"""Crystallized regression test — generated, do not edit by hand. Lineage ------- ancestor asset : va-grant-via-browser ancestor maturity: T1 descendant : va-grant-crystallized (T5 Deterministic) frozen from : 4 identical realizations surface version: lab-0.2.0-baseline generated : 2026-08-22 Why this file exists -------------------- An agent discovered this path 4 times running and it did not change. The search is now waste, so it has been frozen. **No model is involved in running this test.** The realization below is plain HTTP with no framework dependency. The assertions are imported from the originating use case rather than restated — a generated test that paraphrases its assertions creates a second, unverified statement of intent, and drift between the two would be silent. See F-0007 for what that costs. If this test starts failing, the correct first response is **not** to update the selectors. Re-run the agentic ancestor: if it recovers, the surface moved and this file should be regenerated; if it does not, the behaviour changed and that is a finding. """ from __future__ import annotations import urllib.error import urllib.parse import urllib.request from scenarios.alice_bob_carol import _bob_can_read, _bob_cannot_write, _carol_cannot_read TARGET = '/resources/R/grant' FIELDS = {'permission': 'READ', 'subject_id': 'bob'} class OriginViolation(ValueError): """An authenticated request attempted to leave its configured origin.""" def _origin(url): try: parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url) if (parsed.scheme not in ('http', 'https') or not parsed.hostname or parsed.username is not None or parsed.password is not None): raise ValueError return (parsed.scheme, parsed.hostname, parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else (443 if parsed.scheme == 'https' else 80)) except ValueError: raise OriginViolation('invalid authenticated HTTP origin') from None class _OriginRedirectHandler(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): def __init__(self, origin): self.origin = origin def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl): if _origin(newurl) != self.origin: raise OriginViolation('authenticated redirect leaves configured origin') return super().redirect_request(req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl) def authenticated_target(base_url, path): origin = _origin(base_url) target = urllib.parse.urljoin(base_url, path) if _origin(target) != origin: raise OriginViolation('authenticated request leaves configured origin') # The caller supplies the authorization header only after target validation. return target, urllib.request.build_opener(_OriginRedirectHandler(origin)) def _post(base_url: str, token: str, path: str, fields: dict) -> int: target, opener = authenticated_target(base_url, path) request = urllib.request.Request( target, data=urllib.parse.urlencode(fields).encode(), method="POST", headers={ "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", }, ) try: with opener.open(request, timeout=10) as response: return response.status except urllib.error.HTTPError as error: return error.code def realize(base_url: str, token: str) -> int: """Perform grant_access deterministically, exactly as the agent learned to.""" return _post(base_url, token, TARGET, FIELDS) def test_grant_access(crystallized_world): """grant_access still works, and the claims it protects still hold.""" base_url, token, observe = crystallized_world assert realize(base_url, token) < 400, "the frozen realization no longer works" snapshot = observe() assert _bob_can_read(snapshot), 'Bob can read R after the grant' assert _carol_cannot_read(snapshot), 'Carol can never read R' assert _bob_cannot_write(snapshot), 'A READ grant does not let Bob write R'