auth, FLEX-WP-0014)
-
-1. **flex-auth first** — CI image from the nine-action commit, pin
-   `flex-auth-tenant-engine`.
-2. **tenant-engine second** — pin the guardrail image.
-3. **Joint live verification** against a disposable tenant.
-
-flex-auth goes first on purpose. If we pin first, the guardrail surface is live
-but every call denies with `write_denied` — a state indistinguishable from a
-broken deployment to anyone reading logs. Their step landing first makes each
-step independently observable.
-
-## What is already true
-
-- Source revision `e5c1061` on `main`, TEN-WP-0006 finished, 231 tests passing.
-- flex-auth's nine-action package is verified **in source** (17/17 Rego tests,
-  23/23 fixtures, end-to-end against our unmodified `FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer`).
-- Production flex-auth serves the **seven**-action image
-  `@sha256:9320df39…` — the four-action regression is resolved, but the
-  guardrail actions are not in that image.
-- Production tenant-engine still runs the TEN-WP-0005 lifecycle image.
-
-## T01 - Confirm the CI image and its digest
-
-```task
-id: TEN-WP-0007-T01
-status: todo
-priority: high
-```
-
-`src/**` is a trigger path in `.forgejo/workflows/image.yaml` and the guardrail
-commits are pushed, so CI should have built an image for `main-e5c1061`.
-Confirm it exists and record the immutable digest.
-
-Blocked from this workstation: no registry credentials. Needs a shell with
-forge access, or the digest relayed by whoever has one.
-
-Done when the digest is recorded here and the image is confirmed to contain
-the guardrail routes (`GET /openapi.json` on the built image lists
-`/tenants/{tenant_id}/guardrails`).
-
-## T02 - Wait for the flex-auth nine-action pin
-
-```task
-id: TEN-WP-0007-T02
-status: wait
-priority: high
-```
-
-Waiting on FLEX-WP-0014 step 1. Two things to collect when it lands:
-
-- the new flex-auth image digest;
-- confirmation that the **seven pre-existing actions still allow** after the
-  pin. The last regression surfaced as a silent rollback, and lifecycle
-  authority is what user-engine is already shipping against — a second silent
-  rollback would break a live consumer, not just this workplan.
-
-Done when guardrail checks return allow instead of `deny unknown_action`
-against the live decision surface.
-
-## T03 - Apply the migration and pin the tenant-engine image
-
-```task
-id: TEN-WP-0007-T03
-status: wait
-priority: high
-```
-
-The guardrail schema change is two new tables created by the same
-`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` script fresh and existing databases both take, so
-the migration is forward-only and idempotent and needs no separate step. What
-it does need is evidence that the existing SQLite database on the PVC survives
-it with tenants, grants, and plans untouched.
-
-Rollback is `kubectl -n tenant-engine rollout undo`; last-known-good is the
-TEN-WP-0005 lifecycle digest
-`@sha256:08be0b1dcdc65575592b7be665c28e09a82316ea3d4c9b551ccb753f25360612`.
-Rolling back is safe in one direction only: the new tables are additive and the
-old image ignores them, but any override written while the new image is live
-stops being enforced on rollback. Nothing reads guardrails yet, so today that
-is inert — record it before that stops being true.
-
-Blocked from this workstation: `kubectl` returns `Unauthorized`. This is an
-operator step.
-
-Done when the deployment is pinned to the T01 digest and the pre-existing
-tenants are intact.
-
-## T04 - Live verification and consumer confirmation
-
-```task
-id: TEN-WP-0007-T04
-status: wait
-priority: high
-```
-
-Against a disposable tenant, in the TEN-WP-0005-T05 evidence style:
-
-- guardrail read returns the grouping default with provenance `grouping`;
-- a `trial` tenant reads a **zero** spend ceiling — the ADR-0013 mandate, and
-  the one thing here that is enforceable with no meter;
-- override set → read reflects it with provenance `override`;
-- override cleared → falls back to the grouping default;
-- `actor=ops` denied on both read and write;
-- `flex-auth` allowed on read, denied on write (`action_not_granted`);
-- retired tenant still reads, clamps to floor, loosening refused;
-- idempotent replay returns the original result unchanged.
-
-Then confirm to flex-auth from our side — they verified the decision surface,
-not our endpoints in production, and TEN-WP-0005 established that those are
-different claims.
-
-Done when live evidence is recorded here and the confirmation is sent.
-
-## Out of scope
-
-- **Metering.** Still unowned by any repo. The guardrail read stays
-  ceiling-only until canon names a meter.
-- **The plan-derived layer.** `adaptive-pricing` exposes no plan-derived
-  ceilings; the precedence layer exists and is tested but has no feed.
-- **Grouping ceiling values.** The non-`trial` defaults are conservative
-  opening numbers pending product sign-off. Rolling out does not ratify them —
-  they are config, changeable without a deploy.