feat(workplan): rescope CUST-WP-0067 to retire the local hub instance

Operator decision 2026-08-24: rather than making two hub instances coexist
safely, retire the second one. The local postgres+uvicorn instance is what
impersonates central and is redundant with ADR-010 decision 3 plus Repo
Manager's file-derived index.

With it gone, state-hub-primary binds 127.0.0.1:8000 unchanged and every
existing default becomes correct with no call-site edits.

Adds the cache-only recovery export (44 records) as the T05 source.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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codex 2026-08-24 22:24:01 +02:00
parent 9dbd1f7ff9
commit bd8f02b785
2 changed files with 1157 additions and 58 deletions

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@ -100,29 +100,46 @@ and print the resolved API base so the operator can see which instance answered.
defaults throughout, and prints `API base:` as its second line. Verified against
the live API.
## Eliminate the port collision
## Retire the local hub instance and the reverse-tunnel relay
```task
id: CUST-WP-0067-T02
status: todo
status: progress
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "4093e928-d752-5a91-96c3-2e80f0e1dac5"
```
Move `state-hub-primary` off `local_port: 8000` to `18000`, matching the port
map already reserved for the primary in the global agent instructions. Leave the
local cache on 8000 so nothing that currently resolves to it changes behaviour —
this step is deliberately non-breaking and must stay that way.
Decision, 2026-08-24: rather than making two hub instances coexist safely,
retire the second one. The local `postgres:16-alpine` + uvicorn instance is what
impersonates central, and it is redundant — `ADR-010` decision 3 already states
that local work requires no hub at all, and Repo Manager already maintains a
file-derived local index (`index_store.py`, `rmgr cache status` / `cache
rebuild`). Two caching layers exist and one of them is a database pretending to
be the primary.
Extend the `ops-bridge` duplicate-port guard so it rejects a `direction: local`
tunnel whose `local_port` is already bound by any listener, not only by another
bridge tunnel. The current guard could not have caught this.
With the local instance gone, `state-hub-primary` binds `127.0.0.1:8000`
unchanged and every existing `http://127.0.0.1:8000` default becomes correct
without editing a single call site. The port collision cannot recur because only
one process binds the port.
Acceptance: `state-hub-primary` binds `127.0.0.1:18000`; `[::1]:8000` no longer
serves a hub; `curl 127.0.0.1:18000/state/health` reports the central instance
and `curl 127.0.0.1:8000/state/health` reports the cache; the two return
different repo counts; the guard fails a synthetic config that reintroduces the
collision.
Retire the reverse tunnels too. `state-hub-railiance01` forwards a remote box's
`:18000` back to this workstation's `:8000`, so a remote agent following the
documented port map reaches the workstation rather than the primary — which on
railiance01 is its own machine. That topology assumed the workstation was the
hub; it has not been since the primary moved.
Sequence matters: export the cache-only records first, stop serving second,
discard the cache data only after T05 proves central holds everything.
Acceptance: no local hub process listening; `127.0.0.1:8000` answers from
central; MCP `dev-hub` resolves to central; reverse `state-hub-*` tunnels removed
or repointed; the cache-only recovery export is committed.
**Done (2026-08-24):** `docs/recovery/cache-only-repos-2026-08-24.json` captures
all 44 cache-only repository records with working-copy presence, classification
file presence, and HEAD sha — the recovery source for T05.
`ops-bridge` now pins local forwards to `127.0.0.1` (commit `2213847`), so a
contested port fails loudly instead of silently landing on `[::1]`.
## Make the hub target explicit and unspoofable
@ -133,19 +150,19 @@ priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "29977448-1a74-5a4d-b729-974c15b6bbde"
```
Remove the `http://127.0.0.1:8000` default from every call site that claims to
reach the primary: `custodian_cli.py:28`, `statehub_register.py:22`,
`repo_manager/cli.py:56,405`, `repo_manager/commands/registrar_reconcile.py:410`.
Retiring the local instance removes today's impersonator but not the ability for
a future one to appear. Give the hub an instance identity it can assert — role
served from the health or summary endpoint — and make
`registrar-reconcile --confirm-primary` refuse anything that does not assert
`primary`.
A default that silently resolves to a cache is worse than a missing one. Give
the hub an identity it can assert — instance role served from the health or
summary endpoint — and make `registrar-reconcile --confirm-primary` refuse to
run against anything that does not assert `primary`. Confirming against a cache
is a false green and is the specific failure that let this run for seven weeks.
`_check_primary` currently asserts only `status == ok` and `db == connected`.
Both instances passed it. It is a liveness check wearing an authority check's
name, and it is what allowed a cache to certify itself as the registrar.
Acceptance: `--confirm-primary` against the cache exits non-zero with a message
naming the instance it reached; against central it succeeds; no code path
reaches a hub without an explicitly resolved target.
Acceptance: `--confirm-primary` fails against a non-primary instance and names
what it reached; a hub reports its role; `statehub status` shows role alongside
the API base.
## Give Repo Manager a real onboarding write path
@ -156,21 +173,21 @@ priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "ffa141d5-331d-543d-8b87-516f27973a22"
```
Repo Manager owns `managed_repos` as `file-derived` and has no command for it.
Add onboarding that follows ADR-010 decision 5: write `.repo-classification.yaml`
in the target repository, commit, push, and have central derive the record.
Central must not accept a push of derived state, so the command's job is to make
the source file correct and reachable, then trigger and verify derivation.
Repo Manager owns `managed_repos` as `file-derived` in
`hub-record-authority.yaml` and exposes no command for it. Add onboarding that
follows `ADR-010` decision 5: write `.repo-classification.yaml` in the target
repository, commit, push, and have central derive the record. Central must not
accept a push of derived state, so the command makes the source file correct and
reachable, then triggers and verifies derivation.
Resolve the bootstrap gap explicitly — central derives from repositories it
already knows about, so a never-registered repository is never scanned. The
onboarding path must be able to introduce a repository central has not seen.
Acceptance: onboarding a fresh repository from the workstation produces a
central record with no manual step; re-running is idempotent; the cache is not
written directly.
Acceptance: onboarding a fresh repository from the workstation produces a central
record with no manual step; re-running is idempotent.
## Backfill the 44 cache-only registrations
## Onboard the 44 cache-only repositories to central
```task
id: CUST-WP-0067-T05
@ -179,22 +196,21 @@ priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "078159e6-5ecd-5f9d-b3ec-1fabf60955f7"
```
Runs only after T02T04; backfilling before the target is unambiguous refills
the cache. Drive the 43 on-disk repositories through the T04 path. Nine lack
`.repo-classification.yaml` (`binky-control`, `clay-borg`,
`direkt-vermittlung-de`, `polycode-sim`, `railiance-telemetry`, `ralph-workplan`,
`rein-openweights`, `testdrive-jsui`, `timeline-svg`) and need one authored with
the owner rather than guessed — classification is not mechanical, per
`CUST-WP-0065-T01`. Push `soul-frame` and `rein-openweights` first.
Runs after T04. With the cache retired this is no longer a convergence of two
hubs — it is onboarding 44 repositories to central from their files, which is
T04 applied to the recovery export.
`agent-harness` has no working copy: decide restore-from-remote or drop, and
record the decision. Do not preserve it as a hub-only record — that is the
ADR-001 violation ADR-010 calls out.
Ten of the 44 lack `.repo-classification.yaml` and need one authored with the
owner rather than guessed; classification is not mechanical, per
`CUST-WP-0065-T01`. Push `soul-frame` and `rein-openweights` first — both are
ahead of their remote, and central derives from what it can fetch.
`agent-harness` has no working copy: decide restore-from-remote or drop and
record it. Do not preserve it as a hub-only record.
Acceptance: central and cache repo counts converge; the cache-only set is empty
or every remainder has a written disposition.
Acceptance: every record in the recovery export exists on central or carries a
written disposition; only then may the local cache database be discarded.
## Correct the ADR-010 repo-record framing
## Correct the ADR-010 framing and record the retirement
```task
id: CUST-WP-0067-T06
@ -203,16 +219,22 @@ priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "007bfcf1-3b17-5d4a-b16a-b80ebf273934"
```
ADR-010 decision 2 says a divergent database is a merge problem and a stale
cache is a refresh problem. For `managed_repos` neither holds: the gap is a
strict subset in the cache's favour, and refreshing destroys rather than
reconciles. Record the third shape — cache-only records whose authoritative
source exists but was never introduced to central — and state that its remedy is
re-derivation from source, not refresh and not merge.
`ADR-010` decision 2 says a divergent database is a merge problem and a stale
cache is a refresh problem. For `managed_repos` neither held: the gap was a
strict subset in the cache's favour, and refreshing would have destroyed rather
than reconciled. Record that third shape — cache-only records whose
authoritative source exists but was never introduced to central — with
re-derivation from source as its remedy.
Also correct the implicit assumption that the ADR's own remediation happened.
The measurement stands; the fix did not land, and the ADR reads as though it did.
Record the mechanical cause, which the ADR observed but did not diagnose: an
unbound `ssh -L` binds every loopback family, so the IPv4 bind losing to a local
listener still leaves a working `[::1]` forward and `ExitOnForwardFailure` never
fires. The ADR treated the shared port as the hazard; the missing bind address
was what made it silent.
Acceptance: ADR-010 revised with a superseding note dated and linked to this
workplan; the port-collision remediation recorded as an outcome rather than an
observation.
Note also that ADR-010 reads as though its remediation landed. It did not — the
condition it measured was still live seven weeks later. Supersede decision 2 for
this record class and record the local-instance retirement as the outcome.
Acceptance: ADR-010 revised with a dated superseding note linked to this
workplan; `ops-bridge` and the port map documented as the structural fix.