Record reviewed application build source and remaining authenticated operation work

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codex 2026-10-18 00:34:06 +02:00
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@ -1231,3 +1231,45 @@ public digest/Git metadata where the unchanged scanner rejected raw public
identifiers. Exact frozen original bytes are verified and reconstructable using
`owner-followthrough-publication-r1/reconstruct_public_metadata.py`; its receipt
records the derivation. Code/chart bytes, scanner rules and authority are unchanged.
## 18 October: application build source and remaining operation boundaries
Apps source `c29408ae` adds the pinned Forgejo release input lock, reviewed patch,
offline frontend/static-binary build, embedded-asset verification and local OCI
export through its existing Makefile. The normal owner publication and primary
projection are verified in
`apps-release-source-integration-r1/verified-task-bindings.json`: all nine
RAPPS-WP-0016 task bindings match source. T06 records build tooling only; T07/T08
track private input and the transactional inverse, while T09 owns actual Access
Engine application enforcement. Existing five task blocks and the staged brief
are preserved. Neither deployed image nor Helm values changed.
The original build profile produced identical complete binaries and OCI archives.
Independent review reproduced all 2,234 embedded assets and checked both source
workspaces and image contents, but found unrelated process arguments visible
through `/proc`. Its changes-required decision is retained. Exact r2 adds a
private PID namespace; a synthetic canary demonstrates r1 exposure and r2 refusal.
The accepted source correction is now integrated. Historical full-build evidence
belongs to r1; no full r2 rebuild or native deployment is claimed. See
`apps-release-independent-review-r1/`, `apps-forgejo-release-build-r2/` and
`apps-release-independent-review-r2/` under the dated changes directory.
Three further assignments use the founder-requested GPT-6.1-Sol medium model.
Private-input work changes the actual Forgejo CLI and chart helper together;
a file-path flag alone would leave the chart's secret argument exposed. The
transaction work uses actual database comparisons, durable private state and
SQLite competing-writer/crash tests. It also addresses SQL error/slow/trace
argument leakage through one shared redaction implementation. Those private
journals introduce additional credential copies inside the owner DB; custody,
capacity, retention and recovery remain explicit obligations. No public receipt
contains their configuration or credential values.
The Access Engine assignment implements a producer-owned reusable verifier and
actual consumer integration. Decoded identity claims are insufficient: issuer
JWT signature/type/algorithm/audience/lifetime validation and a trusted identity
snapshot must precede UserInfo/PDP use. A login callback alone cannot establish
ongoing HTTP/API/Git/SSH authorization coverage. Producer numeric compatibility,
current operation/inverse identities and independently admitted signer/policy/
caller/runtime inputs remain within that assignment's acceptance scope. These
source activities do not close T34/T37/T39, T06 native acceptance, or any of the
sixteen architecture gates.