Checked the repo rather than trusting the search snippet. Confirms the
capability claims (MIT, 67 rules, 54 of them security, Z3 isolation proofs,
SAFE/BREAKING policy-diff for CI gating, pytest plugin, PG 15-17) and corrects
the auto-fixable count from 20 to 19.
It is also 26 stars and self-described beta. That does not change the
recommendation to adopt the approach, but it does change the recommendation to
adopt the tool: it is a supply-chain decision, not a free win. pgTAP is
long-established and carries no such caveat. Saying so now is cheaper than
having a reviewer discover it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four search-and-read passes against AWS Well-Architected SaaS Lens, Azure
Architecture Center, OWASP, the OpenID Foundation, and PostgreSQL practitioner
literature. Each digest holds one of our ladders against outside practice and
lists its sources.
Headline: the draft-1 -> draft-2 reframe is corroborated. Microsoft states
"isolation is a spectrum, not a discrete property" and derives our E/P coupling
independently. The shape is sound; the details are not.
Five corrections draft-2 needs:
- E3 overclaims. Any session can re-SET the GUC, so RLS is strong against a
forgotten predicate and useless against SQL injection or a compromised
process. The ADR says "the application cannot trivially route around" - the
exact overclaim it prohibits elsewhere.
- The pooling claim in section 16 is backwards. Transaction-scoped SET LOCAL is
what makes E3 safe under pooling; statement-level pooling is what serves
other tenants' rows, only under production concurrency.
- E3 layers on E2 rather than superseding it.
- Placement cannot be expressed per tenant, but the commercial section requires
exactly that - a tier bought by some tenants puts a service at two P levels
at once, which the posture vector cannot represent.
- FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY is mandatory: ADR-0001 already established that our
migration role owns the tables it creates, so it would silently bypass every
policy.
Also: pgTAP and pgrls make the E3 evidence artifact far cheaper than assumed;
OWASP publishes a Multi-Tenant Security Cheat Sheet we reference nowhere; our
tenant-boundary gap is BOLA, OWASP API1, top of that list since it launched;
AuthZEN 1.0 went Final in January and flex-auth is pre-standard; and no plane
covers tenant offboarding, which OWASP makes a MUST.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- umbrella term 'work record'; intake kind 'intake item'
- any repo file is a work-record source; generated per-repo index
(transclusion-style, markitect scope) replaces separate authored file
- engagements are their own kind
- ordering simple (lane+priority+age); deps optional; WSJF optional,
situational overload-triage only
- issue-core repositioned as third-party tracker connector (UUID<->
external id, boundary sync), out of the internal loop
- fresh intake entity in state-hub; suggestions to read-only legacy
- budgets hybrid: repo budgets.yaml + frontmatter override + global
best-guess default; enforcement programmatic, never agentic
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
