diff --git a/.kaizen/agents/custodian-codex/supervision.json b/.kaizen/agents/custodian-codex/supervision.json
index 5b028336..b2168842 100644
--- a/.kaizen/agents/custodian-codex/supervision.json
+++ b/.kaizen/agents/custodian-codex/supervision.json
@@ -679,6 +679,34 @@
       "promotion_evidence": false,
       "refinement_or_rescue": true,
       "prepared_at": "2026-10-13T16:26:09.780197+00:00"
+    },
+    {
+      "proposal_id": "FORGE6-RUNNER-LOOPBACK-001",
+      "disposition": "unscored",
+      "outcome": "succeeded",
+      "original_revision": 1,
+      "original_digest_sha256": "a2d29132c639f76bed0465a30119148d207f9242c29a2229a2e90cfc5a6aecac",
+      "original_proposal_ref": "docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-proposal-revision-1.json",
+      "prepared_revision": 2,
+      "prepared_digest_sha256": "9bd1e9f98a99298c810a47e9dffa0316fe235eff53bcd6cfa0dd6391e094f853",
+      "proposal_ref": "docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-proposal.json",
+      "authorization_ref": "canon/standards/build-mode-change-authorization_v0.1.md",
+      "reason": "Standing founder blue-lane rule: reversible reduction of exposed Docker access, reviewed source commit and server dry-run, no credential/policy-scope expansion, exact rollback and named abort owner. No exact-revision human approval or autopilot claim.",
+      "target": "forgejo/Deployment forgejo-runner only; existing Docker and runner binaries pinned by digest",
+      "expected_result": "Runner remains Ready with same image bytes and loopback Docker ping; actual Docker listener is 127.0.0.1 only and a separate Forgejo pod cannot reach it. No running or queued tasks at apply. No replica, resource-request, credential or policy expansion.",
+      "verification_ref": "docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-activation.json",
+      "rollback": "Run same executor --rollback with this proposal, ignored original-template.json baseline and a new receipt, only against exact candidate template/UID. Restores original listener and image references; records restored exposure. No automatic rollback on a security-probe failure; abort owner reviews live state.",
+      "abort_owner": "railiance-forge, source owner railiance-apps; custodian-codex executes",
+      "cost_estimate_eur": 0,
+      "risk_estimate": "Brief runner unavailability during existing Recreate rollout and cold ephemeral Docker cache. Abort if running/queued work appears before apply. An external Docker consumer using the pod IP loses access; the declared runner uses loopback. A concurrent newly scheduled job remains a race; preserve any nonterminal outcome. Original private template retained for exact guarded rollback. No new resources/spend or data deletion requested.",
+      "refinement_or_rescue": true,
+      "refinement_note": "Read-only preflight showed Docker wildcard binding in /proc/net/tcp6, so rollback verification binds the observed original listener instead of assuming an IPv4-only socket. No live mutation in revision 1.",
+      "promotion_evidence": false,
+      "prepared_at": "2026-10-13T16:42:18.349596+00:00",
+      "executed_revision": 2,
+      "executed_digest_sha256": "9bd1e9f98a99298c810a47e9dffa0316fe235eff53bcd6cfa0dd6391e094f853",
+      "verified_at": "2026-10-13T16:46:23.659255+00:00",
+      "execution_note": "Process exited 0. Generation 4 Ready, exact prior image bytes retained, local Docker ping succeeds, other-pod ping refuses, actual listener is IPv4 loopback only. Zero queued/running jobs before and after. Revision 1 was preparation only; unscored standing grant, no promotion credit."
     }
   ]
 }
diff --git a/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/close_runner_docker_listener.py b/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/close_runner_docker_listener.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ecd9925c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/close_runner_docker_listener.py
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Conditional, receipt-producing reduction of the runner Docker listener scope."""
+import argparse
+import copy
+import datetime
+import hashlib
+import importlib.util
+import ipaddress
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+import re
+import time
+
+HERE = Path(__file__).parent
+s = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('native', HERE / 'verify_receive_native.py')
+n = importlib.util.module_from_spec(s); s.loader.exec_module(n)
+NAME = 'forgejo-runner'
+SELECTOR = 'app.kubernetes.io/name=forgejo-runner'
+PROBE = ['sh', '-c', 'wget -q -O- -T 3 http://127.0.0.1:2375/_ping | grep -qx OK']
+
+
+def digest(value):
+    return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def deployment():
+    return json.loads(n.command(['-n', 'forgejo', 'get', 'deployment', NAME, '-o', 'json']))
+
+
+def ready_pod(d):
+    pods = json.loads(n.command(['-n', 'forgejo', 'get', 'pods', '-l', SELECTOR, '-o', 'json']))['items']
+    pods = [p for p in pods if not p['metadata'].get('deletionTimestamp') and
+            p.get('status', {}).get('phase') == 'Running' and
+            any(c['type'] == 'Ready' and c['status'] == 'True' for c in p.get('status', {}).get('conditions', []))]
+    if len(pods) != 1 or d['status'].get('observedGeneration', 0) < d['metadata']['generation'] or d['status'].get('availableReplicas') != 1:
+        raise ValueError('runner-not-uniquely-ready')
+    return pods[0]
+
+
+def execute(pod, container, *args, timeout=30):
+    return n.command(['-n', 'forgejo', 'exec', pod['metadata']['name'], '-c', container, '--', *args], timeout=timeout)
+
+
+def job_counts():
+    query = "SELECT json_build_object('tasks_running',(SELECT count(*) FROM action_task WHERE status=6),'tasks_waiting',(SELECT count(*) FROM action_task WHERE status=5),'jobs_running',(SELECT count(*) FROM action_run_job WHERE status=6),'jobs_waiting',(SELECT count(*) FROM action_run_job WHERE status=5))"
+    return json.loads(n.command(['-n', 'databases', 'exec', 'forgejo-db-1', '--', 'psql',
+                                '-U', 'postgres', '-d', 'forgejo', '-At', '-c', query]))
+
+
+def boundary(pod):
+    # Emit only fixed booleans and listener addresses, never daemon inventories.
+    address = str(ipaddress.ip_address(pod['status']['podIP']))
+    local = execute(pod, 'runner', 'wget', '-qO-', '-T', '3', 'http://127.0.0.1:2375/_ping').strip() == b'OK'
+    peers = json.loads(n.command(['-n', 'forgejo', 'get', 'pods', '-l', 'app.kubernetes.io/instance=forgejo', '-o', 'json']))['items']
+    peers = [p for p in peers if not p['metadata'].get('deletionTimestamp') and
+             p.get('status', {}).get('phase') == 'Running' and
+             any(c['name'] == 'gitea' for c in p['spec']['containers'])]
+    if len(peers) != 1:
+        raise ValueError('peer-not-unique')
+    other = execute(peers[0], 'gitea', 'sh', '-c',
+                    'command -v wget >/dev/null || exit 21; if output=$(wget -qO- -T 3 "$1" 2>/dev/null); then test "$output" = OK || exit 22; printf reachable; else printf refused; fi',
+                    'sh', 'http://' + address + ':2375/_ping').decode()
+    listeners = execute(pod, 'dind', 'sh', '-c',
+                        "awk '$2 ~ /:0947$/ && $4 == \"0A\" {print $2}' /proc/net/tcp /proc/net/tcp6").decode().splitlines()
+    if other not in ('reachable', 'refused') or any(not re.fullmatch(r'[0-9A-F]{8,32}:0947', a) for a in listeners):
+        raise ValueError('boundary-output-unexpected')
+    return {'runner_loopback_ping': local, 'other_pod_ping': other,
+            'docker_listen_addresses_hex': listeners, 'pod_uid': pod['metadata']['uid']}
+
+
+def candidate(template, images):
+    result = copy.deepcopy(template)
+    spec = result['spec']
+    containers = {c['name']: c for c in spec['containers']}
+    if set(containers) != {'dind', 'runner'}:
+        raise ValueError('unexpected-containers')
+    dind = containers['dind']
+    if dind['args'] != ['dockerd', '-H', 'tcp://0.0.0.0:2375', '--tls=false']:
+        raise ValueError('original-listener-differs')
+    readiness = dind['readinessProbe']
+    if readiness.get('tcpSocket') != {'port': 2375} or any(k in readiness for k in ('exec', 'httpGet', 'grpc')):
+        raise ValueError('original-probe-differs')
+    hosts = [x for x in containers['runner']['env'] if x['name'] == 'DOCKER_HOST']
+    if hosts != [{'name': 'DOCKER_HOST', 'value': 'tcp://127.0.0.1:2375'}]:
+        raise ValueError('runner-docker-host-differs')
+    dind['args'][2] = 'tcp://127.0.0.1:2375'
+    del readiness['tcpSocket']
+    readiness['exec'] = {'command': PROBE}
+    # Pin the exact currently running images, including registration init.
+    for c in spec['containers']:
+        c['image'] = images[c['name']]
+    for c in spec.get('initContainers', []):
+        if c['name'] != 'register':
+            raise ValueError('unexpected-init-container')
+        c['image'] = images['runner']
+    return result
+
+
+def patch(d, target):
+    return [{'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/uid', 'value': d['metadata']['uid']},
+            {'op': 'test', 'path': '/metadata/resourceVersion', 'value': d['metadata']['resourceVersion']},
+            {'op': 'test', 'path': '/spec/template', 'value': d['spec']['template']},
+            {'op': 'replace', 'path': '/spec/template', 'value': target}]
+
+
+def send_patch(operations, dry_run=False):
+    args = ['-n', 'forgejo', 'patch', 'deployment', NAME, '--type=json', '--patch-file=/dev/stdin', '-o', 'json']
+    if dry_run:
+        args.append('--dry-run=server')
+    return json.loads(n.command(args, payload=json.dumps(operations).encode(), timeout=45))
+
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument('--proposal', type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument('--receipt', type=Path, required=True)
+    parser.add_argument('--baseline', type=Path, required=True, help='Private exact original template for guarded rollback')
+    modes = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
+    modes.add_argument('--apply', action='store_true')
+    modes.add_argument('--rollback', action='store_true')
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+    if args.receipt.exists():
+        raise SystemExit('Retain prior receipt; never replay an ambiguous change.')
+    p = json.loads(args.proposal.read_text())
+    record = {'proposal_id': p['proposal_id'], 'proposal_sha256': hashlib.sha256(args.proposal.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
+              'at': datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc).isoformat(), 'result': 'unverified',
+              'mode': 'rollback' if args.rollback else 'apply' if args.apply else 'dry-run'}
+    def save():
+        args.receipt.write_text(json.dumps(record, indent=2) + '\n')
+    try:
+        for name, expected in p['source_sha256'].items():
+            if Path(name).name != name or hashlib.sha256((HERE / name).read_bytes()).hexdigest() != expected:
+                raise ValueError('executor-changed')
+        original = json.loads(args.baseline.read_text())
+        if digest(original) != p['original_template_digest']:
+            raise ValueError('baseline-changed')
+        target = candidate(original, p['images'])
+        if digest(target) != p['candidate_template_digest']:
+            raise ValueError('candidate-changed')
+        d = deployment()
+        expected = p['candidate_template_digest'] if args.rollback else p['original_template_digest']
+        if d['metadata']['uid'] != p['deployment_uid'] or digest(d['spec']['template']) != expected:
+            raise ValueError('deployment-changed')
+        pod = ready_pod(d)
+        before_images = {c['name']: c['imageID'] for c in pod['status']['containerStatuses']}
+        if before_images != p['images'] or any(c['imageID'] != p['images']['runner'] for c in pod['status'].get('initContainerStatuses', [])):
+            raise ValueError('running-images-changed')
+        record['before'] = boundary(pod)
+        jobs = job_counts(); record['jobs_before'] = jobs
+        if any(jobs.values()):
+            raise ValueError('runner-not-idle')
+        if d['spec']['strategy'] != {'type': 'Recreate'}:
+            raise ValueError('rollout-strategy-changed')
+        # Read-only headroom check; Recreate and unchanged requests avoid surge.
+        nodes = json.loads(n.command(['get', 'nodes', '-o', 'json']))['items']
+        if len(nodes) != 1 or not any(a['address'] == '92.205.62.239' for a in nodes[0]['status']['addresses']):
+            raise ValueError('wrong-node')
+        record['node_cpu_allocatable'] = nodes[0]['status']['allocatable']['cpu']
+        description = n.command(['describe', 'node', nodes[0]['metadata']['name']]).decode()
+        section = description.split('Allocated resources:', 1)[1]
+        cpu = re.search(r'^\s*cpu\s+(\S+)\s+\((\d+)%\)', section, re.MULTILINE)
+        if not cpu:
+            raise ValueError('cpu-headroom-unverified')
+        record['node_cpu_requested'] = cpu.group(1)
+        record['node_cpu_requested_percent'] = int(cpu.group(2))
+        record['no_surge_or_request_increase'] = True
+        target = original if args.rollback else target
+        operations = patch(d, target)
+        dry = send_patch(operations, True)
+        if digest(dry['spec']['template']) != digest(target):
+            raise ValueError('server-defaulting-differs')
+        record['server_dry_run_verified'] = True
+        record['result'] = 'dry-run-verified'; save()
+        if not (args.apply or args.rollback):
+            print(json.dumps(record)); return
+        # Recheck immediately before mutation; a concurrent new job is an abort.
+        record['jobs_at_apply'] = job_counts()
+        if any(record['jobs_at_apply'].values()):
+            raise ValueError('runner-became-busy')
+        record['result'] = 'apply-outcome-unverified'; save()
+        changed = send_patch(operations)
+        record.update(result='rollout-started', generation=changed['metadata']['generation']); save()
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + 360
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            after = deployment()
+            try:
+                new = ready_pod(after)
+                if new['metadata']['uid'] != pod['metadata']['uid'] and digest(after['spec']['template']) == digest(target):
+                    break
+            except ValueError:
+                pass
+            time.sleep(3)
+        else:
+            raise ValueError('rollout-unverified')
+        record['after'] = boundary(new)
+        record['jobs_after'] = job_counts()
+        images = {c['name']: c['imageID'] for c in new['status']['containerStatuses']}
+        record['images_unchanged'] = images == p['images'] and all(c['imageID'] == p['images']['runner'] for c in new['status'].get('initContainerStatuses', []))
+        expected_other = 'reachable' if args.rollback else 'refused'
+        expected_listeners = p['original_listener_addresses_hex'] if args.rollback else ['0100007F:0947']
+        if (not record['after']['runner_loopback_ping'] or record['after']['other_pod_ping'] != expected_other or
+                record['after']['docker_listen_addresses_hex'] != expected_listeners or not record['images_unchanged']):
+            raise ValueError('native-boundary-unverified')
+        record['result'] = 'rollback-verified' if args.rollback else 'verified'; save()
+        print(json.dumps(record))
+    except Exception:
+        record['result'] = 'unverified'
+        record['raw_diagnostics_retained'] = False
+        save()
+        raise SystemExit('Runner change incomplete; inspect sanitized receipt and live state before retry.')
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    main()
diff --git a/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-operations.md b/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-operations.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c531ee08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-operations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# Runner Docker listener reduction
+
+FORGE6-RUNNER-LOOPBACK-001, under FORGE-WP-0006-T03 and CUST-WP-0080 G12.
+The October 13 inspection reproduced unauthenticated Docker ping from another
+pod. The live DinD listener covered all pod interfaces and the namespace had no
+NetworkPolicy. The declared runner consumer already used `127.0.0.1:2375`.
+[Docker's daemon guidance](https://docs.docker.com/engine/daemon/remote-access/)
+describes the security implications of network access to this control interface.
+
+The source change is railiance-apps `706461b`, in
+`manifests/forgejo-runner.yaml`. It binds Docker to loopback, changes DinD readiness
+to a local exec ping, and pins all container/init image references to the exact
+bytes already running. It changes no resources, registration, credential path,
+replica count, PVC or workflow. Existing `Recreate` strategy avoids a surge pod.
+
+Revision 1 only ran a preflight. That observed a dual-stack wildcard socket, so
+revision 2 binds rollback verification to the observed original addresses rather
+than assuming an IPv4 wildcard. Both proposals and preflight receipts remain.
+Revision 2's conditional server dry-run matched exactly; three patch-boundary
+tests passed. CPU requests were 3460m of 4 cores (86%); this change adds no requests.
+
+The executor rechecks zero running/queued tasks immediately before the conditional
+patch. This reduces but cannot atomically eliminate a concurrently arriving job.
+Actual activation found no running/queued tasks before or after. Generation 4
+became Ready with the original image digests. The runner's loopback ping passed;
+another Forgejo pod's ping was refused, and `/proc/net/tcp` showed only
+`0100007F:0947`. The executor exited 0. Receipt:
+`docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-activation.json`.
+
+The private original template is retained, mode 0600, in ignored
+`.private-backups/forge-runner-listener-20261013/original-template.json` and bound
+by digest. Rollback requires the exact candidate template and Deployment UID:
+
+```sh
+python3 docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/close_runner_docker_listener.py \
+  --proposal docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-proposal.json \
+  --baseline .private-backups/forge-runner-listener-20261013/original-template.json \
+  --receipt docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-rollback.json \
+  --rollback
+```
+
+Rollback restores the known prior exposure and is not automatic on a security
+verification failure. Abort owner: railiance-forge, with railiance-apps owning
+the source declaration. Never rerun apply because an observation timed out;
+inspect the exact running session and live template first. An unexpected template
+change refuses rollback instead of overwriting concurrent work. Reconcile source
+if rollback is actually used. No rollback was performed in acceptance.
+
+This closes the reproduced cross-pod Docker listener defect. Host-mode workflows
+still share a privileged runner boundary. Job identity, source/workflow authority,
+required checks, independent detection and credential isolation retain their
+existing FORGE-WP-0006 / RMGR-WP-0021 / CUST-WP-0080 gates.
diff --git a/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-proposal-revision-1.json b/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-proposal-revision-1.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..012088ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-proposal-revision-1.json
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{
+  "proposal_id": "FORGE6-RUNNER-LOOPBACK-001",
+  "revision": 1,
+  "deployment_uid": "89c8a056-bcae-4940-acdd-2eb2768e108a",
+  "original_template_digest": "e9dbbea8192bbf805f4f5838db844d40ac9d3c331739952fd3df412cce09bcca",
+  "candidate_template_digest": "1ded8e6fc18d5911bf95d518e19a43cf855802e77582ae04e624fd589937e130",
+  "images": {
+    "dind": "docker.io/library/docker@sha256:aa3df78ecf320f5fafdce71c659f1629e96e9de0968305fe1de670e0ca9176ce",
+    "runner": "code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner@sha256:5071e6832313bafe71577e05631bece88caff08fcfb372193e4a21941f4ed54b"
+  },
+  "source_sha256": {
+    "close_runner_docker_listener.py": "2ad56666680125f3e13dba4c47046618bb0ff0222d05dcae91699a204eae61e8",
+    "verify_receive_native.py": "c9120122c6f6f0b7c41fe4fa975e5a2a340e776885d852b861b8c13b7664adcd"
+  },
+  "authorization_ref": "canon/standards/build-mode-change-authorization_v0.1.md",
+  "target": "forgejo/Deployment forgejo-runner only; existing Docker and runner binaries pinned by digest",
+  "expected_result": "Runner remains Ready with same image bytes and loopback Docker ping; actual Docker listener is 127.0.0.1 only and a separate Forgejo pod cannot reach it. No running or queued tasks at apply. No replica, resource-request, credential or policy expansion.",
+  "diff_ref": "railiance-apps/manifests/forgejo-runner.yaml; exact conditional template patch and server dry-run",
+  "rollback": "Run same executor --rollback with this proposal, ignored original-template.json baseline and a new receipt, only against exact candidate template/UID. Restores original listener and image references; records restored exposure. No automatic rollback on a security-probe failure; abort owner reviews live state.",
+  "abort_owner": "railiance-forge, source owner railiance-apps; custodian-codex executes",
+  "cost_estimate_eur": 0,
+  "risk_estimate": "Brief runner unavailability during existing Recreate rollout and cold ephemeral Docker cache. Abort if running/queued work appears before apply. An external Docker consumer using the pod IP loses access; the declared runner uses loopback. A concurrent newly scheduled job remains a race; preserve any nonterminal outcome. Original private template retained for exact guarded rollback. No new resources/spend or data deletion requested.",
+  "scope_limit": "Reduces unauthenticated cross-pod Docker authority only. Host-mode jobs still share the privileged runner boundary; no full CI isolation, workflow authority, required-check or secret detection conformance inferred.",
+  "baseline_path": ".private-backups/forge-runner-listener-20261013/original-template.json"
+}
diff --git a/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-proposal.json b/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-proposal.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0ec49ef5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/forge-runner-loopback-proposal.json
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+{
+  "proposal_id": "FORGE6-RUNNER-LOOPBACK-001",
+  "revision": 2,
+  "deployment_uid": "89c8a056-bcae-4940-acdd-2eb2768e108a",
+  "original_template_digest": "e9dbbea8192bbf805f4f5838db844d40ac9d3c331739952fd3df412cce09bcca",
+  "candidate_template_digest": "1ded8e6fc18d5911bf95d518e19a43cf855802e77582ae04e624fd589937e130",
+  "images": {
+    "dind": "docker.io/library/docker@sha256:aa3df78ecf320f5fafdce71c659f1629e96e9de0968305fe1de670e0ca9176ce",
+    "runner": "code.forgejo.org/forgejo/runner@sha256:5071e6832313bafe71577e05631bece88caff08fcfb372193e4a21941f4ed54b"
+  },
+  "source_sha256": {
+    "close_runner_docker_listener.py": "3763a4f90ed964aad1bf5fc580318d891501dc6d908de8554a2cd7d35854e3e4",
+    "verify_receive_native.py": "c9120122c6f6f0b7c41fe4fa975e5a2a340e776885d852b861b8c13b7664adcd"
+  },
+  "authorization_ref": "canon/standards/build-mode-change-authorization_v0.1.md",
+  "target": "forgejo/Deployment forgejo-runner only; existing Docker and runner binaries pinned by digest",
+  "expected_result": "Runner remains Ready with same image bytes and loopback Docker ping; actual Docker listener is 127.0.0.1 only and a separate Forgejo pod cannot reach it. No running or queued tasks at apply. No replica, resource-request, credential or policy expansion.",
+  "diff_ref": "railiance-apps/manifests/forgejo-runner.yaml; exact conditional template patch and server dry-run",
+  "rollback": "Run same executor --rollback with this proposal, ignored original-template.json baseline and a new receipt, only against exact candidate template/UID. Restores original listener and image references; records restored exposure. No automatic rollback on a security-probe failure; abort owner reviews live state.",
+  "abort_owner": "railiance-forge, source owner railiance-apps; custodian-codex executes",
+  "cost_estimate_eur": 0,
+  "risk_estimate": "Brief runner unavailability during existing Recreate rollout and cold ephemeral Docker cache. Abort if running/queued work appears before apply. An external Docker consumer using the pod IP loses access; the declared runner uses loopback. A concurrent newly scheduled job remains a race; preserve any nonterminal outcome. Original private template retained for exact guarded rollback. No new resources/spend or data deletion requested.",
+  "scope_limit": "Reduces unauthenticated cross-pod Docker authority only. Host-mode jobs still share the privileged runner boundary; no full CI isolation, workflow authority, required-check or secret detection conformance inferred.",
+  "baseline_path": ".private-backups/forge-runner-listener-20261013/original-template.json",
+  "original_revision_sha256": "a2d29132c639f76bed0465a30119148d207f9242c29a2229a2e90cfc5a6aecac",
+  "original_listener_addresses_hex": [
+    "00000000000000000000000000000000:0947"
+  ],
+  "preparation_refinement": "Read-only preflight showed Docker wildcard binding in /proc/net/tcp6, so rollback verification binds the observed original listener instead of assuming an IPv4-only socket. No live mutation in revision 1.",
+  "source_commit": "railiance-apps@706461b"
+}
diff --git a/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/test_runner_listener.py b/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/test_runner_listener.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..029adbdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/changes/CUST-WP-0080/test_runner_listener.py
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+import copy
+import importlib.util
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+s = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('listener', Path(__file__).with_name('close_runner_docker_listener.py'))
+m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(s); s.loader.exec_module(m)
+
+
+class Tests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def fixture(self):
+        return {'metadata': {'labels': {'existing': 'preserved'}}, 'spec': {
+            'containers': [
+                {'name': 'dind', 'image': 'docker:27-dind', 'args': ['dockerd', '-H', 'tcp://0.0.0.0:2375', '--tls=false'],
+                 'readinessProbe': {'tcpSocket': {'port': 2375}, 'periodSeconds': 10},
+                 'resources': {}, 'securityContext': {'privileged': True}},
+                {'name': 'runner', 'image': 'runner:6.3.1', 'env': [{'name': 'DOCKER_HOST', 'value': 'tcp://127.0.0.1:2375'}]}],
+            'initContainers': [{'name': 'register', 'image': 'runner:6.3.1', 'env': [{'name': 'REGISTRATION_TOKEN', 'valueFrom': {'secretKeyRef': {'name': 'existing', 'key': 'token'}}}]}],
+            'volumes': [{'name': 'data', 'persistentVolumeClaim': {'claimName': 'existing'}}]}}
+
+    def test_changes_only_listener_probe_and_exact_images(self):
+        old = self.fixture(); frozen = copy.deepcopy(old)
+        new = m.candidate(old, {'dind': 'docker@sha256:existing', 'runner': 'runner@sha256:existing'})
+        self.assertEqual(old, frozen)
+        containers = new['spec']['containers']
+        self.assertEqual(containers[0]['args'][2], 'tcp://127.0.0.1:2375')
+        self.assertEqual(containers[0]['readinessProbe']['exec']['command'], m.PROBE)
+        self.assertNotIn('tcpSocket', containers[0]['readinessProbe'])
+        containers[0]['args'][2] = old['spec']['containers'][0]['args'][2]
+        containers[0]['readinessProbe'] = old['spec']['containers'][0]['readinessProbe']
+        for new_c, old_c in zip(containers, old['spec']['containers']):
+            new_c['image'] = old_c['image']
+        new['spec']['initContainers'][0]['image'] = old['spec']['initContainers'][0]['image']
+        self.assertEqual(new, old)
+
+    def test_refuses_unexpected_listener_probe_and_consumer(self):
+        for kind in ('listener', 'probe', 'consumer', 'container'):
+            with self.subTest(kind=kind):
+                value = self.fixture()
+                if kind == 'listener': value['spec']['containers'][0]['args'][2] = 'tcp://different:1234'
+                if kind == 'probe': value['spec']['containers'][0]['readinessProbe']['httpGet'] = {}
+                if kind == 'consumer': value['spec']['containers'][1]['env'][0]['value'] = 'tcp://other-host:2375'
+                if kind == 'container': value['spec']['containers'].append({'name': 'unknown'})
+                with self.assertRaises(ValueError): m.candidate(value, {'dind': 'pinned', 'runner': 'pinned'})
+
+    def test_patch_guards_exact_identity_revision_and_template(self):
+        old = {'metadata': {'uid': 'owned', 'resourceVersion': '12'}, 'spec': {'template': self.fixture()}}
+        patch = m.patch(old, {'desired': 'template'})
+        self.assertEqual([p['path'] for p in patch[:3]], ['/metadata/uid', '/metadata/resourceVersion', '/spec/template'])
+        self.assertTrue(all(p['op'] == 'test' for p in patch[:3]))
+        self.assertEqual(patch[2]['value'], old['spec']['template'])
+        self.assertEqual(patch[3], {'op': 'replace', 'path': '/spec/template', 'value': {'desired': 'template'}})
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__': unittest.main()
diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-12-netkingdom-security/sec-dsm-requirement-ledger.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-12-netkingdom-security/sec-dsm-requirement-ledger.json
index dc86d467..3bc868d8 100644
--- a/docs/evidence/2026-10-12-netkingdom-security/sec-dsm-requirement-ledger.json
+++ b/docs/evidence/2026-10-12-netkingdom-security/sec-dsm-requirement-ledger.json
@@ -965,7 +965,18 @@
         "G07",
         "G12"
       ],
-      "closure_evidence": []
+      "closure_evidence": [],
+      "assessment": {
+        "scope": "Existing Forgejo runner Docker network listener only; full production-grade CI/CD posture remains unverified",
+        "observed": "Unauthenticated Docker ping from a separate pod succeeded before repair. Exact same-image generation 4 now binds only 127.0.0.1:2375; local readiness/ping and runner heartbeat pass; peer-pod ping is refused. Resources and Recreate strategy preserved; zero queued/running jobs at change.",
+        "remaining": "Host-mode job privilege sharing, workflow authority, required checks, short-lived job identity, detection and response remain open. No complete DSM-CI-001 conformance inferred.",
+        "verification_evidence": [
+          "../2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-activation.json",
+          "../2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-heartbeat.json"
+        ],
+        "owner_task": "FORGE-WP-0006-T03; RMGR-WP-0021-T03/T04; CUST-WP-0080-T03",
+        "assessed_at": "2026-10-13"
+      }
     },
     {
       "id": "DSM-CI-002",
diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-gitlink-reconciliation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-gitlink-reconciliation.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9a397252
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-gitlink-reconciliation.json
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+{
+  "repository_id": 55,
+  "scope": "Read-only legacy-address reconciliation against current Forgejo directories and pinned commit reachability; no history scanning or URL edits.",
+  "observed": [
+    {
+      "submodule": "_issue-tracking/issue-facade",
+      "canonical_repository": "issue-facade",
+      "pinned_commit": "70d7ec0cdcbdff1a41cc420e2c939f855fe7787b",
+      "observation": "repository-missing"
+    },
+    {
+      "submodule": "capabilities/kaizen-agentic",
+      "canonical_repository": "kaizen-agentic",
+      "pinned_commit": "afc038d98b1efc5098f473e55fdddd2999f798ba",
+      "observation": "present commit-present 2"
+    },
+    {
+      "submodule": "capabilities/testdrive-jsui",
+      "canonical_repository": "testdrive-jsui",
+      "pinned_commit": "71a2a1e52c02d2fa6df2a4d5f5e808e17fe07221",
+      "observation": "present commit-present 1"
+    },
+    {
+      "submodule": "wiki",
+      "canonical_repository": "markitect-main.wiki",
+      "pinned_commit": "8818df03d3d7be241c144fd839d90c4d7c0ba20a",
+      "observation": "repository-missing"
+    }
+  ],
+  "interpretation": "All four URLs use the retired forge NodePort. Two pinned commits are reachable in current managed repositories; issue-facade and markitect-main.wiki directories are absent. URL rewriting alone cannot establish complete target coverage. No parent hook exception or repository retirement inferred."
+}
diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-heartbeat.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-heartbeat.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a5b7aa55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-heartbeat.json
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "result": "verified",
+  "observed_at": "2026-10-13T16:46:44.001648+00:00",
+  "runner": {
+    "runner_id": 2,
+    "last_online": 1791910005,
+    "online_age_seconds": 1
+  },
+  "scope": "Fresh Forgejo runner heartbeat after listener restriction; not workflow execution proof."
+}
diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-activation.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-activation.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..963abf50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-activation.json
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+{
+  "proposal_id": "FORGE6-RUNNER-LOOPBACK-001",
+  "proposal_sha256": "9bd1e9f98a99298c810a47e9dffa0316fe235eff53bcd6cfa0dd6391e094f853",
+  "at": "2026-10-13T16:42:40.576763+00:00",
+  "result": "verified",
+  "mode": "apply",
+  "before": {
+    "runner_loopback_ping": true,
+    "other_pod_ping": "reachable",
+    "docker_listen_addresses_hex": [
+      "00000000000000000000000000000000:0947"
+    ],
+    "pod_uid": "37cf553a-c8de-4ef1-ad53-ff5a96c49904"
+  },
+  "jobs_before": {
+    "tasks_running": 0,
+    "tasks_waiting": 0,
+    "jobs_running": 0,
+    "jobs_waiting": 0
+  },
+  "node_cpu_allocatable": "4",
+  "node_cpu_requested": "3460m",
+  "node_cpu_requested_percent": 86,
+  "no_surge_or_request_increase": true,
+  "server_dry_run_verified": true,
+  "jobs_at_apply": {
+    "tasks_running": 0,
+    "tasks_waiting": 0,
+    "jobs_running": 0,
+    "jobs_waiting": 0
+  },
+  "generation": 4,
+  "after": {
+    "runner_loopback_ping": true,
+    "other_pod_ping": "refused",
+    "docker_listen_addresses_hex": [
+      "0100007F:0947"
+    ],
+    "pod_uid": "5a0cc0e2-ba02-4f8c-852f-1e96543a174a"
+  },
+  "jobs_after": {
+    "tasks_running": 0,
+    "tasks_waiting": 0,
+    "jobs_running": 0,
+    "jobs_waiting": 0
+  },
+  "images_unchanged": true
+}
diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-preflight-r2.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-preflight-r2.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3525931f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-preflight-r2.json
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{
+  "proposal_id": "FORGE6-RUNNER-LOOPBACK-001",
+  "proposal_sha256": "9bd1e9f98a99298c810a47e9dffa0316fe235eff53bcd6cfa0dd6391e094f853",
+  "at": "2026-10-13T16:41:48.617164+00:00",
+  "result": "dry-run-verified",
+  "mode": "dry-run",
+  "before": {
+    "runner_loopback_ping": true,
+    "other_pod_ping": "reachable",
+    "docker_listen_addresses_hex": [
+      "00000000000000000000000000000000:0947"
+    ],
+    "pod_uid": "37cf553a-c8de-4ef1-ad53-ff5a96c49904"
+  },
+  "jobs_before": {
+    "tasks_running": 0,
+    "tasks_waiting": 0,
+    "jobs_running": 0,
+    "jobs_waiting": 0
+  },
+  "node_cpu_allocatable": "4",
+  "node_cpu_requested": "3460m",
+  "node_cpu_requested_percent": 86,
+  "no_surge_or_request_increase": true,
+  "server_dry_run_verified": true
+}
diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-preflight.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-preflight.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9e2cb293
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-preflight.json
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{
+  "proposal_id": "FORGE6-RUNNER-LOOPBACK-001",
+  "proposal_sha256": "a2d29132c639f76bed0465a30119148d207f9242c29a2229a2e90cfc5a6aecac",
+  "at": "2026-10-13T16:40:44.200829+00:00",
+  "result": "dry-run-verified",
+  "mode": "dry-run",
+  "before": {
+    "runner_loopback_ping": true,
+    "other_pod_ping": "reachable",
+    "docker_listen_addresses_hex": [
+      "00000000000000000000000000000000:0947"
+    ],
+    "pod_uid": "37cf553a-c8de-4ef1-ad53-ff5a96c49904"
+  },
+  "jobs_before": {
+    "tasks_running": 0,
+    "tasks_waiting": 0,
+    "jobs_running": 0,
+    "jobs_waiting": 0
+  },
+  "node_cpu_allocatable": "4",
+  "node_cpu_requested": "3460m",
+  "node_cpu_requested_percent": 86,
+  "no_surge_or_request_increase": true,
+  "server_dry_run_verified": true
+}
diff --git a/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-post-change-ci.json b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-post-change-ci.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..091acc69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-post-change-ci.json
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "run_id": 7251,
+  "status": 1,
+  "commit_sha": "706461b845086ee2df8ce9acae3dae7feebfffda",
+  "jobs": [
+    {
+      "id": 12657,
+      "job_id": "host-smoke",
+      "status": 1,
+      "task_id": 11945
+    },
+    {
+      "id": 12658,
+      "job_id": "container-smoke",
+      "status": 1,
+      "task_id": 11946
+    }
+  ],
+  "result": "verified",
+  "observed_at": "2026-10-13T16:48:22.057414+00:00",
+  "scope": "Actual existing source workflow after loopback restriction; host and container routing succeed. No secret-detection required-check or full CI security claim."
+}
diff --git a/docs/netkingdom-security-gaps.md b/docs/netkingdom-security-gaps.md
index 9d085931..6388cc35 100644
--- a/docs/netkingdom-security-gaps.md
+++ b/docs/netkingdom-security-gaps.md
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ No whole-estate SEC-DSM conformance or maturity level is claimed.
 | G09 | Rotation and revocation closure are incomplete: existing exposure rotation is founder-deferred, npm migration remains open, and five-field descriptions do not prove consumer adoption. | CUST-WP-0073-T05; SECRETS-WP-0006-T06; WARDEN-WP-0037-T03; RPF-WP-0035-T07 | For each relevant credential: new consumer accepted, old credential refused, copies reconciled; explicit DSM exception if still deferred |
 | G10 | Build-mode exceptions and close-down checklist do not uniformly contain DSM-EXC requirement, risk, compensating controls and review fields. | CUST-WP-0080-T03; existing security-close-down checklist and October 11 decisions | Requirement-level exception records with real approval references and revalidation; no invented approval or retroactive conformance |
 | G11 | Root recovery, independent custody and single-node resilience require scoped native proof. Old successful source preparation is insufficient. | WARDEN-WP-0027-T02; platform recovery records; RPF-WP-0015 residual | Fresh authorized scenario, off-host encrypted backup, independent recovery access, verified restore/return; honor build-mode single-holder decision |
-| G12 | CI credential authority, Kubernetes delivery-copy lifecycle and at-rest protection lack complete estate coverage. Forge metadata shows Actions enabled on 165 repositories and zero protected-branch rules; this does not establish workflow execution or required checks. | RPF-WP-0036/0044; railiance-forge; existing CCRs; CUST-WP-0080-T03 | Pipeline writer scope and job identity, per-store namespace/path isolation, refresh/deletion semantics, consumer adoption, independently governed encryption keys |
+| G12 | CI credential authority, Kubernetes delivery-copy lifecycle and at-rest protection lack complete estate coverage. The reproduced unauthenticated cross-pod Docker listener was closed on October 13; runner loopback connectivity and heartbeat remain healthy. Forge metadata shows Actions enabled on 165 repositories and zero protected-branch rules; this does not establish workflow execution or required checks. | RPF-WP-0036/0044; railiance-forge; existing CCRs; CUST-WP-0080-T03 | Pipeline writer scope and job identity, per-store namespace/path isolation, refresh/deletion semantics, consumer adoption, independently governed encryption keys |
 | G13 | PDP authenticity is separate from digest binding. FLEX-WP-0024 implements optional signatures; Secrets Engine still lacks independently anchored verification. Its reproduced redirect/proxy credential forwarding defects are now fixed in source (675 tests pass, one skipped). Native signer/consumer acceptance remains open. | SECRETS-WP-0014 T01 done; T02/T03 own trust admission, signed consumer enforcement and native verification. CUST-WP-0080-T03 tracks estate coverage | Independently trusted key or authenticated channel, configured producer, consumer verification, forged/altered/unknown-key/unsigned-downgrade refusals and key-rotation evidence |
 
 G01 source repair is deployed; authenticated preview/U08 remains open. G02 and G03 require existing owner
@@ -189,6 +189,21 @@ and private response gates remain open; this is no whole-estate closure.
 Evidence: Custodian `docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-expansion-final.json`
 and `forge-api-route-readiness.json`.
 
+2026-10-13 G12 runner boundary repaired: actual unauthenticated Docker ping
+from another pod reproduced the wildcard listener defect. Exact revision 2 of
+FORGE6-RUNNER-LOOPBACK-001 deployed source railiance-apps `706461b`, pinning the
+same running images and restricting Docker to loopback with local exec readiness.
+The conditional server dry-run and three patch tests pass. Generation 4 is Ready;
+loopback ping succeeds, other-pod ping refuses and the socket table contains only
+127.0.0.1:2375. Zero running/queued jobs were observed before/at apply and after;
+resource requests and Recreate strategy are unchanged (node CPU requests 86%).
+Fresh runner heartbeat is one second old. The original revision-1 preflight is
+retained; revision 2 corrects rollback verification for the observed dual-stack
+wildcard. Receipt: `docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-activation.json`.
+This closes the reproduced listener exposure only. Host jobs still share the
+privileged runner boundary; workflow authority, required detection checks and
+job-scoped credentials remain open in FORGE-WP-0006-T03 / RMGR-WP-0021-T03/T04.
+
 ## SEC DSM requirement coverage
 
 Each numbered requirement in these families is in scope for assessment. The
diff --git a/docs/security-close-down-checklist.md b/docs/security-close-down-checklist.md
index 956ef19a..18970f1d 100644
--- a/docs/security-close-down-checklist.md
+++ b/docs/security-close-down-checklist.md
@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ Add a row whenever you loosen, shortcut or leave unarmed a control. Remove nothi
 | 19 | Fresh informed-decision readback during a failed T05 rollout | Exact new trial INFD-WP-0009-T05/zlib85091-r1 approved under founder acceptance b5ce337c-5d7d-44fa-864d-706b54039f7c at2026-10-11T10:40:55Z. Image f558/source312ab97 verified Ready and actual canonical lifecycle HTTP200 at11:20:25Z, with latest database preserved. Proposed bounded30minute manual outage recovery was expressly accepted but never invoked; trial completed. Original proposed packet and pre-execution refusals remain immutable. [Outcome](evidence/2026-10-10-security-consolidation/zlib-native-completed/canonical-provider-verification.json). | Completed2026-10-11. Ordinary fresh-authority gate retained; no standing cached authority, autonomy promotion, other-trial or customer-production reuse. Any future standing recovery mechanism needs independently obtainable authority and separate review. | informed-decision, railiance-platform; Custodian tracks | 2026-10-11 |
 | 20 | Unattended origin publication for assembly-economics checkpoints | rein-aharness approach `assembly-checkpoint` pushes to `coulomb/assembly-economics` origin without an attended session, limited to `checkpoints/`, fast-forward only, rebase-once, never force (mirrors the FI brief grant). Founder-approved 2026-10-12: assembly-economics `docs/decisions/2026-10-12-checkpoint-origin-publication.md`. Runs on legacy profile-absent routing until 2026-12-31. | Publication through rein-aharness's governed publish lane with a per-repo, path-scoped grant and a governed execution profile; legacy route removed. | rein-aharness / assembly-economics | 2026-10-12 |
 | 21 | Independent repository secret detection and response (CUST-WP-0080 G07) | Scanner active on 22 workstation checkouts and 166 of 167 Forgejo repositories. Exact expansion of 143 targets passed native SSH scanner verdicts and final cleanup audit; one repository with four external submodules remains builtin-only. [Expansion evidence](evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-expansion-final.json). Template inheritance deployed October 13; its first rollout broke scanner custody permissions and is retained as failed. Recovery adds a pinned startup guard; two Kubernetes replacements (generations 13/14) pass 0755 custody and native clean/secret/quarantine/recovery checks. Thirty isolated configuration/lifecycle/rollback checks pass; authenticated production API/SSO/frontend acceptance remains open. Import/mirror fetch, historical/LFS/log/artifact coverage and private finding response remain open. [Recovery evidence](evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-custody-recovery-summary.json). | Complete FORGE-WP-0006 and RMGR-WP-0021: admit the full repository denominator, persist/reconcile hooks across creation and lifecycle, verify deployed write paths and unsupported input handling, and prove private detection-to-response with existing custody owners. Rejection alone does not revoke prior exposure; CUST-WP-0073-T05 remains founder-deferred. | railiance-forge, repo-manager; Custodian coordinates | 2026-10-13 |
+| 22 | CI runner authority boundary (CUST-WP-0080 G12) | Reproduced unauthenticated cross-pod Docker access is closed: same-image generation 4 listens on loopback only, local ping and heartbeat pass, peer pod denied. [Evidence](evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-activation.json). Host-mode jobs still share the privileged runner; no full isolation or job-scoped credential claim. | Complete native workflow authority, required detection checks, job identity/expiry and privileged runner trust boundaries under FORGE-WP-0006 / RMGR-WP-0021. Preserve loopback-only listener across deployments. | railiance-forge, railiance-enablement, railiance-platform; source railiance-apps | 2026-10-13 |
diff --git a/workplans/CUST-WP-0080-netkingdom-security-blueprint-and-gap-closure.md b/workplans/CUST-WP-0080-netkingdom-security-blueprint-and-gap-closure.md
index f0464921..492c413e 100644
--- a/workplans/CUST-WP-0080-netkingdom-security-blueprint-and-gap-closure.md
+++ b/workplans/CUST-WP-0080-netkingdom-security-blueprint-and-gap-closure.md
@@ -324,6 +324,23 @@ and session-revocation receipts remain required. Packet: Custodian
 `docs/attended-window/2026-10-13-forge-route-acceptance.md`; evidence:
 `docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-routes-preparation.json`.
 
+2026-10-13 G12 runner boundary repaired: actual unauthenticated Docker ping
+from another pod reproduced the wildcard listener defect. Exact revision 2 of
+FORGE6-RUNNER-LOOPBACK-001 deployed source railiance-apps `706461b`, pinning the
+same running images and restricting Docker to loopback with local exec readiness.
+The conditional server dry-run and three patch tests pass. Generation 4 is Ready;
+loopback ping succeeds, other-pod ping refuses and the socket table contains only
+127.0.0.1:2375. Zero running/queued jobs were observed before/at apply and after;
+resource requests and Recreate strategy are unchanged (node CPU requests 86%).
+Fresh runner heartbeat is one second old. Normal source push `706461b` triggered
+workflow 7251; host-smoke and container-smoke both succeeded. Receipt:
+`docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-post-change-ci.json`. The original revision-1 preflight is
+retained; revision 2 corrects rollback verification for the observed dual-stack
+wildcard. Receipt: `docs/evidence/2026-10-13-netkingdom-security/forge-runner-loopback-activation.json`.
+This closes the reproduced listener exposure only. Host jobs still share the
+privileged runner boundary; workflow authority, required detection checks and
+job-scoped credentials remain open in FORGE-WP-0006-T03 / RMGR-WP-0021-T03/T04.
+
 ## Verify native closure against every requirement
 
 ```task