diff --git a/SCOPE.md b/SCOPE.md index 0e18539..eaaa5a2 100644 --- a/SCOPE.md +++ b/SCOPE.md @@ -89,13 +89,21 @@ their own repositories and are referenced here only as integration pointers. - Status: active coordination and source tooling. `CUST-WP-0071` retains representative pilot acceptance, allocation review and weekly execution; - `CUST-WP-0073` retains actual interactive credential isolation and its - documentation; `CUST-WP-0079` retains schedule activation, policy publication, + `CUST-WP-0073` is blocked only on the founder-triggered rotation (T05); + `CUST-WP-0079` retains schedule activation, policy publication, fleet history acceptance and attended actions. Consult their task blocks for current gates. `CUST-WP-0076` and `CUST-WP-0080` are finished; later architecture and hardening work is tracked in `CUST-WP-0081` and `CUST-WP-0082`. Source preparation and owner integration can proceed independently of attended acceptance; a blocked acceptance gate does not imply absent implementation. +- Interactive credential isolation (`CUST-WP-0073`; T02 and T04 done + 2026-10-20). Codex, Claude Code and Grok Build run in the WSL2 distro + `custodian-agents` as `custodian-agt`. They hold only short-lived credentials + that the founder issues: a 24h ServiceAccount token + (`custodian-agents/custodian-agent`, curated read) and a 12h `agt-custodian` + SSH certificate (`permit-pty` only). Privileged actions go through + gated-executor on railiance01 under exact founder approval. Evidence is under + `docs/evidence/2026-10-20-*`. - Cross-domain work driven from here but owned elsewhere: forge closure (prj-forgejo-org-refactor `ORGREF-WP-0002`; decision record `decisions/forge-visibility-policy.md`) and the SecurityCaseType model @@ -236,6 +244,13 @@ description: scripts/summarize_agent_supervision.py reports acceptance and verif keywords: [agents, supervision, evidence, approvals] ``` +```capability +type: tool +title: Attended agent credential issuance and denial verification +description: docs/changes/CUST-WP-0073/workstation-agents-r4/issue-agent-credentials.sh lets the founder issue an interactive agent a 24h curated-read ServiceAccount token and a 12h permit-pty-only agt-custodian SSH certificate. docs/changes/CUST-WP-0073/credential-boundary-r1/verify_agent_denials.py probes Kubernetes denials from the agent's own account, retries errors and reports granted and undetermined results separately. Attended use only; grants no authority. +keywords: [agents, credentials, isolation, rbac, ssh-certificate, verification] +``` + These local discovery descriptions are not publication grants. The federated `registry/indexes/capabilities.yaml` deliberately exposes only generic runtime and repository classification tooling. Confidential canon, memory, operational