# tenant-engine — NetKingdom security layer declaration
#
# Framework: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md
# Companion: net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md v0.2
# Assent:    decisions/decisions.md TEN-DEC-2026-001
# Validate:  python3 scripts/check_layer_conformance.py
#
# Engine / PIP. Same authoritative tenant state yields the same result. We
# supply tenant-as-an-entity facts as claims; we do not render a decision.
# Writes are PEP-shaped (pep-stance.yaml). Catalogued Tooling (§4) is
# key-cape and OpenBao — we hold no client for either.

schema_version: "0.1"
framework: netkingdom-security-layer-model
standard_version: "0.7"
repository: tenant-engine
layer: engine
role: pip
declared_by: decisions/decisions.md#TEN-DEC-2026-001
declared_at: "2026-08-29"

pep_stance: pep-stance.yaml
pip_claims: pip-claims.yaml

catalog_entry:
  owns:
    - tenant-as-an-entity facts

# Empty is a claim. scripts/check_layer_conformance.py fails a new OpenBao
# or key-cape client that is not listed here.
tooling_contacts: []

declared_shapes:
  "5.1": []
  "5.2": []
  "5.3": []

non_tooling_clients:
  - id: postgres-own-store
    module: src/tenant_engine/postgres_store.py
    target: PostgreSQL
    layer: not-catalogued
    operation: "psycopg pool against TENANT_ENGINE_DATABASE_URL_FILE"
    write: true
    note: >-
      Persistence this engine owns for its own facts. Companion §4: list
      uncatalogued infrastructure so the check is total. Not a Tooling
      contact — OpenBao and key-cape are the §4 Tooling rows.

  - id: sqlite-dev-store
    module: src/tenant_engine/sqlite_store.py
    target: SQLite
    layer: not-catalogued
    operation: "sqlite3 file used for development and test"
    write: true
    note: "Dev/test backend. Production is PostgreSQL (TEN-WP-0009)."

  - id: access-engine-check
    module: src/tenant_engine/flex_auth.py
    target: access-engine (flex-auth)
    layer: engine
    operation: "HTTP POST /v1/check"
    write: false
    note: "Engine API. §5 permits it; this is the shape §5 prescribes."

  - id: audit-core-emission
    module: src/tenant_engine/audit_core.py
    target: audit-core
    layer: engine
    operation: "HTTP POST /v1/events from the local outbox"
    write: true
    note: >-
      Evidence engine. Emission is attributive and non-blocking
      (docs/evidence-emission.md). Sender registration on audit-core is
      requested separately.

  - id: state-hub-work-records
    target: state-hub
    layer: not-catalogued
    operation: "HTTP to the Custodian State Hub for work records"
    write: true
    note: >-
      Outside §5 by the v0.7 scope rule. Recorded, not policed. Carries no
      tenant-fact authority and no secret payload.