lab/app.py (users, tenants, auth, resources, sharing, read/write, revoke, audit), lab/http_api.py (JSON API + browser UI, stdlib only), 20 labelled composable version-stamped mutations, ground-truth matrix. 48 tests pass. Detection against the reference scenario: MECHANICAL 0/10 flagged (correct), DEFECT 6/6, SEMANTIC 2/4 with both inert cases declared. - F-0002: M16 and M18 initially escaped detection entirely. A use case protects exactly what it asserts. Resolved by adding two claims already stated as intent in INTENT.md; the six-mutation catalogue would never have surfaced this. - test-id axis added: stable selectors survive most UI mutations, which would make H-001 trivially false. Mutations now vary on preserves_test_ids so the hypothesis is analysed split by that axis rather than rigged. - M12 (semantic deferred revoke) and M19 (defect race) are behaviourally identical and asserted as such - the discrimination problem as a test. lab/minimal.py removed; superseded by lab/app.py. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 1629012@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 78d4fb13-8a1e-474b-87a3-9b9261c49a39
205 lines
9.6 KiB
Python
205 lines
9.6 KiB
Python
"""The labelled mutation catalogue — the project's measuring instrument.
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Every claim test-driver makes is measured against this catalogue, so its quality
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caps the credibility of every downstream result. Six mutations, as the milestones
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document originally sketched, cannot support any statement about precision or
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recall; there are twenty here.
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Each mutation carries a **ground-truth label**, decided by a human from the use
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case and recorded before any run:
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MECHANICAL the surface changed; protected semantics are identical.
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test-driver should recover and report an adaptation.
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SEMANTIC intended behaviour genuinely changed. test-driver must escalate
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to a human and must never rewrite a claim by itself.
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DEFECT the system violates unchanged intent. test-driver must report a
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Product Finding and must never adapt to it.
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The distinction between SEMANTIC and DEFECT is deliberately *not* inferable from
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the code — both change behaviour. It is a statement about intent, which is why
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claims must have independent provenance (D-06) and why ambiguity escalates
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rather than resolving itself.
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Mutations compose: `build_lab("M01", "M15")` applies both and records both in the
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version string, so a mechanical change shipping alongside a defect is
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reproducible. That combination is decision-table row 3 and the case a naive
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self-healing tool gets wrong.
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## The test-id axis
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The UI carries stable `data-td` attributes, as a well-instrumented application
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would. Most mechanical mutations preserve them, and a recorded selector sequence
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keyed on those attributes survives such a mutation untouched — which would make
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H-001 (semantic actions outlast recorded sequences) trivially *false*.
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That is not a flaw to be rigged away. It is the honest shape of the question:
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**a semantic action earns its keep exactly when stable identifiers are absent or
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not carried forward.** Mutations therefore vary along `preserves_test_ids`, and
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H-001 must be analysed split by that axis rather than as a single rate. A
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catalogue whose mutations all broke naive selectors would flatter the thesis and
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tell us nothing.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from typing import Callable, Literal
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from .app import BASE_VERSION, LabApp, ObservationChannel, build_baseline
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__all__ = [
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"CATALOGUE", "BY_ID", "Mutation", "ObservationChannel", "build_lab",
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"expected_classification",
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]
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Label = Literal["MECHANICAL", "SEMANTIC", "DEFECT"]
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Layer = Literal["ui", "api", "domain"]
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@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
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class Mutation:
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id: str
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title: str
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label: Label
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layer: Layer
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rationale: str
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apply: Callable[[LabApp], None]
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preserves_test_ids: bool = True
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def _m(app: LabApp, **flags) -> None:
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for key, value in flags.items():
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setattr(app, key, value)
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# --- MECHANICAL -----------------------------------------------------------
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# The surface moves. What the system means does not.
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def _m01(app): _m(app, ui_share_control="modal")
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def _m02(app): _m(app, ui_dom_style="nested", ui_test_ids="dropped")
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def _m03(app): _m(app, response_id_field="id")
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def _m04(app): _m(app, ui_labels="verbose")
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def _m05(app): _m(app, ui_field_order="reversed")
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def _m06(app): _m(app, api_path_style="short")
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def _m07(app): _m(app, ui_button_element="anchor")
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def _m08(app): _m(app, ui_confirm_revoke=True)
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def _m09(app): _m(app, latency_seconds=0.05)
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def _m10(app): _m(app, denied_status=401)
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# --- SEMANTIC -------------------------------------------------------------
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# Intended behaviour changed. A human must decide; test-driver must not.
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def _m11(app): _m(app, require_share_acceptance=True)
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def _m12(app): _m(app, revoke_delay_seconds=3600.0)
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def _m13(app): _m(app, grant_permission_for=lambda p: p or "WRITE")
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def _m14(app): _m(app, enforce_tenant_isolation=True, tenant_sharing_announced=True)
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# --- DEFECT ---------------------------------------------------------------
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# Unchanged intent, violated.
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def _revoke_is_cosmetic(app: LabApp, user_id: str, resource_id: str) -> bool:
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"""Record and audit say revoked; enforcement still allows the read."""
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resource = app.resources.get(resource_id)
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if resource is None:
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return False
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if resource["owner"] == user_id:
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return True
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return any(
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r.event == "grant" and r.subject_id == user_id and r.resource_id == resource_id
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for r in app.audit
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)
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def _read_permits_everyone(app: LabApp, user_id: str, resource_id: str) -> bool:
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return resource_id in app.resources
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def _ignores_tenant(app: LabApp, user_id: str, resource_id: str) -> bool:
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return app.baseline_may_read(user_id, resource_id) or resource_id in app.resources
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def _m15(app): _m(app, may_read=_revoke_is_cosmetic)
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def _m16(app): _m(app, grant_permission_for=lambda p: "WRITE")
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def _m17(app): _m(app, may_read=_read_permits_everyone)
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def _m18(app): _m(app, audit_revoke=False)
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def _m19(app): _m(app, revoke_delay_seconds=2.0)
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def _m20(app): _m(app, enforce_tenant_isolation=False, may_read=_ignores_tenant)
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CATALOGUE: tuple[Mutation, ...] = (
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Mutation("M01", "Sharing control moves into a modal", "MECHANICAL", "ui",
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"Same action, different place. The canonical mechanical change.", _m01),
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Mutation("M02", "DOM rewritten, test ids not carried forward", "MECHANICAL", "ui",
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"Selectors break; nothing the user can do changes. Unlike M01 this "
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"drops the stable test ids, which is what a real rewrite usually "
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"does.", _m02, preserves_test_ids=False),
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Mutation("M03", "API renames resource_id to id", "MECHANICAL", "api",
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"Compatible representation change of the same field.", _m03),
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Mutation("M04", "UI labels reworded", "MECHANICAL", "ui",
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"'Share' becomes 'Give access'. Wording, not meaning.", _m04),
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Mutation("M05", "Form field order reversed", "MECHANICAL", "ui",
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"Permission precedes subject. Same form, same result.", _m05),
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Mutation("M06", "API paths shortened", "MECHANICAL", "api",
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"/resources/{id} becomes /r/{id}.", _m06),
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Mutation("M07", "Buttons become anchors", "MECHANICAL", "ui",
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"Element type changes; affordance does not.", _m07),
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Mutation("M08", "Revoke gains a confirmation step", "MECHANICAL", "ui",
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"An extra legitimate click. The postcondition is unchanged, so this "
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"is mechanical — but it is the closest mechanical case to a semantic "
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"one, and a good test of where the boundary really sits.", _m08),
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Mutation("M09", "Responses are slower", "MECHANICAL", "api",
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"Latency only. Tests patience, not semantics.", _m09),
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Mutation("M10", "Denials return 401 instead of 403", "MECHANICAL", "api",
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"Both mean refused. A driver keying on the exact code breaks.", _m10),
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Mutation("M11", "A share must be accepted before it takes effect", "SEMANTIC", "domain",
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"Bob genuinely cannot read until he accepts. The old claim 'Bob can "
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"read after the grant' is now wrong, and only a human may say so.", _m11),
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Mutation("M12", "Revocation is deferred, not immediate", "SEMANTIC", "domain",
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"A deliberate product decision that revocation batches. Looks exactly "
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"like M19 from the outside; the difference is intent.", _m12),
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Mutation("M13", "Grants default to WRITE", "SEMANTIC", "domain",
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"Only affects grants that omit a permission. Inert for the reference "
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"scenario, which passes READ explicitly — recorded as such rather "
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"than quietly dropped.", _m13),
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Mutation("M14", "Cross-tenant sharing is announced as prohibited", "SEMANTIC", "domain",
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"Codifies existing enforcement as intended behaviour. A change of "
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"intent with no change of code — the case that shows classification "
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"cannot be a diff.", _m14),
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Mutation("M15", "Revocation updates the record but not enforcement", "DEFECT", "domain",
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"Audit trail and stored grant both say revoked; the read still "
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"succeeds. The defect that looks correct to an operator.", _m15),
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Mutation("M16", "A READ grant confers WRITE", "DEFECT", "domain",
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"Privilege escalation through the ordinary sharing path.", _m16),
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Mutation("M17", "Any authenticated user can read any resource", "DEFECT", "domain",
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"Authorization effectively removed. Carol reads R.", _m17),
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Mutation("M18", "Revocation is not audited", "DEFECT", "domain",
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"Enforcement is correct; the evidence trail is not. Detectable only "
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"because audit is observed, not assumed.", _m18),
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Mutation("M19", "Revocation propagates after a delay", "DEFECT", "domain",
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"Not a decision — a race. Indistinguishable from M12 by behaviour "
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"alone, which is exactly the point.", _m19),
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Mutation("M20", "Tenant isolation leaks", "DEFECT", "domain",
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"A user of another tenant reads the resource.", _m20),
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)
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BY_ID: dict[str, Mutation] = {m.id: m for m in CATALOGUE}
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def expected_classification(mutation_id: str) -> Label:
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"""Ground truth. Recorded by a human before any run — never inferred."""
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return BY_ID[mutation_id].label
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def build_lab(*mutation_ids: str) -> tuple[LabApp, dict[str, str]]:
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"""Build a lab with the named mutations applied, versioned by what it carries."""
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app, tokens = build_baseline()
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for mutation_id in mutation_ids:
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BY_ID[mutation_id].apply(app)
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app.applied_mutations = tuple(mutation_ids)
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suffix = "+".join(mutation_ids) if mutation_ids else "baseline"
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app.version = f"{BASE_VERSION}-{suffix}"
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return app, tokens
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